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PREFACE
The Center for Labor-Management Policy Studies at the City Uni
versity of New York hosted a year-long series of seminars during the
academic year 1989-90 that brought together academics, union leaders,
government officials, business executives, and graduate fellows at the
Center to discuss and analyze the relationship between economic
restructuring and industrial relations. In the fall of 1990 the Center
hosted a conference at Princeton University, which included all of the
seminar participants and an array of scholars and practitioners who
have worked on understanding and shaping the highly competitive
economic environment in which most organizations find themselves.
Complete lists of seminar presenters and conference participants are
included in Appendix I and Appendix II, respectively. This volume
grew out of the seminars and conference sponsored by the Center.
Bruce Herman and I, both graduate fellows at the Center during this
period, organized the seminar series and conference under the guid
ance of Professor Seamus O'Cleireacain, then Assistant Director of the
Center now at the Ford Foundation. We received financial, intellectual,
and editing assistance from Susan Houseman, Allan Hunt, and Judy
Gentry of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. We
were also supported in our efforts by the Centers director, Victor Gotbaum, and deputy director, Richard Styskal. Richard died tragically in
the summer of 1990. All of us at the Center miss Richard's guidance
and good humor.
In early 1991 Bruce Herman became President of the Garment
Industry Development Corporation (GIDC) of New York, where he has
put into practice many of the ideas that he writes about in the chapter
on the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. I assumed Richard Styskal's
position as deputy director of the Center.
In any edited collection of works there inevitably are differences in
writing styles and practice. To the greatest extent possible, we have
sought to smooth them out so that the reader can extract the greatest
amount of information from each of the cases. In the introduction I
have briefly summarized the case studies and analyses, and have pro
vided an executive summary of the key conclusions that follow from
the papers. A bibliography is provided for readers interested in follow
ing up on the many subjects that are raised in this collection.
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Introduction
Stephen R. Sleigh
City University of New York

Over the last 20 years, global competition, product obsolescence,
and excess capacity in traditional industries have brought about pro
nounced changes in the structure of the world economy. In response to
these changes, unions, corporations, and governments have struggled
to develop economic policies that will ensure adequate returns on
investment, create or save jobs, and anchor industries within national
borders. The purpose of this book is to review innovative responses to
economic restructuring that have involved the joint efforts of unions,
corporations, and government.
The record of these initiatives forms a mosaic of varied responses
and results. Through a year-long series of seminars conducted by the
Center for Labor Management Policy Studies of the City University of
New York, culminating in a conference in the fall of 1990, analyses of
efforts were presented where workers and their unions, businesses and
government at the local, regional, or state level, have worked together
to develop economic restructuring processes. These efforts include
case studies from Western Europe, as well as detailed examination of
U.S. examples, particularly state-level efforts from Michigan, Massa
chusetts, and Pennsylvania. The analyses emphasize the role of indus
trial relations in these processes. Detailing the seminars and the
conference, this book serves as a resource for unions, businesses, and
government on current economic restructuring activities and as a sur
vey of current thinking about the process of economic restructuring,
particularly the often neglected role workers and their unions play in
this process. 1
The wide-ranging economic shocks of technological change and
global competition have produced fundamental changes in the past two
decades. In the steel industry alone, 460,000 American jobs were lost
during the 1980s, cutting the membership of the United Steel workers
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of America in half. In the automobile industry, General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler all experienced reductions in the workforce and market
share throughout the 1980s, and judging by recent announcements by
GM that another 74,000 jobs will be cut over the next three years, the
trend will continue. These changes have altered the respective roles of
workers and their unions, management, and government in economic
development. As the response time to these continuing changes short
ens, considerable experimentation is underway in Western Europe and
the United States to find the proper mix of employee involvement in
managerial decisionmaking and government support for restructuring
efforts. No clear paradigm has yet emerged that would replace the tra
ditional adversarial relationships between labor, management, and
government which in many respects have been institutionalized.2
In the United States, the importance of developing a coherent
national economic restructuring strategy is becoming increasingly
clear. President Bush's trip to Japan in January 1992 with a cadre of
influential American CEOs highlighted the lack of a national strategy
beyond the need to open up Asian markets to American products. The
cases in this book point to a general direction for plotting a policy that
is responsive to the highly competitive global economy in which enter
prises large and small now operate.3
The 1989-90 seminar series brought together practitioners to report
on and critically assess the reciprocal relationships among technologi
cal change, economic restructuring, and industrial relations. During the
course of the project, three main issues were examined: the extent to
which work organization and market share or competitive position are
influenced by technical innovation; how these changes are conditioned
by government policies; and the role collective bargaining relation
ships between unions and companies play in the economic restructur
ing process. The answers provided in these case studies are essentially
qualitative judgments for which the analysis of cross-national experi
ences is of considerable value. The comparative perspective allows one
to identify those patterns that are specific to particular conditions
within and between nations and regions, and those that form a more
universal set of relationships. The case studies from Western Europe
and the United States provide a context for two "thought" pieces, one
by Wolfgang Streeck and one by Charles Sabel, on the implications
these efforts have for industrial relations.
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While the exact mix of the respective roles of labor, management,
and government varied in the cases examined, the project concentrated
on efforts in which these three sectors are working cooperatively to
address economic restructuring. More specifically, the project focused
on collaborative efforts to expand and deepen market share through
more diversified, higher value-added and customized products, and the
reorganization strategies initiated to achieve these goals. The seminars
primarily, though not exclusively, dealt with unionized workforces in
manufacturing industries.
In both pieces by Charles Sabel and by Wolfgang Streeck the
emphasis is on the importance of taking into account an institutional
perspective of the labor market. The social dimension of economic
restructuring is in part based upon the collection of institutional com
petencies that make, in specific conditions, positive contributions to
competitive market performance. The case studies, which are briefly
described below, sought to identify what specific conditions and insti
tutional mechanisms facilitated successful economic restructuring.
Case Studies of Economic
Restructuring—European Experience
The first three case studies are from Western Europe. They were
selected for their diversity of experience and for their emphasis on dif
ferent aspects of the economic restructuring process. The three cases,
from the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, from Andalusia, Spain, and
of the Auroux laws in France, are similar to the United States in that in
each case unions at the national level are relatively weak.
Making transnational comparisons is always a difficult task, but we
believe that the cases selected have important lessons for American
policymakers because the problems faced in each case were roughly
comparable. During the course of the seminar series we also hosted
sessions on German codetermination and Swedish social democracy.
We elected to include the less well-known examples from Italy, Spain,
and France even though many people, particularly those in the labor
movement, aspire to the high level of coordination that has prevailed
between business, labor, and government in Germany and Sweden. It
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bears noting, however, that the paper by Wolfgang Streeck on training
as a strategic variable in economic restructuring borrows heavily from
his experience and understanding of the German system.
The first case study, by Bruce Herman, analyzes the successful eco
nomic development of Emilia-Romagna, Italy. As explained by Her
man, Emilia-Romagna has undergone a dramatic transformation in the
past 50 years, moving from fascist domination and civil war to a situa
tion of broad economic well-being and 40 years of government by the
Italian left in the region.
In the 1950s, the Emilian economy was based primarily on agricul
tural production. What manufacturing did exist was concentrated in a
small number of very large, vertically integrated firms. As manufactur
ing grew, there was a decline in large firms and a proliferation of small
firms. Initially, the small firms of Emilia-Romagna served large enter
prises as dependent subcontractors. To overcome the negative conse
quences of this situation, small shops learned to diversify their client
base through horizontal linkages to other firms. Stronger commercial
linkages reinforced the tendency of industry sectors to cluster, further
stimulating the consolidation of industrial districts comprised of firms
involved in different stages of production.
Supporting industrial restructuring in Emilia-Romagna is a system
of business services rooted in public/private cooperation. At first,
industry experts were provided by trade associations to take advantage
of appropriate economies of scale and cut overhead costs for member
firms. Following the lead of the trade associations, regional and local
governments became actively involved in economic restructuring, as
has the trade union movement in Emilia-Romagna.
Local unions, particularly the FIOM (the metalworkers union), have
concentrated on using the collective bargaining process to broaden par
ticipation and gain more autonomy within the process of production.
Beginning in 1987 the FIOM began to sign a series of agreements
aimed at establishing more participatory cooperation through grouporiented work organization. Still in its initial stages, the FIOM is mak
ing sure that the shop floor is not overlooked. The Emilian case shows
the importance of strategic alliances between firms and the role that
government and organized labor can play in fostering these connec
tions.
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The second European case, by Michael Barzelay, is from Andalusia,
Spain. The focus of this paper is entirely different from any of the oth
ers in this collection in that the role workers or their unions play is tan
gential to the economic restructuring process. What Barzelay does
develop is a detailed rendering of the difficulties one public sector
manager encounters as he tries to bring about a shift in the organization
of an entire industry in his region. The role of a dedicated public
administrator is clearly critical to success in this case, and a component
that is often overlooked when policymakers think up economic devel
opment strategy.
The case of Andalusia's attempts to revitalize the declining marble
industry in this poor southeastern state in Spain starts with the end of
the Franco era in the mid-1970s and the dawning of democracy in
Spain. As a result of the reconfiguration of political boundaries after
Franco, a series of autonomous states was created. Without a history of
local self-government, the patterns of government assistance and regu
lation remained to be defined in Andalusia. The principal activities
Barzelay recorded from 1983 to 1988 were those of the director of the
Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), which was
charged with instigating planning efforts, identifying the activities and
tasks that must be carried out for planning to be productive, inducing
participants to understand the competitive environment, insisting that
joint actions which create common competitive advantages be con
ceived and undertaken, and mobilizing resources for these individual
and joint actions that fit the mutually agreed upon plan. The industry
most in need of IPIA's assistance was the centuries old marble quarry
ing in Andalusia.
In 1983 nearly 70 percent of the marble extracted from the indus
try's quarries was sold in unfinished or semifinished form to manufac
turers in other regions. The marble industry was characterized at that
time by small, family-owned quarries that typically employed only a
handful of workers, and those often only on a seasonal basis. Lacking
modern technology and equipment, miners relied on the same tech
niques of extraction that had been used for generations, and local fabri
cators produced only artisanal goods.
The marble industry of the communities of Macael County, which
employed 7,000, was in need of strategic realignment: jobs were being
lost to more sophisticated operations; existing jobs were unsteady and,
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for the most part, poorly paid After initiating an action plan in 1985
with the support of the mine owners and workers, the industry began to
turn around. By 1987, only 30 percent of the marble extracted was sold
in unfinished form, while the remainder was processed locally into
higher value-added finished products.
Barzelay's case shows how social change and strategic planning,
instigated and coordinated by a regional governmental institution, can
dramatically improve the performance and competitive capacities of a
traditional industry, even in one of Europe's most underdeveloped
regions. While the case does not focus on industrial relations as such, it
does offer a richly detailed analysis of the kinds of problems that a
public administrator can expect to face when taking on the process of
economic restructuring.
The third European case is also distinctive. In this piece Bernard
Brown looks at the Auroux laws in France. Working from a new-found
position of strength after the election of Mitterrand, the French labor
movement worked closely with Socialist Minister of Labor, Jean Aur
oux, to develop "new rights for workers." These efforts culminated in a
series of four laws enacted in 1982 that were intended to give workers
a direct say in the decisionmaking process of all enterprises employing
more than 200 people. The intentions of the Socialist government and
French labor movement, to create a new form of labor-management
relations system through public action, were not realized, according to
Brown. The most fundamental change seems to have occurred within
management, described by Brown as a "cultural revolution that has
taken place within the enterprise" in support of participatory programs.
Brown's brief analysis of the Auroux laws points to an ongoing
debate among scholars of industrial relations in the United States as to
the benefit of employee participation schemes. As one part of competi
tiveness strategy, employee participation in decisionmaking has gained
widespread support in both unionized and nonunion organizations in
the United States. In 1978, the United States went so far as to adopt the
Labor-Management Cooperation Act, whose main goal is "to improve
communication between representatives of labor and management."
Other steps along the same lines have included the creation of the
Bureau of Labor Management Relations and Cooperative Programs
within the Department of Labor and various efforts at improving qual
ity service through cooperation in federal programs such as at the Fed-
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eral Aviation Administration. Brown's analysis of the French
experience casts doubt on the way in which the participatory process
was conceived and operationalized in France, a country with a rela
tively weak labor movement. The implications for unions in the United
States are sobering and are reflected in the lack of a participation pol
icy at the AFL-CIO.
Case Studies of Economic
Restructuring—U.S. Experience
The first case study from the United States, by Peter Lazes,
describes the collaborative efforts of New York State and Cornell Uni
versity's Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) to
keep a Buffalo windshield wiper blade company operating. Lazes
worked closely with the company, Trico Products, and the union,
United Automobile Workers, from 1985 to 1987 in trying to find inno
vative solutions to the competitive challenge posed by the option to
produce Trico's main product in Mexico at a fraction of the labor cost
in the Buffalo plant.
The odds were long that the difference between costs in the Mexican
plant—a "maquiladora," or assembly plant, on the U.S.-Mexico border
and the Buffalo plant could be significantly reduced: the prevailing
wage in Mexico was $1.20 an hour versus $12.50 in Trico's Buffalo
plant An independent analysis by a well-known management consult
ing firm showed that labor costs in Buffalo would have to be cut 30
percent in order to remain competitive with the cost of producing in
Mexico. In early 1985 the state's Urban Development Corporation
agreed with Trico's management that the advantages of producing in
Mexico were too great to overcome. But Lazes and the UAW regional
director persuaded the skeptics to give PEWS and the workers in the
plant some time to do their own analysis of possible cost savings from
restructuring the work process.
Working together with Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and PEWS,
union members and production management came up with a plan that
exceeded the cost savings projected for the Mexican plant. The in-plant
cost study teams, according to Lazes, created a new sense of together-
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ness among workers and between labor and management. While Trico's original projections were to close the Buffalo production
facility—and in the process eliminate between 1,400 and 2,000 wellpaid union jobs—the in-plant teams projected that half of the work
force could be saved. In what Lazes described as a bittersweet out
come, despite the concerted efforts to keep all production based in
Buffalo, Trico's management still moved some production to Mexico.
The Trico case presented by Lazes shows both what is possible through
joint labor, business, and state efforts, and the limitations of these
efforts. The inability of the state or the union to persuade Trico to
approve their proposed improvements was an agonizing difficulty that
could not be overcome.
Robert Coy, director of the Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation
for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, along with Saul Rubenstein
and Mike Shay, present the second U.S. case study by describing the
state's Manufacturing Innovation Network Initiatives (MAIN) projects
in the Lehigh Valley. At present the MAIN projects involve four differ
ent industries: the plastics industry in northwestern Pennsylvania; the
metalworking and machine tool industries in the southwestern part of
the state; and the apparel industry in the Lehigh Valley. The basic
approach of the MAIN projects is to work with clusters or groups of
firms rather than trying to provide assistance in a piecemeal one-onone fashion.
In order to develop the appropriate response, all MAIN projects
begin with a strategic audit of the industry, which is used to gather
information and to begin to define a constituency of firms. In turn,
steering committees are established to organize the projects, while the
specific industry needs identified are used to form working groups
charged with coordinating and developing programs to address restruc
turing problems. Within the Lehigh Valley there are over 200 apparel
firms with over 15,000 employees. Pursuing a participatory restructur
ing approach, which included representatives from business, labor, and
government, the Lehigh Valley Project Steering Committee identified
issues ranging from labor force problems, training, management sys
tems and technology, industrial structure and linkages, and marketing
and sourcing concerns. While these initiatives have not reached the
implementation stage, this case stresses that the MAIN projects bode
well for continued cooperative efforts.
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In the third case study from the United States, Mike Schippani gives
an inside account of the Michigan Modernization Project, which was
created by Governor Blanchard in 1984 to bring together labor, busi
ness, and the state in reversing the declining competitiveness of Michi
gan's industrial base. The state's plan, writes Schippani, was threefold.
The first part of Michigan's modernization strategy was a vision of
Michigan as an international center for the development of manufac
turing technology. The goal was to build institutions that would be in
the business of developing and applying technology to the manufactur
ing base of Michigan. Two institutions were created to achieve this
goal: the Industrial Technology Institute and the Michigan Moderniza
tion Service—a sort of industrial extension program.
The second part of the strategy was the creation of innovation capi
tal to fill the gaps in financing available to newer firms or nontraditional projects. To accomplish this goal the state created the Michigan
Strategic Fund.
The third part of the strategy centered around workforce learning
and workplace relations. The keys to this aspect of the strategy, Schip
pani argues, were the education and training of the workforce and
innovations in labor-management relations. Bringing together
resources from the state's Department of Education and Department of
Labor, the Michigan Modernization Plan was able to provide technical
services to hundreds of firms.
While evidence on the program's effectiveness is still under evalua
tion, Schippani notes the importance of involving business, organized
labor, and the government in joint collaborative efforts. As the threepart Michigan strategy grew and matured, it became clearer that early,
proactive union involvement was critical to the success of maintaining
industrial competitiveness. The elections in the fall of 1990, which dis
placed Governor Blanchard, occasioned a fundamental shift in direc
tion in economic development strategy in Michigan described by
Schippani.
The final case study from the United States, presented by Frank
Emspak, then director of the Massachusetts Center for Applied Tech
nology, further emphasizes the need for inclusive, participatory
restructuring. Emspak writes that the Center for Applied Technology
concentrates on skills-based automation (user-driven design) as a key
component of shop-floor reorganization. Utilizing the skills-based
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approach, the Center for Applied Technology has sought to involve
blue-collar workers in technology development and deployment strate
gies. To date the Center's efforts have been modest, impacting only a
handful of firms. Nonetheless, Emspak stresses that worker-inclusive
needs assessment creates a situation whereby the analysis of the prob
lem helps build consensus for possible solutions. As in Michigan, the
defeat of a liberal Democratic governor in the 1990 elections brought
about significant changes in policy direction away from collaborative
efforts involving business, unions, and government as equal partners to
the traditional model of direct aid on an ad hoc basis from government
to industry.
Economic Restructuring
and Industrial Relations: Two Views

The two papers that conclude the volume provide provocative anal
yses of economic restructuring and the emerging patterns of industrial
relations. The two authors have written extensively on these and
related topics during the 1980s and open up the debate on future eco
nomic restructuring policy.
Charles Sabel writes of the relationship between international com
petition, the organization of production, and labor-management rela
tions. Pointing out that changing interfirm relationships are driving an
ongoing industrial restructuring, Sabel examines how the reorganiza
tion of production challenges the labor movement by creating new
demands on behalf of both management and the rank-and-file.
Sabel links the development of unstable market conditions, and the
subsequent need to respond through more flexible production, with the
difficulties national unions are having in maintaining cohesion and
membership. He argues that economic restructuring is creating a new
set of production relations as the demise of stable mass markets under
mines industrial organization based on the mass production of stan
dardized commodities. The mass production regime, predicated on
mass consumer markets, dedicated machinery, and semiskilled work
ers and dependent on captive subsuppliers, is being superseded by a
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more fluid, increasingly differentiated, system of production, accord
ing to Sabel.
In this economic environment, firms are forced to establish more
interdependent relationships with subsuppliers and seek cooperative
joint ventures with other firms to keep pace with changes in key tech
nologies. This type of industrial configuration requires considerable
workforce reskilling as rigid, long-run, standard product technologies
are replaced by more flexible, short-run, computer-enhanced equip
ment. Also present is the potential for a more decentralized system of
control, within the chain of production, between the various units con
tributing to the final product, and in labor-management relations.
In terms of labor-management relations, the demands for increased
flexibility have led to a situation where local agreements are circum
venting national contracts. Across Europe and the United States Sabel
notes the emergence of local-level agreements, which he characterizes
as the establishment of "jointness" rather than cooperation. That is, the
responsibilities of labor and management became more intertwined,
blurring the distinction between roles that requires joint action. More
over, there is evidence of a shift toward decentralized bargaining, even
where it is not officially sanctioned by national unions. As the cases
show, these developments are rooted in the changing system of produc
tion.
Wolfgang Streeck's paper concludes the book by specifying an insti
tutional mechanism of the sort that Sabel is describing in a more gen
eral fashion. Streeck focuses primarily on the value of union
involvement in vocational training. In his view, skill formation is the
key to enhancing productivity, and unions are well positioned to pro
vide common linkage across firms to promote high standards of train
ing. Streeck is clearly influenced by the successful German model of
apprenticeship training, but he makes the case that the same logic that
has brought business, labor, and government together in Germany may
apply to other industrial countries as well. Supported by public policies
that help reduce the incentive for employers to look for a free ride from
someone else's training, unions may develop an active commitment to
enforce high standards of training stringently, in the interest of high
wages, secure employment, and a non-Taylorist organization of work.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
"If we don't develop a national program in the next five years, it's
going to be impossible for us to be serious industrial contenders by the
year 2000. I'm advocating for us collectively—government and indus
try—to accept that there is a problem and that we have to come up with
responsible solutions." So said Andrew Grove, president and chief
executive officer of silicone chip manufacturer Intel Corporation in
1990.4 We concur with this sentiment The cases presented show, in
varied ways, how the third social partner—workers and their unions—
can contribute to the economic restructuring process.
In the absence of a national industrial policy in the United States,
state governments have taken the initiative by setting the agenda, pro
viding funding, and establishing technical support programs for coop
erative restructuring efforts. Throughout the 1980s, individual states
started a wide variety of programs that responded to declining eco
nomic competitiveness—particularly in the industrialized states of the
Northeast and Midwest. These efforts were not strictly partisan, as evi
denced by the innovative programs developed by Republican Gover
nors Thornburgh of Pennsylvania, Kean of New Jersey, and Orr of
Indiana. These Republican governors had no problem with seeking out
governmental responses to declining competitiveness in the 1980s,
often with the assistance of organized labor. The states examined in
this book, along with the cases from Western Europe, point towards a
common direction supporting an economic restructuring process that
integrates social goal-setting while retaining the efficiency of market
competition.
State efforts were developed out of pragmatic assessments of the
need to remain competitive, not out of ideological commitment. What
the cases show is that the ability of governments to positively influence
economic development is limited when they go it alone. The question
these states faced was not which industries are worth saving (the sun
rise versus sunset debate that characterized the discussion of industrial
policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s), but rather how can govern
ment bring resources to promote joint efforts between businesses,
workers, and unions who are trying to adapt to a profoundly changed
operating environment.
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Still, the failure of "industrial policy" as a political idea in the
United States, and the apparent success of various models of market
economies the world over, would seem to indicate that rethinking the
role of collaborative efforts between business, labor, and government
is unnecessary. Transnational alliances, and direct foreign investment,
blur the national identity of corporate identities, making life more diffi
cult for interventionist policymakers not convinced of the benefits of
trade liberalization. Policymakers long accustomed to a world in which
they could identify and support "national champions," increasingly
find that national champions have foreign alliances. The growth and
diversity of these strategic alliances complicates the established rela
tionships between policymakers and national champions. In some
instances, the contributions of national champions to national employ
ment, Gross National Product, and tax revenue may be little different
from those of competitors who have opened production facilities in the
national champion's home market.
Indeed, recent efforts emanating from Washington at coordinating
business and governmental activities in economic development have
been, by and large, spectacular flops. The much-publicized U.S. Mem
ories project, a ground-breaking attempt by American computer com
panies to cooperate in producing memory chips with federal
government backing, was officially declared dead in early 1990. Simi
larly, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's attempts to
fund basic research and development of commercial technology for
high-definition television, a project that enjoyed almost universal sup
port on Capitol Hill in the spring of 1989, was effectively ended in the
spring of 1990.
Given these failures, why is the idea of joint business, labor, and
governmental coordination in economic restructuring being promoted
in this book? The answer, as it emerges in the case studies in this vol
ume, is that joint efforts work when the right conditions and well
thought out policies prevail. This is not an ideological or moral argu
ment—it is a pragmatic assessment that follows from and supports
basic values of democratic participation. The lessons of how best to
pursue economic restructuring are being learned piece by piece, and
place by place. The importance of this volume is that it takes a step
toward synthesizing these lessons into a coherent policy that is of use
to workers and their unions, business, and government.
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A number of common themes which emerged from the case studies
are useful for policymakers from business, labor, or government trying
to fashion a coherent response to economic restructuring. We identified
three.
1. Intrafirm organization, or workplace organization. As the
case studies from Michigan, Massachusetts, and Italy clearly show,
shop-floor organization and reorganization involve questions of
employee participation in areas traditionally reserved for managerial
decisionmaking and control over the decisionmaking process. Shorten
ing product life cycles, doing away with rigid distinctions between
jobs and departments in order to speed new product development, and
just-in-time sourcing demand higher levels of coordination and coop
eration within firms. Many of the firms discussed in the case studies
have moved toward group, or team-based, work organization in an
attempt to manage the growing complexity of production. The French
example, however, serves as a cautionary note that the benefits of par
ticipation may work against a weakened labor movement.
2. Interfirm linkages. The cases of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Italy,
and Spain show that the improved competitive position of an individ
ual firm, or semiautonomous unit of a larger corporation, is often the
result of the quality of interfirm relations. The example of the increased
interdependence of suppliers and original equipment manufacturers in
the auto industry, whether in the United States, Germany, or Japan, is a
case in point. The importance of interfirm relations is in turn com
pounded by the need for access to technical specialization which is
often prohibitively expensive to maintain, or by market uncertainty,
both of which demand more flexible production. Increasingly, as these
cases show, the competitive position of any individual firm is rooted in
a web of forward and backward linkages with other suppliers and cli
ent firms.
3. Industry policy. Distinct from the focus of debates about indus
trial policy in the past, these cases suggest that when discussing the
competitive situation of an industry sector, a subnational or regional
focus tends to be the proper reference point. While the U.S. case stud
ies showed that lack of a coherent federal policy was often the driving
force behind the development of a state-level economic restructuring
strategy, a more regional approach often made more sense for the states
anyway. The competitive position of an industry sector, our cases indi-
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cated, is increasingly determined by the health of mutually reinforcing
networks within regions.5
In conclusion, the essays in this book demonstrate the challenges
and opportunities that exist for forging alliances between business,
organized labor, and government that can create economic value. The
diversity of cases also indicates that developing a coherent and effec
tive federal-level industrial policy is problematic. Perhaps the best role
the federal government can play in the United States is to help coordi
nate and facilitate the activities undertaken at the local, regional, or
state level. Providing a clearinghouse of information on such activities
would perform a valuable service for local government officials, busi
ness executives, and labor leaders. More comprehensive data on the
effectiveness of differing approaches to economic restructuring would
also assist researchers in assessing these new models.
Four observations follow from Sabel's essay and the case studies
that involved the active participation of unions. Unions can influence
restructuring, either positively through active participation in the pro
cess or negatively by clinging to outdated work rules or practices, but
union participation is neither necessary nor sufficient to insure a bene
ficial outcome for labor. Weak unions in Japan, for example, seem
quite compatible with international competitiveness, while strong
unions and a management sheltered from market competition in the
United States has in some instances led to mutual stagnation. Second,
strong unions may well be undermined by successful corporate restruc
turing. Skilled workers, for example, may lose their position as skills
get transferred to automated processes or professional employees.
An additional point raised by Sabel, and evidenced in the case stud
ies of Italy and Michigan, is that labor organizations need substantial
internal reforms in order to face the challenges of economic restructur
ing. Because of the rapid integration of firms with their suppliers, the
unit of organization of the union can no longer be the firm or corpora
tion, but must be regional or national. The whipsawing of plants
against one another within General Motors, pitting UAW members in
New York against UAW members in Michigan, is an example of this
problem. Finally, the point was made that even in Europe, where
unions are generally stronger and more politically influential than in
the United States, workers and their unions often get hurt by restructur
ing. While firms require more commitment from workers in high
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value-added operations, they often provide less job security. Moreover,
the pressures for continuous learning in these firms has the effect of
empowering workers but also of separating workers who have skills
from those who do not. The subsequent stress and insecurity of work
ers are areas that unions are only beginning to address.
Perhaps the most important lesson of all, however, is made clear in
Wolfgang Streeck's concluding essay. Without an institutional base for
supporting economic restructuring, the short-term pressures on politi
cians will overwhelm the longer-term needs of economics. The cases
of Michigan and Massachusetts provide ample testimony to this—
without a strong institutional base, the changing of political parties
governing the state led to significant retrenchment of economic
restructuring programs. By institutionalizing the processes or policies
described in the case studies, an economic restructuring process that
pays attention to the emerging patterns of industrial relations can help
address the difficulties of adapting to a highly competitive global mar
ketplace. Putting the pieces together is a critical challenge for policymakers in business, labor, and government throughout the industrial
democracies in the 1990s.
NOTES
1. All too often unions and workers are considered the cause of lagging competitiveness rather
than part of the solution. A recent attempt to correct this view can be found in Lawrence Mishel
and Paula Voos, editors, Unions and Economic Competitiveness. Arrnonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
1992.
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editor. Global Competitiveness: Getting the U.S. Back on Track. NY: W.W. Norton, 1988; and
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ogy and Industrial Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988; and Richard Cyert and David
Mowery, editors, Technology and Employment. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987.
All the data presented are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various publications.
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neurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992; and David
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S. Along similar lines of thought see, Robert Beauregard, editor, Economic Restructuring and
Political Response, in Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, vol. 34. London: Sage, 1989; and Michael
Storper and Alien Scott, editors, Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development in the
1990s. Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1991.

Economic Development
and Industrial Relations
in a Small-Firm Economy
The Experience of Metalworkers
in Emilia-Romagna, Italy
Bruce Herman
Garment Industry Development Corporation

One example often referred to in discussions of successful eco
nomic restructuring is the "Third Italy," particularly the EmiliaRomagna region of north-central Italy. And yet in the growing litera
ture on Emilia-Romagna there is often little mention of the role of
industrial relations in this predominantly small-firm economy. This
chapter seeks to explain the history and results of a proactive collective
bargaining strategy developed by the Federazione Impiegati Operai
Metallurgici (FIOM), the metal-mechanical union affiliated with the
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), in the context of
the successful industrial restructuring of the Emilian economy.
The FIOM, with almost 70,000 members in the region (Catholic and
Republican affiliates have 16,000 members), in an industry sector with
a 55 percent unionization rate, has used its strength to pursue a proac
tive collective bargaining strategy designed to increase worker partici
pation and control. 1 Leveraging needed organizational change within
the firm to gain greater autonomy and an expanded role in the restruc
turing process, the FIOM is trying to "regain" control of work layout
and job design. The goal of the FIOM approach is to establish an ongo
ing, autonomous union role in what are often referred to as areas of
management prerogative (such as work layout and staffing) inside indi
vidual firms (intrafirm). Yet, given the complex web of relations
between firms (interfirm) in Emilia-Romagna, the FIOM strategy is
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also clearly intended to promote an active union role in defining interfirm relations as well.
The initial objective of the HOM strategy is to expand the scope of
collective bargaining to establish interdisciplinary (cutting horizontally
across existing vertical hierarchies), autonomous work groups, thereby
bilaterally determining job design and layout Once established, these
work groups will pursue productivity improvements and be rewarded
based upon the results achieved. However, because of the autonomy of
the work groups, management does not automatically gain access to
the methods whereby the productivity improvements were achieved.
Therefore, by attempting to establish ongoing autonomy and control
over production decisions, the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna is redefining
the boundaries of collective bargaining and industrial relations.
Background

Industrial relations have been in a state of flux for the past few
decades, with the Italian situation exhibiting considerable volatility.2
Twenty-five years ago the Italian labor movement found itself with for
mal recognition guaranteed by the Italian constitution, but with very
little real power and almost no presence inside the factory.3 The union
federations—Communist/Socialist (CGIL), Catholic (CISL), Republi
can (UIL)—were numerically significant, yet they lacked effective
power both on the shop floor and at the national policymaking level.
This situation of formal recognition but de facto exclusion was swept
away by the social unrest of the late 1960s and the "Italian Hot
Autumn" of 1969. Throughout this phase of rapid ascendancy on the
part of labor and the working class, the union movement played a var
ied role, from that of catalyst to reactive captive, attempting to "ride
the tiger."4 Nonetheless, despite a somewhat contradictory approach,
by the mid-1970s the Italian labor movement was considerably
strengthened and therefore had much to lose in the subsequent period
of resurgent capital.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Italian labor movement
succeeded in establishing, or co-opting, factory-based workers coun
cils (consigli di fabbrica) while simultaneously achieving a national
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role in setting macroeconomic policy. Utilizing a process of political
exchange, the Italian union federations were able to insert themselves
into a tripartite, neo-corporatist bargaining process involving govern
ment and industry.5 Once having gained a seat at the national policymaking table, the union federations used their ability to control the
political activities of their members (e.g., strikes, job actions, and
broader demonstrations) in exchange for favored macroeconomic and
social policy. The passage of the Italian Labor Bill of Rights (Statute di
Lavoro) in 1970, the legislative response to the unrest of 1968-69,
proved to be the most enduring result of this period of tripartite bar
gaining.
Relations between the three national trade union federations—
CGIL, CISL, and UIL—also improved dramatically during the 1970s.
Increased cooperation among them led to the adoption in February
1978 of a common platform, the EUR Accord, and it appeared as
though a new era of industrial relations was beginning.6 The post-EUR
optimism proved to be short-lived.
Union solidarity ruptured when CISL, UIL, and part of the CGIL
supported the Craxi government plan to limit the wage indexing sys
tem (seala mobile) in 1984. The metalworkers union, the Federazione
Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (FLM), officially broke apart in February
1984, although the crisis had been in the making since 1979-80. In par
ticular, the failed 35-day strike at HAT in 1980 was emblematic, mark
ing a significant shift in power away from unions and toward
management initiative.7 After the 35-day strike, FIAT management
moved quickly to reassert complete control over the organization of
the factory by using technology to unilaterally restructure the firm.8
Throughout Italy firms followed FIATs lead as industry restruc
tured to the detriment of organized labor. Management began to outsource components, followed by whole subassemblies, in order to
circumvent large unionized firms.9 Growing decentralization, fueled by
outsourcing, contributed substantially to the proliferation of small
firms; and as some of these firms increased their sophistication and
capacity to meet market demand, local industrial agglomerations began
to coalesce. 10 The development of a broad range of business services,
including market, financial, and production assistance, by trade associ
ations and some local governments assisted small firms in achieving
certain "external" economies of scale. Shaped by the decentralization
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process and the subsequent interventions on behalf of trade associa
tions and government, Emilia-Romagna evolved into one of the most
advanced examples of a small-firm economy. Today, while some large,
vertically integrated firms continue to operate in the region (FIATs
tractor factory in Modena is one example), the Emilian reality is pre
dominantly one of small and medium-sized firms.
Located in the heart of what has come to be known as the Third Italy
(an area stretching from the Veneto to Tuscany), the Emilia-Romagna
region of north-central Italy provides a useful example of dynamic
economic development." This region has undergone a dramatic trans
formation in the past 50 years, moving from fascist domination and
civil war to a situation of broad economic well-being and political
domination by the Italian Communist Party (PCI).12 The present,
unquestionably fluid situation in which the PCI is attempting to
"refound" itself does not negate over 40 years of the PCI's rule.
The PCI's historic Bologna Congress of March 1990 confirmed the
initiative to reconstitute the party, and at the Rimini Congress in early
1991, the PCI officially became the Partite Democratic© della Sinistra
(Democratic Party of the Left—PdS). Different interpretations of the
new course remain and the divisions could well be destabilizing for the
PdS. PdS Secretary, Achille Ochetto, the architect of the transforma
tion, was himself rebuffed at the Rimini Congress by not being
reelected Secretary on the first ballot, although he was reelected on the
second ballot. Still, Ochetto, his cadre of quarantenne (40-year-olds, a
reference to youth and an acknowledgment that the post-World War II
generation has taken the lead within the party apparatus), and the nor
mally allied reformist "miglioristi" wing of the party appear to have
mustered a somewhat unstable majority.
Long-term PCI control over local governments has made EmiliaRomagna a center of activity for both the miglioristi and the postwar
militants. Often in conflict in the past, many members of these two
groups found themselves united in the "si" (promajoritarian/Ochetto
platform) coalition during the heated internal debate that led to the
demise of the PCI and the simultaneous birth of the PdS.13 Perhaps
more important, the transformation of the PCI into the PdS is, accord
ing to the majoritarian position, an attempt to broaden the party to
include other progressive forces. In this respect, Emilia-Romagna has
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been a leading example of inclusive politics based on the dominant
electoral position of the PCI.
Coalition politics and government are familiar situations in EmiliaRomagna where the PCI has usually preferred to govern with the Ital
ian Socialist Party (PSI). Recent, exclusively PCI, "monocolore" gov
ernments appeared to challenge the norm of coalition, but the
municipal elections of May 1990, in which the PCI continued to lose
votes, led to a return of coalition government.
Since July 1990, Bologna (the capital of Emilia-Romagna) has been
governed by a PCI, PSI and Psdi (Italian Social-Democratic Party)
coalition headed by Renato Imbeni of the PdS, member of the Euro
pean Parliament and mayor since 1983. At the regional level, the
numerical impossibility of a local equivalent to the ruling national coa
lition (the pentapartito or five-party coalition comprised of the Chris
tian Democrats, PSI, Psdi, Republicans and Liberals) led to a regional
agreement between the PCI, PSI, Psdi and the Republican Party. These
recent political changes have resulted in the election of Socialist
Enrico Boselli as President of the region.14
In terms of industrial policy, the Regional Ministry of Industry, tra
ditionally the domain of the PCI, is now in the hands of the Republican
Party. The Republican Party is not a formal member of the governing
coalition, but the Republicans agreed to support the new government
and were given the Regional Ministry of Industry as part of that agree
ment. Whether or not these political changes will lead to any signifi
cant shifts in industrial policy remains to be seen.
The Emilian Economy

At the end of World War II, the local economy of Emilia-Romagna
was primarily agricultural, with the manufacturing that did exist being
concentrated in a small number of large, vertically integrated firms.15
This situation changed drastically during the 1950s and 1960s as agri
culture was replaced by manufacturing as the dominant economic
activity in the region.
It was also during the immediate post-World War II period that an
active cooperative sector began to reassert itself. 16 Originally, the co-op
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movement was based in the agricultural sector, but it quickly spread to
construction, food processing and distribution, light manufacturing,
and transportation. Today, many Emilian co-ops have become large
enterprises, dominating some industry sectors (construction, food pro
cessing and distribution) and active in all economic areas.17
As industry grew, there was a concomitant deterioration of the dom
inance of a few sizable manufacturing firms and a proliferation of flex
ible, specialized small firms. Today, Emilia-Romagna, with a
population of almost 4 million, has over 325,000 individual firms.
More than 90 percent employ fewer than 50 people, and almost 40 per
cent of the workforce is engaged in manufacturing. The results of this
decentralized, yet integrated, system of firms are striking.
•Wage rates are almost double the Italian average.
•Productivity is among Europe's highest
•Exports are increasing (7.9 percent of Italian exports originated in
Emilia-Romagna in 1973; 10.2 percent in 1986).
•Per capita income grew faster than the Italian average between
1970 and 1979; by 1979 per capita income in the region was 127
percent of the national average. During the same 1970-79 period,
the provinces of Modena and Reggio moved from seventeenth and
twelfth in national income rankings to second and fourth, respec
tively (Brusco 1982).
•From 1971 to the present, Gross Regional Product has increased
over 50 percent.18
Overall, the economy of Emilia-Romagna has proved to be both
resilient, specializing in high value-added products, and adaptable,
adjusting quickly to market fluctuations. A system of auxiliary industry
services that operate through pooled resources, accessible programs,
and accountable member organizations has directly contributed to the
high level of technical expertise attained by individual firms.
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Decentralized Production and Flexible Manufacturing
Initially, the small firms of Emilia-Romagna served large enterprises
as dependent subcontractors, and some of those relationships continue
today. For example, many of the Modena artisans continue to supply
components, or specialized manufacturing services such as grinding
and heat treating, to FIAT's tractor factory, one of the remaining large,
vertically integrated firms in Emilia-Romagna. Still, to overcome the
negative consequences of being dependent subcontractors, many small
shops learned to diversify their client base through horizontal linkages
to other small firms. This process was accelerated as small firms
decided to pursue discrete specializations in order to differentiate their
activities and expertise from that of other small firms.
Relationships of trust grew as firms subcontracted among them
selves rather than refusing to take on contracts too large for the indi
vidual shop. Informal networks developed, especially in the tightly
knit industrial districts in and around Bologna, Modena, and north
along the via Emilia (Carpi, Reggio-Emilia, Piacenza) to Milan. 19
Commercial linkages were also encouraged by the diversification,
fragmentation, and customization of market demand, which led firms
to adapt flexible production techniques, both internally and externally,
through outsourcing. Specialization strengthened commercial linkages,
and as the small firms became increasingly independent of large enter
prises, they began to coordinate their respective expertise, thereby
developing value-adding partnerships.20
Cooperation between firms made it feasible to bid on larger, more
valuable contracts, and this in turn stimulated the growth of value-add
ing chains which could be coordinated to create complete products.
Stronger commercial relationships reinforced the tendency of industry
sectors to cluster, further stimulating the consolidation of industrial
districts comprised of firms involved in different stages of produc
tion.21 These developments were facilitated by the growth of industry
services which helped overcome the traditional limits of small busi
ness.
Informal relations between firms have become.more structured as
some medium-sized local firms have begun to acquire outright, or take
a minority equity position in smaller, generally more specialized satel-
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lite firms. For example, Corazza, a medium-sized company producing
food packaging equipment located outside Bologna, recently bought
one of its more sophisticated subcontractors and acquired equity posi
tions in other small suppliers. Similar relations are being established
throughout the Emilian economy.
Many of the larger co-ops have grown by merging with other co
ops.22 Recent studies have also identified significant merger and acqui
sition activity as many of the Emilian firms are increasingly integrated
into the global economy through large multinational corporations.23
Industry Services

In Emilia-Romagna, industry services are used not only to support
individual firms, but to stimulate shared solutions to what appear at
first to be individual problems.24 At the outset, industry services were
provided by trade associations to take advantage of appropriate econo
mies of scale and cut overhead costs for member firms. Because
resources could be pooled by trade associations, shared accounting,
payroll, and business planning services were available for reduced user
fees. Easy access to these services (available to nonmember firms as
well, though at a higher price) allows firms to cut costs while concen
trating on producing high quality products.
The National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) is the most notable
example of a small-firm trade association aggressively involved in pro
viding an array of business services.25 Formed in the immediate postWorld War II period, the CNA has grown to include 340,000 member
firms (80,000 in Emilia-Romagna). Nationally, the organization has
2,300 offices and 7,000 employees and is financed through annual
membership dues of $100, plus 1 percent of payroll. As with most Ital
ian trade associations, the CNA is organized both geographically and
by industry sector. Local CNA chapters are organized at the provincial
level and governed by an elected board of directors who must them
selves be artisans. Sector-specific trade federations are organized
nationally in 27 categories (i.e., metalworking, woodworking, cloth
ing). Thus, artisan firms normally belong to a sector-specific trade fed
eration within provincial chapters of the CNA.
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The sector-specific focus allows the CNA and its federations to
develop considerable expertise and sophisticated, tailored business ser
vices. Sector-specific expertise, channeled into geographically proxi
mal clusters of related firms, allows the CNA staff to maximize its
outreach for minimal cost. The democratic and participatory nature of
the CNA also facilitates an ongoing process of interaction and
exchange of information among member firms. As the CNA began to
develop more sophisticated types of business services, member firms
grew to expect and therefore demand increased levels of service.
Following the lead of trade associations, the regional and local gov
ernments became actively involved in enterprise creation and develop
ment. Promoting a system of industry services that facilitates economic
development, public planners opted for an "incubator without walls"
strategy. Economic development activities focused on:
•assistance in business expansion and new enterprise creation by
developing targeted industrial parks for small firms and supporting
trade associations and cooperatives to foster new enterprises;
•sectoral technology transfer programs and research services to aid
innovation;
•market information, export assistance and support for trade fairs;
•upgrading the entire vocational and technical training system;
•financial assistance for an array of needs including training, group
procurement, and purchasing new equipment.
To implement this strategy, a public-private partnership, ERVET,
was created by the regional government with the support of local banks
and trade associations in 1974. ERVET's industrial policy is geared
towards sectors rather than individual firms and designed to provide
both vertical (sector-specific) and horizontal (across industries) assis
tance through technology transfer and marketing service centers
located in their respective industrial districts. Established centers
include:
Vertical (sector-specific)

CITER (1980) for knitwear and fashion
CESMA (1983) for agricultural
machinery
CERCAL (1983) for shoe firms
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QUASCO (1985) for the construction
industry
Horizontal (cutting across sector) CERMET (1985) for the metal
mechanical and related industries
ASTER (1985) technology transfer and
R&D center
RESFOR (1986) promotes
subcontracting arrangements among
firms located in the region
SVEX (1989) export assistance for small
firms

Labor's Role
The success of the broad, highly articulated economic development
infrastructure of Emilia-Romagna is generally acknowledged. Less
discussed is the role of industrial relations and organized labor in the
Emilian economy.26 To date, trade unions play no direct role in the
established service centers, and unlike local banks, trade associations
and educational institutions, labor unions do not sit on the advisory
boards of ERVET or the established centers.
The fact that organized labor plays little direct role in the service
centers is criticized by the unions, although the criticism is somewhat
muted given the leading role of the PCI-PdS and its historic alliance
with the trade union movement (especially the CGIL). Still, organized
labor's demand to be part of the governing board for a long-anticipated
regional research complex, Polo Tecnologica, was the principal imped
iment that delayed the start of the project for almost three years.
Recently, the controversy was settled in labor's favor and the unions
will be represented on the governing board of Polo Tecnologica.27 This
in itself is an interesting prospect, since few unions share a similar role
in the world's increasingly numerous science parks.
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FIOM's Strategy
While the FIOM supports efforts to gain access to the region's eco
nomic development apparatus, it has concentrated on using the collec
tive bargaining process to broaden participation and gain more
autonomy on the shop floor and increased control over the process of
production. As explained by the FIOM's Regional General Secretary,
Francesco Garibaldo:
Since the end of the sixties a specific characteristic of the
Bolognese metal-mechanical workers' experience is the enduring
interest in the organization of work considered as the meeting
point of every strategic problem: wage, work environment, pace
and intensity of production and career development.28

Focusing on work organization assisted the FIOM in successfully
contesting management's efforts during the 1970s to improve produc
tivity by simply speeding up production rather than exploring a more
efficient organization of production.
The success of FIOM's bargaining position influenced manage
ment's decision to initiate a new investment cycle through the intro
duction of computer-numerically-controlled equipment. During this
phase of technological change and reorganization, the FIOM pursued a
policy designed 'to contest the capitalistic work organization and to
build up the power of the workers over their work conditions." Overall,
the strategy was quite successful and workers gained significant power
within the firm; piecework was done away with, "the whole wage was
a bargained wage" with wage differentials based on skill, and a 35hour workweek was established.
Management attempts to divide craft activities, such as those of
machine tool workers or design engineers, into many unskilled jobs
was also resisted. Instead, the FIOM insisted upon an open career for
each craft-like activity. Career mobility would be encouraged by
requiring that rotation and recomposition schemes be linked to broadbased education courses, rather than more limited task-specific train
ing. These achievements may seem modest, yet when compared to
counterparts in the rest of the industrialized world, the FIOM has
clearly succeeded where many others have failed.

30 Economic Development and Industrial Relations in a Small-Firm Economy

The FIOM's organizational presence and power inside the firm com
pelled management to bargain and, in exchange for performance, to
increase wages as well as allow for growing self-management over
work conditions. However, by 1977 this strategy had reached an
impasse; the expansion of outsourcing and supply firms, coupled with
the introduction of new computer-based technologies and new organi
zational criteria combined to erode the gains derived from the FIOM's
policies.29
Searching for a new approach, FIOM concentrated on building up
craft-based professional areas (technicians, design engineers, operators
and fitters) but strong management pressure for increased flexibility
limited the FIOM strategy to "a few small experiments."30 Given these
unsatisfactory results, FIOM continued to search for a viable alterna
tive.
The Search for an Alternative

The conceptual basis for FIOM's new approach is the belief that the
world economy is in the midst of a new industrial revolution. In the
emerging industrial order there is a growing tension between the "inte
gration needs" inherent in the increasingly complex organizational and
technical aspects of production and the model of social relations. In the
"old" social model, employee cooperation was bargained for in a rigid,
mechanical (Tayloristic) fashion, resulting in complex, hierarchical
work rules. Within the emerging system of production, employee
cooperation needs to be of an organic (flexible) nature, involving more
interactive problemsolving than was previously the case.
To better comprehend the transition from mechanical to flexible
cooperation, the FIOM initiated two research projects. The first aimed
at understanding the impact of emerging economic conditions on the
structure of the firm and work organization, while the second project
concentrated on identifying and comprehending the subjective feelings
of the workers about their work experience.31 The results of these two
projects were widely discussed as the FIOM debated a new strategy.
From 1985 to 1987, the FIOM began to pull together the methodol
ogy needed to pursue an "alternative strategy." The starting point was a
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new educational scheme for unionists designed not to rely upon a pre
fabricated set of solutions, but rather promote an interdisciplinary
understanding of the new technological and organizational revolution
currently underway. This new educational program was in turn linked
to a participatory design process geared toward a radical reform of
work organization and industrial relations.
Acknowledging that there are diverse strategies to achieve a more
"organic cooperation," the FIOM decided to pursue a "democratic
alternative" based on interactive work groups.32 The decision to pro
mote work organization based on group activities was itself a risky
one. As pointed out by the FIOM's chief consultant on the project:
Work organized by groups, like work carried out individually, is
marked by contradiction. On the one hand, such groups can be
manipulated by the mechanisms of management; on the other,
they can use the bargaining process to reclaim the ability to man
age themselves.
Embracing the dynamic of group experience does not mean
adhering strictly to approaches which favor workers alone.
Indeed, such an approach can only be subordinate to corporate
goals. The issue is rather one of distinguishing between the work
organization "produced" by the group in the framework of a given
firm, and the group's relationship to worker identity—an equally
critical process.33

Beginning in 1987, the FIOM began to sign a series of agreements
aimed at establishing more participatory cooperation through grouporiented work organization. Briefly, two broad categories of agree
ments have been signed. The first, and more limited set of agreements,
established procedures whereby the unions and factory council dele
gates would receive advance information on new technologies and/or
changes in work organization. Once informed, the union and the dele
gates can propose an alternative plan which management must review
and discuss. The weakness of this first approach is that there is no obli
gation to come to a mutually acceptable agreement.
The second approach includes the procedures of the first but goes
further by establishing bargained patterns of work organization with
considerable autonomy from management intrusion for some areas of
the firm. In these agreements there are provisions which establish
diverse, autonomous work groups. For example, certain agreements
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established "unified production groups." The main characteristics of
these groups are:
1. The group has autonomy to decide its own task assignments,
maintenance, and educational courses for skill development.
2. The group has a coordinator (usually a skilled worker) who coor
dinates the management of the group. The position of coordinator
rotates from every four to six months depending on the agree
ment
3. The group workload is bargained for once a year and production
beyond the agreed upon amount is rewarded. Other types of
groups have been established in specific functional segments of
the firm (e.g., design department groups), or for systems integra
tion/assembly (e.g., the "fitting group," which assembles a com
plex automatic machine).
The specifics vary from firm to firm and agreement to agreement, but
the overall approach is consistent; the focus remains the control over
the organization of production, autonomy from what is viewed as rigid,
hierarchical management control, and "bargained results" where man
agement agrees to reward productivity improvements but, because of
the autonomy of the work groups, does not automatically obtain own
ership of the method by which the productivity improvements were
obtained.
The FIOM is also quick to point out the importance of how the
group is established and its role in shaping the worker's identity.
The group planning phase is not a technical one, but is rather one
of the processes by which workers' identity is formed in relation
to both the company and the socio-political context. Hence the
benefits of this reorganization of work are continuously channeled
in two directions: towards the company and towards the workers.
On the one hand, this approach results in the reduction of lead
time and the improvement of product quality; on the other, it tends
to strengthen the relationship between professional experience
and identity.34

The importance of the group's autonomy from management is para
mount for the FIOM. According to FIOM strategists, autonomy within
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the firm (intrafirm) could eventually be used to establish contact across
firms (interfirm) without having to go through the normal channels of
management hierarchy. The FIOM believes the results would be a
more efficient and flexible system of production that acknowledges
and rewards the efforts of members.
To date the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna has successfully signed doz
ens of contracts which, to varying degrees, create autonomous work
groups within the firm (see appendix).35 Still very much in the experi
mental stage, the strategy did nevertheless receive a sympathetic hear
ing at the FIOM's 1988 National Congress, but no formal endorsement
was forthcoming.
The success at the intrafirm level has not yet been expanded to entail
interfirm linkages; informally, however, on a problemsolving basis,
work groups have begun to communicate across firms. At the Ferrari
factory in Maranello, a suburb of Modena, the installation of a sophis
ticated flexible machining system(FMS) to machine engine blocks pre
sented a complex set of problems that needed to be resolved quickly to
bring the system on-line.
The FMS, a complex series of computer-integrated machining cen
ters, is made by Mandelli in nearby Piacenza. Communication through
the respective Ferrari and Mandelli management hierarchies proved to
be a time consuming, inefficient way to debug the FMS. Therefore, the
work group installing the system found it necessary to circumvent
management hierarchies and establish direct contact with the Mandelli
team that built the FMS. In this case, a telephone link from one shop
floor to the other proved more effective than the established corporate
channels of communication.36
Although the contracts signed so far have involved mostly mediumsized firms, the metalworkers have not neglected the artisan firm sec
tor, signing their first contract (involving all three metalworkers
unions) with the National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) in 1984.
Efforts to expand this precedent to other sectors have been slow to
show results. A modest breakthrough occurred in 1989 when the textile
workers unions signed a contract with the Emilia-Romagna CNA and
continued to pressure the other small-firm associations.
At the national level, recent legislation extended employee protec
tion from arbitrary dismissal to include the artisan firms, further incor
porating the small-firm sector into the national industrial relations
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system. Still, much remains to be done within both the Italian and
overall European contexts to bring small firms into a more regulated
system.
The innovative bargaining approach developed by the FIOM of
Emilia-Romagna, and the results achieved, argue well for the possibil
ity of a more democratic alternative to hierarchical, rigid production
systems. However, the limited role of organized labor in many of the
economic development agencies in Emilia-Romagna may prove to be
an impediment to continued successful economic restructuring.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Composition of Work Groups by Individual Firm
Firms
Biotec

PaiDemm
Mectrak
Cima
Giuliani
G£>.
Ima
Sasib
Co-op Cam
Sabiem

Areas of Activity and Composition
Analysis (125) Design (1235) Production (25)
Bargaining (1235) Supervision (12)
Education (1238) Analysis (12358) Design (1235)
Production (123568)
Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Education (128) Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Analysis (235) Design (235)
Education (2358) Analysis (1234568) Design (1234568)
Bargaining (236) Supervision (12)
Education (23) Analysis (12345) Design (2345)
Education (238) Analysis (1234568) Design (23568)
Education (23) Analysis (12358) Design (1235)
Production (123568)
Education (12) Analysis (735) Design (1235)

Participants

1 - Department workers
2 - Worker's Council delegates
3 - Education Department of the metalworkers union
4 - Bargaining Department of the metalworkers union
5 - Organizational Department of the metalworkers union
6 - Metalworkers union secretary
7 - Representative from Bologna Camera di Lavoro
8 - Consultant
Adopted from: O. Marchisio, "La progettazione organizzativa fra negoziazione ed identitd: i
casi della regione Emilia-Romagna," in M. La Rosa, ed., // modello giapponese (Milan: Franco
Angeli, 1988).
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In the democratizing societies of Europe and Latin America, politi
cal officials of many subnational jurisdictions are likely to be elected
on platforms of promoting economic development. As they formulate
their policies, many such officials will predictably face similar institu
tional and substantive constraints: few conventional economic policy
instruments under their control; administrators inexperienced in man
aging government agencies in a democratic context; few business own
ers or managers with an adequate conception of how their industries
can create and capture value in highly integrated market-oriented econ
omies; innovation or entrepreneurship in business activity unlikely to
be a cultural tradition; and government intervention through "plan
ning" discredited in the public mind.
The search for effective combinations of policies, agency mandates,
organizational strategies, and operational methods in such settings
might be significantly aided by examining how the challenge of pro
moting economic development was handled in one of Spain's poorest
regions—Andalusia—after the nation consolidated its transition to
democracy. The goal of improving the economic well-being of this
region was codified in the Statute of Autonomy, which became law in
1981. 1 The same commitment was embodied in the electoral program
of the party winning an absolute majority in the 1982 regional parlia
mentary elections. Once in power, the region's first political executives
faced the institutional and substantive constraints listed above.
After a policymaking process described as an act of democratic
planning, top regional officials announced a policy of achieving development-from-within.2 Concurrently, the regional parliament created
the Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), whose man-
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date was to promote small and medium-sized locally owned industrial
enterprises.3 IPIA's organizational strategy sought to involve the stake
holders of a handful of industries in formulating and implementing a
common competitive strategy4 and to persuade public and private
financial institutions to extend credit and subsidies to participating
firms.5 IPIA's operational method was to instigate an interactive plan
ning process that focused stakeholders' attention on the need to
improve natural resource utilization, product quality, marketing strat
egy, infrastructure, plant and equipment, access to financing, procure
ment, working conditions, and training. In addition, the planning
process intended to identify a large number of actions that would per
mit the region's firms to create and capture more value as a result of
their work.6 This process entailed negotiating what was termed a com
prehensive and dynamic action plan.7
IPIA's most successful action plan—given the policy of development-from-within and the agency's mission and strategy—involved
Andalusia's white marble mining and fabrication industry, which is
clustered around the mountain communities of Macael (pronounced
Mahk-eye-el) County in Almerfa province. During the first phase of the
Macael Action Plan (1983-87), the industry's sales revenues expanded
fivefold. The Macael firms' new ability to compete in the growing mar
ket for quality finished marble construction materials accounts for the
prodigious growth in revenues. Analysis of this case shows that IPIA's
operational method—championing the formulation and implementa
tion of a negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic action plan—
enabled Macael firms to compete in the marble construction materials
industry.
The skills needed to employ IPIA's operational method success
fully—in Andalusia as elsewhere—include leadership, negotiation,
and political management. Skilled leaders can mobilize people to face
their problems, search for solutions, make informed decisions, and
accept change. Skilled negotiators can forge networks of value-creat
ing agreements, often involving significant degrees of cooperation
among people and institutions. Skilled political managers can influence
the policy and operational decisions of people and institutions without
the aid of formal authority.
Arguably, officials responsible for agencies such as IPIA can only
develop the skills of leadership, negotiation, and political management
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through practice and coaching. It is conceivable, however, that a prior
skillful performance in one setting may leave a residue of clinical
knowledge, which, if identified and utilized, would improve the skill
displayed by officials subsequently using the same operational method
in other settings. In an effort to begin cumulating clinical knowledge
relevant for operating in policy contexts bearing a family resemblance
to Andalusia in the mid-1980s, this paper offers a series of narrative
accounts and interpretations of how the successful Macael Action Plan
gradually unfolded.
Initial Conditions

When the Macael Action Plan was initiated in 1983, some 150 fam
ily-owned firms employing an average of seven workers were engaged
in marble mining and/or fabrication. Business owners followed the
production and marketing practices of their forebears, resulting in tech
nological backwardness. Dynamite, rather than precision saws, was the
principal means by which marble was loosened from hillsides. Few
fabricating shops were equipped with mechanical cutting and polishing
devices. Even fewer firms were able to establish brand name recogni
tion and none had the capacity to fill a major construction order. As a
result, 70 percent of extracted marble was sold to manufacturers in
other regions in Spain, who produced quality goods for the huge
national construction industry, while Macael fabricators limited their
production to a narrow line of artisanal goods. This pattern of eco
nomic activity had characterized the marble industry in Macael for
decades, resulting in static revenues and ingrained resistance to
change. Overcoming such impediments would have required some
degree of collaboration among firms. However, for Macael's individu
alistic business owners, collaboration was anathema.
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The Joining-Up Process
Events at Macael

IPIA's first contact with Macael business owners took place in their
own quarries and fabricating shops. Accompanied by the local mayor,
IPIA's director general spent two days touring these sites before the
idea of holding a meeting was broached with business owners. The
director used this opportunity to learn about the industry's work and.
Macael's deteriorating economy. Through his presence, manner, and
line of questioning, IPIA's director also sought to demonstrate his gen
uine concern for the industry and to spark curiosity about why IPIA
had come to Macael.
By then, it had become common knowledge that a man from IPIA
was in town. When the mayor called an impromptu meeting of the
employers association and trade unions, their leaders came. The direc
tor, Ricardo Sa"nchez de la Morena, explained that IPIA's aim was to
build on the strengths of Andalusia's land and people to promote entrepreneurship in the region. He noted that those he had spoken with dur
ing the previous two days felt the local marble industry was in crisis
and that a solution was not evident. He did not offer a diagnosis,
though he mentioned that deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment
were clear. He invited the people in attendance to work with IPIA in
developing an action plan to "totally modernize" the local industry.
The Macael Action Plan, the director explained, would be unlike
most development plans. It would deal with all issues concerning the
marble industry, including technology, products, finance, infrastruc
ture, and working conditions; it would be dynamic, beginning with a
diagnosis of the problems and opportunities of the local marble indus
try; and it would focus on changing the reality of the industry. The
Macael Action Plan would not be formulated by IPIA, but rather would
be negotiated by the assembled group, with IPIA serving as general
coordinator. Sa*nchez de la Morena also promised that IPIA would use
its influence to mobilize resources from banks, utilities, and govern
ment agencies—so long as the group agreed unanimously on every ele
ment of the Action Plan.
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Knowing that the audience's aspirations for economic betterment
were checked by anxieties about participating in such a group process,
IPIA's director wanted to build immediate commitment to an action
plan. He gave them a stark choice: either agree unanimously at that
moment to work with IPIA on a comprehensive, negotiated, and
dynamic action plan, or forfeit the chance to enlist his support for mod
ernizing the Macael marble industry.8 After some discussion, a vote
was taken. It demonstrated that the balance of sentiments had tipped
uniformly in favor of initiating the process.
Clinical Interpretations
The initial meeting must include the active participation of the
industry's professional associations. No one would be in a better insti
tutional position to speak on behalf of business owners than top offi
cials of the employers association. The participation of local
governmental officials and union leaders may also be essential for sub
stantive and political reasons.
How the regional government frames the problem and describes an
action plan is of paramount importance. While it is valuable to leave
open the question of substance to the industry's own sense of its situa
tion and potential, it is equally important to emphasize the defining
characteristics of an action plan: that it is negotiated, comprehensive,
and dynamic, and that all decisions must be unanimous. These features
ensure that each component of the local industry will be a full partner
in the action plan and that the interests and concerns of all participants
will be addressed during the planning process.
Whether IPIA's brinkmanship during the first meeting at Macael
was generally appropriate can be debated. The chief merit of this
approach is that it frames as sharply as possible the question of
whether to continue sliding into crisis or to work together towards a
common solution, drawing to some degree on outside help. Putting the
issue to an immediate vote serves other purposes as well. It forces the
attendees to make a public commitment to the agency and to each
other. If the vote is positive, some of the anxieties about the process
will likely be suppressed. Imposing the unanimity rule also serves to
embed this important process norm in the group's experience from the
start.
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Negotiating the Action Plan
Events at Macael
In advance of the first official meeting of the planning committee,
which took place in September 1983, IPIA wrote and distributed a
draft document that enumerated what it regarded as the key issues and
problems of the local marble industry. Hie broad categories of issues
were production, commercialization, and personnel. IPIA's director
general began the meeting by presenting the draft outline. As the dis
cussion developed, it became apparent that opinions differed sharply
on factual premises as well as on what should be done. Before closing
the session, IPIA urged the committee to adopt a work plan for prepar
ing its next meeting. The employers association said it would survey
the industry to count the number of firms and workers belonging to
each branch of activity and to gauge each firm's level of technological
development. In addition, subcommittees on production, commercial
ization, and personnel were formed. These groups were charged with
the task of drafting preliminary reports about their respective areas of
interest, to be presented to the full committee at its October meeting.
Each report was to identify problems, proposed solutions, and suggest
who would be responsible for followup.
The director came away from the meeting convinced that IPIA
needed to be in constant, if informal, contact with the subcommittees
during this critical phase in the process. Since travel time between
Macael and the Institute's headquarters in Sevilla exceeded eight
hours, he could not play this role himself. Sa*nchez de la Morena there
fore asked a consultant in whom he had complete confidence to spend
the following weeks or months in Macael.
While the work plan did not allow time for formal studies to be
done, the subcommittees did have access to advice from knowledge
able individuals. As an example, the production subcommittee inter
viewed on several occasions the chief of the mining section of the
central government's provincial delegation. The expert, Rafael
Escribano, shared with the committee the limited information that was
known about Macael's white marble deposits and suggested a number
of specific studies that he believed would be valuable.
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The full committee debated the draft reports during two days of
meetings in October. While many disagreements persisted, they were
muted by three factors: some disputes about facts were resolved by
investigation or expert opinion, committee members had experienced
working together, and every participant felt ownership of at least one
subcommittee's draft report. By the end of the second day, IPIA's
director believed that agreement on the issues was sufficient to support
the fonnalization of an action plan. He promised that IPIA would use
the subcommittee reports in preparing a full draft of the plan, which
would serve as the basis for discussion at the meeting scheduled for
November.
Apart from summarizing the problems, the draft identified a number
of lines of action, including revising contractual mining rights, com
missioning geological and engineering studies of the area's marble
deposits, establishing an office for technological support, contracting
with designers for assistance in gauging the artisanal goods market,
setting standards for product quality, improving roads, expanding elec
trical networks, planning industrial sites, creating a purchasing cooper
ative, conducting market research, founding a marketing cooperative,
improving occupational health and safety, sponsoring educational pro
grams, and seeking official financing. Each line of action identified the
problem it addressed, conceptualized distinct phases, set a time frame
for each phase, and assigned responsibility for implementation to spe
cific subcommittees. A slightly modified version of IPIA's proposal
was unanimously adopted by the full committee in November 1983
and became the official "Comprehensive Action Plan of the Area of
Marble of Macael."
Clinical Interpretations
When the planning process begins, knowledge about the environ
ment mostly reflects each committee member's respective experience.
Intense conflict is to be expected when people whose perceptions of
reality are untested interact for the first time.
Conflict can be productive if it motivates committee members to
inquire into questions that they had considered settled. In striving
towards this ideal, the action plan coordinator must be willing to play a
leadership role in the planning committee. This role entails taking
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responsibility for structuring the initial discussions, as well as ensuring
that diverse viewpoints are heard. Offering a roster of key issues is one
way to focus attention. In managing the ensuing discussion, the
regional promotion agency should not suppress differences of opinion,
but rather should seek to help stakeholders to work through their dis
agreements.
Subcommittees can bear much of the burden of detailing definitions
of problematic issues, proposing lines of action, and fostering the par
ticipants' sense of ownership of the planning process. An action plan
coordinator can influence the pace of the subcommittees' work by ask
ing them to report by a certain date to the full group. The coordinator
also can influence the substance of this work through ongoing informal
contacts, which may require establishing a personal presence in the
community during this phase of the process.
The realities of the planning process suggest it is incumbent on the
coordinator to press for unanimous agreement on the action plan
before the industry's problems are systematically studied. It might be
thought that this approach is tantamount to putting the cart before the
horse. However, the coordinator has to be concerned with building a
cohesive planning committee, with creating a sense of momentum and
accomplishment, with expressing respect for what the industry
believed was true, and with projecting a unified image to agencies that
would be asked to fund the studies recommended by the committee.
Negotiating the first official version of the action plan before the
research phase can place an industry in a better position both to obtain
resources for high quality studies and to make effective use of what
can be learned from expert inquiry. An additional advantage of this
seemingly "inverted sequence" is that it embeds deeply into the fabric
of the planning group's experience the norm that an action plan is
negotiated and dynamic.9
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Events at Macael

IPIA's first major task in implementing the Action Plan was to
arrange for studies of the area's geological structure and mining prac
tices. Preliminary contacts with a state-owned research enterprise,
ADARO, indicated that the proposed studies would cost more than 100
million pesetas (roughly, $US 700,000) to complete. Under the
national mining promotion law, the Ministry of Industry's General
Direction for Mines could fund three-quarters of such costs. Since nei
ther IPIA nor Macael could afford to make up the difference, Sa*nchez
de la Morena decided to ask the Ministry to fund the full project. He
invited Macael's mayor and the president of the employers association
to accompany him at a meeting with Ministry of Industry officials in
Madrid. In making their case, the trio claimed that Macael was fully
committed to finding common solutions to its current crisis, as evi
denced by its ability to reach unanimous agreement on its comprehen
sive Action Plan. Studies of Macael's geological structure and mining
practices were, they argued, crucial to the further development and
success of the Action Plan. In the end, the Ministry agreed to fund 100
percent of the ADARO studies.
Thanks to the active role played in formulating the plan by Rafael
Escribano, the provincial mining official, participants on the planning
committee knew from the outset what information they wanted to
obtain through the geological and mining studies. They were looking
for an authoritative measure of the magnitude of Macael's marble
deposits. They wanted to know how the quality of the area's marble
compared with that of other regions in Spain and with that of Carrara,
Italy's premier white marble-producing area. They hoped to learn how
to reduce the debris generated in huge quantities by the technique of
blasting marble blocks and boulders out of quarry frontages. They
sought ways to prevent landslides in the mines. In addition, they were
curious about how the spatial distribution of the area's various marble
formations related to the boundaries of their respective quarries. Some
committee members were also interested to know how this information
might be used in planning the industry's development.
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Since much of ADARO's work took place in the field, many busi
ness owners came into direct contact with the activities of the Action
Plan. Some business owners gained additional familiarity with the geo
logical and mining research studies by attending periodic meetings,
called by the employers association, at which interim results were dis
cussed. At one event, for instance, Rafael Escribano and ADARO
researchers explained the significance of detailed aerial photographs
that had been taken of Macael's surroundings. At a subsequent meet
ing, it was announced that Macael possessed Spain's largest endow
ment of white marble, which ADARO said would likely remain
plentiful for at least a few generations, and that Macael's marble was
more durable than Carrara's.
With the aid of science, IPIA was able to draw out the competitive
implications of these facts about nature: If Macael's white marble was
the most plentiful in Spain and more durable than Carrara's, then the
area should strive to become a formidable competitor in the national
and European marble industry. As to why Macael was suffering an eco
nomic crisis, despite its potential competitive advantages, scientific
studies provided an alternative answer to a lack of subsidies: the
boundaries of the existing quarries did not correspond to rock forma
tions and the use of dynamite reduced the yield of valuable marble
blocks. This analysis implied that Macael needed to seek solutions to
its problems, such as restructuring property rights and introducing
major technological change, that were not part of the industry's usual
way of looking at itself. These conclusions did ring true for a sizable
number of Macael business owners, as indicated by their eventual
enthusiasm for both kinds of changes.
Sensing that business owners were emboldened by the news that
Macael was richly endowed with marble of the highest quality, yet
anxious about the recommendation that mining rights be restructured
and technology updated, IPIA created an opportunity for members of
the employers association, along with a few other planning committee
participants, to travel to Carrara. IPIA and the employers association
agreed to share the projected travel expenses of 3 million pesetas ($US
25,000). The trip to Italy by bus was an important experience for those
who went along, most of whom had yet to travel beyond Spain. In Car
rara, they toured quarries, fabricating shops, and residential areas, find
ing little resemblance between the world of Macael and the one they

Managing Local Development 51

were coming to know. In many quarries, for example, they saw fully
automated machines, equipped with industrial diamonds, cut huge
blocks out of marble veins. In the fabricating shops, they observed the
operation of automatic saws mat sliced marble blocks into thin sheets,
which were then mechanically polished into finished floor tiles and
steps. During the stay, the visitors from Macael also had a chance to
meet with their local counterparts and representatives of Italian equip
ment manufacturers. Some members of the delegation came away from
this experience saying to themselves, "We are nobodies in this busi
ness." The term "total modernization," which had been bandied about
by IPIA even since S£nchez de la Morena first proposed the idea of
working on an action plan for Macael, suddenly had a fuller meaning.

Clinical Interpretations
An important task at this stage in the process is to draw out the com
petitive implications of objective knowledge about the physical and
economic environment of the industry. Once business owners become
accustomed to thinking that the operating environment can be under
stood with some degree of objectivity and that the local industry is a
valid unit of analysis, action plan coordinators should help work out a
detailed, shared vision that expresses what the industry as a whole
wants to achieve. A vision is not so much a statement of objectives as a
shared cognitive and affecting image of a state of affairs that individu
als sense is worth striving toward. Shared visions motivate individual
and collective action and foster agreement on what operational steps
should be taken.
When most people reflect upon what they want to achieve, they look
for role models. It is reasonable to infer by analogy that a traditional
industry's effort to envision an attractive future will be aided if its
stakeholders are familiar with traditional industries which overcame
the competitive disadvantages of fragmentation. Bringing action plan
participants into contact with potential role models could well be the
most cost-effective investment a coordinator can make.
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Building Institutions and Planning Investments
Events at Macael
During 1984, while the ADARO studies were in progress, members
of the planning committee began to explore ways to solve certain prob
lems common to all firms in the area. Almost everyone felt, for exam
ple, that the dirt roads leading into the quarries were a problem. They
were dusty in summer, muddy in winter, and generally unsafe for the
large trucks that drove along them hauling away marble stones and
boulders. The narrow, winding paved roads that connected the several
municipalities of the Macael area to one another and to the major pro
vincial roads were also considered inadequate. Knowing that the
regional government, which was responsible for roads, was short on
funds, the employers association proposed that its members and the
government share the costs: if the regional government would pay for
the asphalt, the firms would supply the labor to lay it on the roadbed.
After some delay, the initiative succeeded. This event set the stage for
a more comprehensive agreement in mid-1985 for road improvements,
signed by Macael and two departments of the regional government.10
A second major problem upon which all could agree was the need to
improve the availability of electricity in the industrial and mining
areas. Solving this problem required the cooperation of the privately
owned electric power utility of Andalusia, the Compaflfa Sevillana de
Electricidad. IPIA took the lead in pressuring the utility to invest in
Macael. As a result, the company invested about 74 million pesetas
($US 500,000) in the area in 1984, up from 13 million pesetas the pre
vious year. 11
The Macael Action Plan called for studying the feasibility of creat
ing several industrywide institutions, which were strongly favored by
IPIA and the local government. One of these proposed institutions was
a purchasing cooperative, which would take title to inputs it acquired
in bulk and stored in its own warehouse until they were repurchased by
Macael firms. The proposal did not spark much resistance since interfirm rivalry focused on sales, and business owners recognized that they
could purchase supplies at lower prices by concentrating their buying
power. Moreover, a similar arrangement among extraction firms for the
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production and delivery of compressed air—a key blasting input—was
already in place. Once the industry agreed in November 1984 to create
the purchasing cooperative, plans were made for constructing the
warehouse and a former local priest was hired to manage the operation.
The issue that generated the most conflict was the proposed joint
sales and marketing cooperative. Both Macael's mayor and IPIA
expected this institution to solve such key problems as small firms'
inability to fill the large orders of major construction firms, field a sales
organization, and fund promotional campaigns. They also hoped that it
would mitigate tendencies of local firms to compete with each other for
sales principally on the basis of price. Business owners, however,
viewed this proposal as a threat to their individual autonomy. The firms
whose commercial connections were better developed, furthermore,
did not see how they would be advantaged by the marketing coopera
tive. Despite stiff resistance from the employers association, both IPIA
and the mayor pressed ahead with the feasibility study called for by the
Action Plan. The opposition of the employers association relented in
mid-1985, when agreement on a relatively weak marketing cooperative
was hammered out.12
In early 1985, IPIA shifted attention to the idea of creating a corpo
ration whose principal asset would initially be the brand name, "Mar
ble of Macael." This corporation, at a minimum, would prepare audio
visual materials on the industry's products, represent the industry at
trade fairs, and promote the name of Marble of Macael in the media. A
more ambitious conception was to give the corporation the power to
prohibit local firms from using the brand name if they failed to meet
specific quality standards. This latter suggestion, however, foundered
on business owners' unwillingness to have the quality of their products
judged by such an organization. IPIA and the mayor believed it was
more important to launch the brand name corporation, the "Sociedad
de la Marca 'M£rmol de Macael,' S.A.," than to hold out for more
restrictive bylaws. The two camps reached an agreement in November
1985.13
A second major objective of the Action Plan in 1985—in addition to
building institutions—was to translate the general vision of Macael's
modernization into a plan for investing in plant and equipment. Such a
plan was to be used in attracting financing from official and private
institutions and in inducing changes in the operations of individual
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firms. Formulating the industrial restructuring model required detailed
knowledge of firms' existing product lines, scale, output quality, access
to raw materials, plant, equipment, production management, sales
capacity, administrative skill, and the like. This information was col
lected by a consulting firm hired by IPIA and the employers associa
tion. The interim product of this effort was a classification of Macael
firms by product line, based on their existing capacities and what their
future role in the industry might be.
This formulation of the industrywide plan for firm-level investments
generated some controversy at meetings of business owners convened
by the employers association. The consulting firm modified the pro
posed model somewhat before recommending investments for each
category of firms.
In November 1985, the planning committee made the industrial
restructuring model and its investment plan part of the official Macael
Action Plan.14 Shortly thereafter, IPIA announced that it would cover 9
percent of the investment costs of the larger firms and 18 percent of
those of smaller firms, so long as these firms' proposed projects were
consistent with the industrial restructuring model.
By the beginning of 1986, about two years into the implementation
of the Action Plan, Macael was thus well positioned to respond to the
rising domestic demand for marble construction materials. Some infrastructural improvements were complete and many more were planned,
including the development of industrial sites equipped with electrical
lines, telephone circuits, and water supplies. Business owners were
beginning to collaborate with one another, as long as their autonomy
was not genuinely threatened. As a symbol of this new willingness to
cooperate, a centrally located building containing the offices of the
employers association and the warehouse of the buyers cooperative
was about to be inaugurated. The Sociedad de la Marca was gearing up
to promote the brand name, Mdrmol de Macael. Many business owners
were primed to invest in new plant and equipment; a few had already
begun to do so by reinvesting whatever profits they had been earning.
The idea of a comprehensive and negotiated action plan for the mod
ernization of Macael's marble industry, furthermore, had been given a
detailed, logical expression in the industrial restructuring model. But
IPIA and the industry knew that even the best laid plans for Macael
could founder on the absence of external financial support.
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Clinical Interpretations
An action plan should eventually offer a clear conception of how the
industry as a whole intends to compete in the national and international
marketplace. It should also embody specific plans for designing, pro
ducing, and selling products. And it should offer a framework for plan
ning and evaluating the array of firm-level and collective investments
that would make it possible to carry out the strategic business plan.
At the time a shared vision begins to form, such a detailed plan can
only be a distant objective. In deciding what issues to take up, in what
order, and with what duration of inquiry, an action plan coordinator,
therefore, should also seek to achieve some interim process objectives.
One such objective is to sustain industry leaders' newly generated opti
mism about the prospects for meaningful change and to help their
respective constituencies share this attitude.
An action plan committee may create a sense of momentum by ini
tially working on issues that tend to generate modest conflict (e.g.,
road paving and the purchasing cooperative in Macael). When commit
ment to the action plan concept is strong and a specific vision is begin
ning to form, the planning process can handle intense conflict (such as
that generated by the marketing and sales cooperative issue).
In managing intensely conflictual issues, an action plan coordinator
might best take a long-term view of its goals. The critical short-term
interest includes educating business owners about the prospects of
their industry and demonstrating to the outside world that the industry
is overcoming the effects of fragmentation. In the short run, it may be
less important to enforce common standards of quality, for instance,
than to enlarge business owners' experience with collaborative institu
tions.
Handling controversial issues sequentially is useful in containing
conflict, building decisionmaking capacity, and distributing the plan
ning committee's workload over time. Yet, dealing simultaneously
with a range of issues, such as infrastructure, plant and equipment, and
collaborative institutions is necessary for planning to result in a com
petitive strategy before too long.
In advancing simultaneously along these lines without overtaxing
the planning committee, it is almost certainly necessary to use the ser
vices of consulting firms. Action plan coordinators can reduce the risks
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of involving consultants by educating them about the premises and
precepts of the process. In addition, it is advisable to arrange for at
least one of the other planning committee members to share the costs
of the consulting work. This arrangement strengthens the norm that the
planning committee is responsible for making the decisions that shape
the local industry's future. It also facilitates the interactive relationship
among experts and decisionmakers essential to a successful action
plan.
Mobilizing Resources
Events at Macael

IPIA's early fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Macael Action Plan
met with considerable success. As discussed above, the Ministry of
Industry agreed to cover the entire cost of ADARO's scientific and
engineering studies. The Compaflfa Sevillana de Electricidad and
Telef6nica were persuaded to greatly increase their rate of investment
in Macael. The regional government, as well, invested $3.5 million
during 1984-85 in roads, market research, warehousing facilities for
the buyers and marketing cooperatives, office space for the employers
association, and a medical clinic for Macael's workers.
Despite these early successes in channeling funds towards research
and infrastructure projects, IPIA was extremely anxious about deliver
ing on its commitment to help firms finance investments in plant and
equipment. The pressures on the Institute to fulfill business owners'
expectations became especially acute in late 1985, when the planning
committee approved the industrial restructuring model.15 This detailed
plan called for investments of more than 3 billion pesetas ($US 25 mil
lion) in Macael's fabricating shops (i.e., seven times the amount gener
ated by the Action Plan so far).
IPIA's anxiety about delivering on its promise to mobilize resources
was further heightened by several facts. IPIA knew that most Macael
firms had never obtained subsidies from the central government
Andalusia's regional government, moreover, remained short on funds
while the fiscal system for Spain's 17 Autonomous Communities
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evolved. And Macael firms could not yet finance a high proportion of
these investments from operating profits.
IPIA also entered into discussions with the Ministry of Industry,
which managed the national industrialization fund for Andalusia, to
reduce the bureaucratic obstacles that had impeded Macael firms'
access to this funding source. In early 1986, the Ministry agreed to pro
vide the highest degree of financial support it could, namely, up to 25
percent of those planned outlays for plant and equipment judged by
IPIA to be consistent with the restructuring model. It was also agreed
that IPIA would serve as a conduit for subsidy proposals.
IPIA also sought to make it easier for Macael firms to borrow funds
from private sources. Commercial banks in Andalusia were historically
wary of loaning funds to small enterprises. In the years immediately
preceding the Action Plan, banks practically refused to extend credit to
Macael firms, including Banco Popular, which had maintained a
branch office in Macael for 30 years. As the result of negotiations that
began in January 1986, this bank agreed to extend five-year loans
instead of its usual short-term loans for industrialization projects. The
regional government, in turn, agreed to provide an interest rate subsidy
of 2 percent for projects that implemented the Action Plan. A similar
agreement was reached later in the year with the quasi-public savings
bank of Almerfa (Caja de Ahorros). 16
When meeting with banks and agencies, IPIA usually noted that
Macael's proven marble reserves were plentiful and that the demand
for the area's products would grow markedly. The ADARO studies and
the sharp upturn in demand that occurred in 1985—as construction
activity revived along Andalusia's Costa del Sol—gave credibility to
these points. Citing investments in infrastructure, IPIA also sought to
demonstrate the public sector's commitment to eliminating bottle
necks. At such meetings, the president of the employers association
argued that the area's business owners were committed to making
Macael a major force in the national and European marble industry.
In mobilizing resources for Macael, the Institute anticipated that
social and political arguments would be as persuasive to some audi
ences as economic ones. Andalusia's weak industrialization was
widely considered to be a pressing social problem. Many institutions,
moreover, were extremely sensitive to the fact that the socialist party
had won an absolute majority in the regional parliament after cam-
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paigning on a platform of social and economic development.17 S&ichez
de la Morena explained that IPIA's specific mission was to find ways of
manufacturing valuable products from Andalusia's rich endowment of
natural resources and to stitch together the region's economic fabric.
He pointed out that Almerfa province was otherwise virtually bereft of
industrial activity. By implication, financing investments at Macael
represented an excellent way to advance the industrial development
goals of the regional government and of the Andalusian public.
The Macael planning committee promoted this concept through a
variety of means. For example, the employers association in 1985
invented the Premio de Mdrmol, a prize to be awarded annually to an
individual or institution who made a significant contribution to the
local industry. The association's leadership chose the award recipients
carefully. In 1987, for instance, a Premio de Mdrmol was given to the
editor of a national news magazine, Cambio 16, who had previously
worked for a prominent newspaper in Almerfa; to the director of a
major provincial bank, Caja Almerfa; and to the trade association of
eastern Andalusia's architects. In this way, special ties were fostered
with national media, banking, and customer organizations. Members of
the planning committee found additional ways to draw influential out
siders to Macael. As just one example, the regional government's pres
ident came to inaugurate the warehouses for the buyers and marketing
cooperatives in March 1986. Apart from these special events, planning
committee leaders created hundreds of opportunities to project
Macael's image as an industry and community on the move.18
The combined efforts of IPIA and the Macael Action Plan leaders
succeeded in generating about 700 million pesetas ($US 5 million) in
government grants and about 1,850 million pesetas ($US 15 million) in
loans for investments in plant and equipment during 1986-88. The
goals for aggregate investment in plant and equipment, set out in the
industrial restructuring model, were practically reached before the end
of 1988, thanks in large part to an extremely high rate of profit rein
vestment. The total investment in Macael, including infrastructure,
research, and institution-building, exceeded 5 billion pesetas ($US 42
million) during the first five years of the Action Plan.
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Clinical Interpretations
Once the coordinator votes in favor of an action plan proposal
requiring external financial resources, it is obligated to use its institu
tional muscle with banks, government agencies, and utilities in order to
implement the agreed upon plan. In many cases, banks and govern
ment agencies are reluctant to invest in industries of the past When
decisionmakers are naturally skeptical of investing resources in tradi
tional industries, it is advantageous to expose them to the action plan
process. One way to do so is for the coordinator to be joined by other
key planning committee members at negotiating sessions; another is to
invite decisionmakers to make site visits. The action plan's numerous
diagnostic and prescriptive studies are another important tool for
explaining how implementing the plan will enable the local industry to
compete.
If agencies are seeking to make their programs visible in the public
eye, it makes sense to intimate that a formal agreement will be publi
cized and that credit for the overall success of the action plan will be
shared. If funding agencies and banks are looking for ways to serve
small and medium-sized firms efficiently, it is advantageous to explain
how the framework of the action plan will reduce the transaction costs
of evaluating individual project proposals. To underscore this advan
tage, action plan coordinators might serve as a conduit between partic
ular firms and these large institutions.
Outcomes
While total quarry output increased 33 percent between 1983 and
1987, the production of marble suited for construction materials rose
by 75 percent. 19 As a result of improvements in mining and fabrication,
some 20 firms became major suppliers of building materials. By 1987,
only 30 percent of sales were accounted for by unprocessed marble,
while annual revenues reached 15 billion pesetas ($US 125 million).20
The industrial restructuring study recommended that firms that
could not produce raw materials economically focus on the fabrication
of decorative objects. The extent to which firms have followed this
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recommendation cannot be estimated with available data. It is,
however, clear that some shops have purchased equipment to mecha
nize this production process.
The number of firms that complied with the Action Plan and
received subsidies from the regional government increased from 16 to
64 between 1985, when the industrial restructuring study was com
pleted, and 1987.21 Total investment in plant and equipment during
1984-88 reached $US 30.6 million.22
The Sociedad de la Marca has been extremely active in promoting
the brand name "Mdrmol de Macael" Between 1986 and 1987, it
administered an advertising promotion budget of more than 70 million
pesetas (about $US 600,000). Its activities, along with the objective
improvements in product quality, have made the name "Macael" a
potent signal of value in the national marble industry.
Macael firms have utilized their purchasing cooperative. It is diffi
cult to estimate, however, the magnitude of the cost savings it gener
ated. The sales and marketing cooperative has not been utilized by
firms catering to the construction industry. Most firms have been sell
ing directly all they can produce, thanks to a boom in luxury construc
tion activity in Spain.
Conclusion

The use of the operational method of coordinating a negotiated,
comprehensive, and dynamic Action Plan helped to achieve results in
Macael that were congruent with the political platform of Andalusia's
elected leaders and public policies, as well as with IPIA's mandate and
organizational strategy during the 1982-87 period. These results were
achieved despite such constraints as distrust of governmental eco
nomic or regional planning, a weak enterprising tradition, and the
regional government's minimal direct control over economic policy
instruments. The Macael case shows that this combination of policies,
mandates, organizational strategies, and operational methods can be
remarkably effective in contexts such as Andalusia, where subnational
governmental officials were committed to promoting economic devel
opment in the aftermath of a transition to democracy.
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An action plan is an operational method whose effectiveness in pro
moting the aims of public policy depends significantly on the skill with
which it is managed. While some skilled performances may be based
solely on personal and inarticulate knowledge,23 coordinating an action
plan is not one of them. Practitioners' skill in using this method may be
enhanced by expanding their clinical knowledge.2* This paper expands
clinical knowledge about the use of this operational method by inter
preting why specific actions in Macael helped achieve the public pol
icy aim of developing locally based industries in Andalusia.25
To be skilled practitioners, coordinators of action plans also need a
way to conceptualize or frame the role they play. Role frames "deter
mine practitioners' strategies of attention and thereby set the directions
in which they try to shape the problematic situations they confront."26
Judging from the Macael case, an appropriate role frame for action
plan coordinators may be grounded in conceptual networks such as
service management, issue framing, leadership, social learning, negoti
ation, and political management.27 The literature about these concep
tual networks—which structure an emerging American conception of
public management—is a useful source of precepts for developing the
role frame of action plan coordinators, as indicated below.
1. Service Management. Treat the stakeholders in an industry as cus
tomers. Imagine how customers are likely to experience initial contacts
with agency personnel. Assure stakeholders that the agency wants to
provide a service rather than to exercise administrative control. Indi
cate that if stakeholders reach agreement on an action plan, the agency
would champion it in contacts with government agencies, banks, and
other resource providers.28
2. Issue Framing. Choose carefully the categories employed to define
the situation.29 Identify goals that are attractive to all stakeholders,
given the dominant ideology of the period.30 Indicate that the problem
is multifaceted, involving production, marketing, finance, and working
conditions.
3. Leadership. Develop a transactive relationship with the stakeholders
conducive to mutual learning.31 Explain that the action plan should be
theirs, not the government's. Insist that the purpose of an action plan is
to achieve change, not just to study problems. Provide a certain amount
of structure for stakeholders' involvement in the planning activity.32
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Empower stakeholders to perform leadership functions.33 Modulate
conflict among stakeholders so that they are stimulated to master the
situation they are facing, while not overwhelmed by the task.34 Gener
ate small wins and celebrate successes.35
4. Social Learning. Create an experiential and institutional basis for
joint inquiry and action. Use formal inquiry and analysis to create
movement in the group process.36 Ensure mat expert knowledge is col
lected or developed in response to stakeholders' perception of a need
for it.37 Give stakeholders an opportunity to accept, amend, or reject the
results. Help stakeholders fashion an attractive and realistic vision of
the future. Focus attention on how the local industry fits into the
broader environment.38 Let specific objectives emerge in the course of
ongoing inquiry and action.39
5. Negotiation. Negotiate networks of linked agreements consistent
with public policy and the agency's strategy.40 Provide incentives for
firms to collaborate when it is beneficial for the local industry as a
whole.41 Seek firms' compliance with the action plan by making it the
basis for allocating subsidies and credit.
6. Political Management. Publicize the planning process and results.
Use analysis as an instrument of persuasion.42 Highlight stakeholders'
commitment to achieving their vision for the local industry. Remind
audiences of the relationship between public policy and the operational
method of action plans.43
The conceptual networks within which these precepts are embedded
emerged in the mainstream literature about public administration as the
result of decades of criticism of a vision of good government as cen
tralized, hierarchical, and staffed by experts. They reflect many con
temporary American beliefs about social problemsolving and
governance in a decentralized liberal democracy. As elected officials
and managers in Eastern Europe and Latin America look for role
frames appropriate to both their positions in democratic institutions
and the substantive problems of postauthoritarian situations, they may
find the experientially grounded conceptual networks of public man
agement attractive.
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Worker Democracy
in Socialist France
Bernard E. Brown
City University ofNew York

Worker participation hardly existed in French enterprise before the
victory of the Left in 1981. Enterprise committees ("comite*s d'entreprise"), created after World War II, were concerned almost entirely
with external activities (travel, holiday, cultural and educational pro
grams). Trade unions competed vigorously for control of enterprise
committees, whose sizable budgets offered opportunities for employ
ment of union militants and shaping of working-class attitudes. But
enterprise committees did not share meaningfully in management
It was the intention of the Left government in 1981 to transform
authority relations within enterprises. The stated goal was eventually to
achieve economic democracy, summed up in the slogan "autogestion"
(literally, self-management). Roundly condemning both capitalism
(Socialists agreed with Communists on the need to break with this evil
system) and Russian-style communism (Communists agreed with
Socialists that the Soviet Union represented a form of authoritarian
socialism that had to be transcended), the united Left pledged to enable
workers to become masters and shapers of their own destinies. 1
In the summer and fall of 1982 a series of four laws was enacted by
the National Assembly creating "new rights for workers," known pop
ularly thereafter by the name of the Socialist Minister of Labor, Jean
Auroux. The lois Auroux, or Auroux laws, mandated the creation in all
enterprises employing over 200 people of "groupes d'expression
directe" (expression groups), in which workers would be able to speak
up directly and collectively on any aspect of their workday life. Impor
tant new powers were also devolved upon the enterprise committees,
whose members are elected only by workers. Management was
required to inform enterprise committees ahead of time concerning any
important decisions—including production and pricing strategy, intro67
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duction of new technology, and investment policies. And enterprises
were also required to bargain collectively with unions every year. What
happened? Did the French Left find a "third way" between grasping
capitalism and authoritarian socialism?
To judge by the accounts that have appeared so far outside of
France, very little of consequence has happened,2 Foreign observers
have tended to downgrade the changes introduced by the Auroux laws.
W. Rand Smith demonstrates convincingly that the laws have not
enabled workers to challenge the basic power of private (and, we may
add, public) employers to make decisions. Hence, autogestion (defined
as the exercise of control over workplace decisions), he says, has not
been achieved. Indeed, employers have turned the Auroux laws to their
advantage, so that worker control is farther away than ever. The laws
are an attempt to "modernize" labor-management relations, Smith con
cludes, "by giving workers an opportunity to express themselves and
by encouraging collective bargaining."3 Hence, French practice has
merely been brought into line with practice elsewhere.
Bernard Moss affirms also that the Auroux laws have failed to bring
about a change in the balance of power. He sees continuity in labormanagement relations as the major feature of the modern period in
France, described as "the cycle of managerial supremacy interrupted
by waves of radical protest which have characterized its industrial
past"4 Similarly, Duncan Gallic concludes that the laws did little to
modify the traditional structure of French industrial relations.5 A slight
difference of emphasis may be noted in the appraisals of these observ
ers. "Modernized" managerial supremacy presumably is not the same
as an immutable traditional structure.
Why didn't the French Left break with capitalism? The reasons
mentioned by Smith and Moss include: the inherent ambiguity of the
notion of autogestion, the rivalry between Socialists and Communists,
divisions among the unions, and government-sponsored austerity mea
sures. "Under these conditions," Moss observes, "it was not surprising
that managerial adversaries rather than union supporters derived the
greatest satisfaction from the application of the new laws."6 In addition
to the unfavorable circumstances, Smith adds, the Socialist party was
not able to adopt a program capable of translating its aspirations into
reality. The implication is that under favorable conditions—unity of
the Left parties and of the working class, a period of economic growth
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and prosperity, and a firm political will to break with capitalism—the
goal of autogestion would be within reach. As the French would say,
"Vouloir, c'est pouvoir" (where there is a will, there is a way).
These critics are thoroughly familiar with labor-management rela
tions in France, and with the excellent studies by French labor sociolo
gists on the implementation of the Auroux laws.7 Each point in their
argument is well taken. But they have underestimated the importance
of changes in the climate of labor-management relations and have
drawn partial conclusions. The purpose of this essay is to call attention
to new developments in industrial relations in France since the adop
tion of the Auroux laws, and to show that the failure to achieve the
stated goal of the French Left sheds precious light on the theory of eco
nomic democracy.
Managerial Supremacy—But Why?

Agreement may be registered at the outset on one key point: the par
ticipative structures created by the Auroux laws have come under the
domination of management. To understand why, let us take a closer
look at these structures. Between 1983 and 1985, when the Auroux
laws were reviewed, amended, and reenacted by the National Assem
bly, some 6,000 agreements were reached between management and
the representatives of workers (either unions or enterprise committees),
leading to the creation of about 100,000 expression groups. Typically,
an expression group consists of 15 to 20 people who meet two or three
times a year and have the right to "express" themselves on any aspect
of their working conditions.
Some major trends were immediately evident. Better educated
workers tended to speak up and monopolize the time of most groups;
only skilled leadership was able to prevent this from happening. As
predicted by the skeptics, apathy set in after the initial period of enthu
siasm. Workers generally lost interest in attending meetings, even
though they were on company time. Within two years, about one-third
of the expression groups had ceased to meet altogether, and another
one-third met only intermittently.
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Expression groups that meet regularly share a crucial characteristic:
their worker-members are mobilized and actively supported by man
agement. As one French sociologist put it, successful expression
groups have been a creation of "the Prince."8 This development
resulted from a turnaround of business policy on workforce participa
tion. Immediately after the adoption of the Auroux laws, the Conseil
National du Patronat Frances (CNPF)—which had fought their adop
tion tooth and nail—encouraged its members to play the game accord
ing to the changed rules in order to prevent the Communist-led
Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT) from taking over. An
Estates-General of the CNPF in 1983 urged managers to train foremen
and supervisory employees (cadres) as discussion leaders and to throw
their resources and energies into the struggle to control the new groups.
Managers were advised through the business press to take the fol
lowing steps: set up training courses for cadres; reward cadres for tak
ing the lead in groups; make sure that questions and criticism receive
the attention of the hierarchy; rapidly resolve problems thus called to
the attention of superiors; and communicate this information to the
groups. When managers were reluctant to take these measures (either
because they were unconvinced of the need, had too much difficulty
with cadres who wished to preserve their traditional prerogatives, or
were harassed by a strong union leadership), expression groups faded
away or were easily contained.
It was virtually impossible for the CGT or Confederation Franc.aise
Democratique du Travail (CFDT) to displace management in giving a
firm lead to the groups. Most militants were formed in the school of
class conflict, and were not ready for instant conversion into apostles
of class cooperation. Nor did their training prepare them to be adept at
two-way communication between rank-and-file at one end and man
agement at the other. In rare cases where unions were able to mobilize
and guide workers, management was able to contain unruly expression
groups by ignoring them. After a while, discouraged workers simply
gave up.
An unforeseen development after 1982 was the phenomenal expan
sion, not of expression groups but rather of all things, quality circles. A
handful of French businessmen, inspired by Japanese production meth
ods during an Asian tour, had founded the Association Franc,aise des
Cercles de Qualite (AFCERQ) a year before the passage of the Auroux
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laws. The attempt to introduce Japanese-style quality circles was a fail
ure—considered by workers to be the latest of many business-spon
sored schemes to intensify class exploitation. It was only after the
passage of the Auroux laws that the quality circle movement took off.
As of 1988, AFCERQ had presided over the creation of some 40,000
quality circles, and the principle was extended by the Chirac govern
ment to the civil service.
How did it happen? Managers were advised to consider the expres
sion group as a useful technique for involving workers in their enter
prise and identifying problems. In a second step, workers were to be
encouraged to help resolve problems—through quality circles.
AFCERQ consultants warned that quality circles would wither unless
substantial resources, time, and energy were invested in them. Success
ful quality circles, according to AFCERQ, would require: commitment
from top management; organization of study groups for travel to the
United States or Japan; weekend seminars for all managers and cadres
in order to consider the recommendations of the consultants; discus
sion by all employees of the new procedures; and, finally and only
then, creation and constant care of the quality circles.
The pressure on workers to enter and participate in the quality
movement was irresistible. The unions, including even the CGT, gave
up their boycott. Alas (for management), quality circles are subject to
the same trends of apathy that wreaked such havoc with expression
groups. The most recent development is to make emphasis on quality
part of the productive process through work teams, suggestion boxes,
and collective participation in definition of goals for the enterprise,
along with expression groups and quality circles.9
Equally disappointing to advocates of worker control has been the
performance of enterprise committees. In the original conception, dele
gates elected by workers are to give an opinion on all important deci
sions by management before they are taken. Management is also
required to submit annual reports to enterprise committees, which are
permitted to hire specialists (such as accountants, lawyers, or engi
neers)—at company expense—to help them understand these reports.
Great hopes were placed in enterprise committees, suitably aided by
outside experts, union headquarters, and political parties, to counter
management proposals with their own. Enterprise committees were to
constitute a rival power within the structure of enterprise, and perhaps
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prepare the way for the assumption of managerial prerogatives by
workers. The Communist party planned to use enterprise committees
to impose its celebrated "new criteria of management"— production
for use rather than for profit—throughout the economy.
Enterprise committees suffered the same fate as expression groups,
and for much the same reasons. Management could ignore recommen
dations from hostile enterprise committees with relative ease. More
positively, management made the agreeable discovery that it could
communicate more effectively with workers through their elected dele
gates, and with delegates through their hired experts. Instead of chal
lenging capitalism, enterprise committees and expression groups for
the most part were enrolled in a vast campaign to strengthen it—in
order to protect jobs and raise salaries.
The fate of participative structures thus points up the inherent diffi
culty of maintaining worker autonomy against the formidable pressure
that can be brought to bear by the concentrated power of management.
Only one effective counterforce can be envisaged: the unions. But
worker autonomy has meant, in France, independence of workers from
all external constraints, including that of unions, which are bureaucratized and linked to potentially domineering political parties and the
State. Worker control is not the same as control by unions and parties
in the name of workers.10
The failure of enterprise committees to offer a feasible alternative to
management policies is highly instructive. Almost immediately after
the passage of the Auroux laws, the CFDT found that its resources
were stretched too thin to be able to take on managerial functions as
well, and it stopped submitting counterproposals. The CGT, on the
other hand, drew up a number of counterproposals, particularly in
industries threatened by layoffs or plant closings.
Invariably, the CGT counterproposal consisted of a detailed inven
tory of customer needs, and of functions performed by each work post,
all leading to the triumphant conclusion that the enterprise is viable
and not a single job need be lost. What if there is no longer a market?
That is because management is thinking in terms of short-term profit
instead of social use. Plenty of customers are out there, in the Third
World and in Eastern Europe. How those customers would be able to
pay for goods without subsidies from French taxpayers is never
explained. Part of the standard counterproposal was also elimination of
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bothersome imports, while foreigners presumably would be happy to
go on buying French goods without any thought of retaliation. CGT
proposals were considered unconnected to reality, not only by manage
ment of private enterprises, but also (perhaps even more forcefully) by
the Socialist State responsible for the nationalized industries.11
Why has it been impossible to maintain worker autonomy against
bureaucratic pressure? For Edmond Maire, perhaps the most important
advocate of autogestion in the 1970s, the reasons go beyond the con
tingent factors mentioned by Smith and Moss (unemployment, auster
ity, lack of political will). It is the very notion of worker autonomy that
he calls into question. For a long time, Maire concedes, the labor
movement contrasted monarchical enterprise (where the boss wields
absolute power) with models reflecting the belief that workers can
decide everything. But now we must go further, declares the former
general secretary of the CFDT, and recognize the specificity and legiti
macy of the managerial function, which cannot be the result of collec
tive deliberation. Autogestion, he concludes, remains a valid ideal, but
is not a model for enterprise. The need today is not for a "break with
capitalism" (termed by Maire "a dangerous illusion and nonoperative")
but vigorous defense of workers' interests and "logic" within enter
prises. In effect, virtually every plank of the CFDTs radical program
of the 1970s has been discarded since the adoption of the Auroux
laws. 12

"Capitalism Ain't What It Used to Be"
A new model of enterprise has emerged in France, and it has
become dominant within the large, professionally managed sector of
the economy (both public and private). Before 1981, it was taken for
granted that management made all decisions, which were then trans
mitted downward to employees. Negotiations with unions took place
mainly at the branch or industry level (not within individual enter
prises), following guidelines set by the State. In turn, business was
expected to follow the lead of the State, whose top functionaries were
presumed to have a sense of national interest. This patriarchal model
reflected the prevailing belief within the French political class after the
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Liberation that French capitalism was backward, and that only a
dynamic State, served by specially trained civil servants, could accom
plish the task of rapid modernization.
"Le capitalisme n'est plus ce qu'il e*tait," exclaimed Edmond Maire,
who can hardly be accused of special sympathy for the profit motive.
Capitalism has undergone a "cultural revolution," observes Pierre
Rosanvallon, not an admirer of capitalism in the past. And Henri
Weber, former Trotskyist and now close collaborator of Laurent
Fabius, speaks of a "mutation" of French capitalism.13 What they all
refer to is the new model of the dynamic sector, based on a freer flow
of information throughout enterprises oriented to the market rather
than to the State. A significant portion of the budget of a modern
French enterprise (about 5 percent of the total payroll) is now devoted
to securing information from the base, circulating it through the hierar
chy, and ensuring collaboration of employees, cadres, and managers in
the achievement of agreed-upon goals. This emphasis on permanent
dialogue, two-way communication, and service to customers rather
than carrying out the commands of the State is a break with past prac
tice.
However, management's very success in creating participative
structures opens the way for a possible counterattack by unions and
workers from within the citadel. The process of dialogue changes atti
tudes and affects power relationships. In an enterprise fully committed
to participation, managers must eventually recognize the legitimacy of
a "workers' logic," to use Edmond Maire's term, and the importance of
workers' contribution to production. Absolute monarchy is converted
into at least a rechtstaat, or rule of law, with democracy perhaps in the
offing. But industrial democracy in this sense means interaction
between managers (who retain their prerogatives) and workers, not the
absorption of elites into a self-governing community.
The new model enterprise poses a formidable problem for unions,
which lost half of their members between 1976 and 1988. Pierre
Rosanvallon estimates union membership as of 1988 as follows:
600,000 for the CGT; 400,000 each for the CFDT and the ForceOuvriere (FO); and 200,000 for the teachers' union.14 The virtual col
lapse of unions, says Rosanvallon, is due to their inability so far to
cope with the cultural revolution that has taken place in enterprise.
Unions traditionally represent workers in negotiations with business
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and the State, and also in social security and welfare councils. They
have not been oriented towards participation in an "informational"
enterprise in which workers, cadres, and managers are in direct com
munication with each other and collectively regulate daily life. To meet
this immense challenge, unions must recast their structures and create a
new culture based on communication rather than either confrontation
or meek submission. Only CFDT leaders have thought through the
problem, but so far they have not been able to gain the support of their
own militants in bringing about the necessary reforms.
Primacy of the Political

Political factors have been and remain crucial determinants of the
nature of labor-management relations in France. Paradoxically, it was
the victory of the Left that led to an expansion of managerial power.
Before 1981 all attempts by business and parties of the Right to inte
grate workers into enterprise were rejected by unions and the parties of
the Left. But when the Left, in power, vowed to "break with capital
ism," workers and unions were carried into new structures of participa
tion on a wave of enthusiasm. Radicalization of the Socialist party was
a deliberate tactic by Francois Mitterrand to outflank the Communist
party on its Left, and to demonstrate to workers that they could have
socialism of a democratic rather than an authoritarian variety. Autogestion was an integral part of a Socialist program designed to reduce the
Communist party's appeal; it was a useful fiction. But, as it turned out,
once workers entered into the structures created by the Auroux laws
they could not resist domination by cadres and managers.
When the Socialists returned to power after the legislative elections
of 1988, they did not revive the ideological battle cries of 1981. On the
contrary, Prime Minister Michel Rocard fully accepted the principle of
worker participation and free flow of information within enterprise. He
embraced quality circles, instructed every ministry to draw up plans for
improving quality, and called for constant dialogue between workers
and managers as a top Socialist priority—thus trying to appropriate the
quality movement for the Left. The Socialists are seeking ways to push
the balance of power back in the direction of workers and unions—an
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extraordinarily difficult task. The experience of the Auroux laws so far
demonstrates that management enjoys an inherent advantage in the
contest for control of decisionmaking within enterprise.
To further complicate matters, the Socialist party did not have an
absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Communist party
made a slight comeback, gaining enough representation in the National
Assembly to command respect The strategy of both the Communist
party and the CGT was to take a militant line, resort to confrontational
tactics, and compel the Socialists to turn toward the Left instead of
opening to the Center. Class collaboration may prove to be as elusive
as the Socialist commonwealth.
Were the Auroux laws, in the final analysis, a failure? I suggest that
this attempt to create a worker democracy was actually an extraordi
nary success, because it permitted Francois Mitterrand to attain his
supreme goal: to reduce the influence of both the Communist party and
the CGT. Many workers were now persuaded that the Socialist party
indeed had their interests at heart. They responded by turning away
from the Communists, enabling Socialists to dominate the Left; the
way was thus cleared for genuine alternation in power between the
Right and a now respectable Left. As a result, the climate of labormanagement relations in France has changed significantly.
Worker democracy was always an unrealistic goal; but giving work
ers a say in enterprise is a major progressive development. Only the
victory of the Left in 1981 and the Auroux laws made it possible to
break down working-class and trade union resistance to participation
in enterprise. Management was able to dominate participatory struc
tures easily enough in a first step. But French business is beginning to
realize that there is a distinctive and valuable workers' logic (as
Edmond Maire put it). For French enterprises to compete effectively, it
is now currently accepted, they must convert to models in which infor
mation flow is circular rather than merely from the top down. The bat
tle between labor and management, and between Left and Right, is
now being redefined within a transformed economy.
The social base of French politics is no longer what it was before the
passage of the Auroux laws. The major actors within the system—busi
ness and labor—have in the past decade undergone at least the begin
ning of a mutation. Labor-management relations in France have not
reverted to their pre-1981 status; nor have they become a copy of for-
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eign models. Traditions of Jacobinism, business paternalism, revolu
tionary syndicalism, and mass communism have produced unique
conditions for the ongoing experiment in workforce participation.
Industrial relations surely will continue to evolve and to reflect a dis
tinctively French political culture somewhere this side of Utopia.
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at Trico Products
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After losing $28 million over a four-year period, and faced with
increasing pressure from OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers)
demanding that Trico Products reduce their product costs, Dick Wolf,
the president of the company, announced his plan to lay off 1,400 out
of 2,000 workers in November 1985. The "Big Three" automakers
were forcing Trico to reduce their costs by 30 percent in three years in
order to retain their contracts. Trico decided, with the encouragement
of Ford executives, to move the bulk of plant operations to Mexico and
Texas in order to remain competitive, as this move would result in sig
nificant wage reductions. Little was done to investigate the feasibility
of cutting operating costs in order to remain in Buffalo; it seemed that
these costs were accepted as a given that could not be changed.
The projected plant closing and move from Buffalo was a major
departure from the company's traditions. Trico Products had been
founded in Buffalo in 1917 and was still controlled by a Board of
Directors mainly based in the city. For years, a basic concern of this
board was to keep jobs and manufacturing in their area, yet the plan to
set up plants in Mexico and Texas seemed to them to be the only prac
tical way to remain profitable.
Soon after hearing of the relocation plan, I contacted both Dick Wolf
and Tom Monaghan, the regional director of the United Auto Workers
(UAW), to explore an alternate approach. I suggested that they con
sider the possibility of restructuring the existing Trico plants in order to

79

80 International Competition and the Organization of Production

reduce manufacturing costs and improve production quality, thereby
obviating the need to relocate. The proposal included the development
of small groups of workers and managers as Study Action Teams
(SATs) who would work full time on analyzing manufacturing proce
dures and the costs of production, and then propose alternative costcutting methods. This approach was based on a process that I had
helped to establish at the Xerox Corporation in 1982-84, which elimi
nated the need for substantial layoffs by reducing production costs by
30 percent.1 In my work with the PEWS (Programs for Employment
and Workplace Systems) group at the Cornell School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, I had continued to refine this method successfully in
working with several other companies and unions.2
Wolf was initially reluctant to discuss the possibility of a Study
Action Team process at Trico, because he had already given up on the
attempt to make the Buffalo operation profitable. However, he finally
agreed, after six weeks of discussions, to meet with local 2100 of the
UAW and with Vincent Tese, director of the New York State Depart
ment of Economic Development, to at least consider the proposal. At
this meeting, he was persuaded to set up Study Action Teams with
three purposes: to examine ways to improve efficiency in Trico's man
ufacturing operations, to identify specific methods to reduce yearly
costs, and to improve the quality and timeliness of product delivery.
The Department of Economic Development would share the costs with
Trico for Cornell consultants who would help to establish and guide
the SAT process. While Wolf agreed to establish the Study Action
Teams, he refused to set targets for each SAT, or to commit the com
pany to a reversal of its relocation plan if the SATs were in fact suc
cessful. Despite this, the UAW informally set a 30 percent cost
reduction target for the teams, which was the amount of the cost reduc
tion required by Ford. It was decided by Wolf and the union that three
SAIfc would be established and have 18 weeks to work on this project.
Two teams would each study a different area of the plant—the tool
room and linkage assembly areas—and the third would analyze the
possibility of constructing a new plant to replace current obsolete facil
ities and compare the costs of this with constructing new plants in
Mexico and Texas.

International Competition and the Organization of Production 81

Method of Analysis and Action
The Trico Study Action Teams for the toolroom and linkage assem
bly areas consisted of two workers (union representatives) and two
managers from each of the departments. Each team was assisted by the
Cornell staff and by a manufacturing engineer from Rensselaer Poly
technic Institute (RPI). The third SAT consisted of members of the
executive committee of UAW local 2100, the manufacturing engineer
from RPI, and an architect from Boston to study new plant construc
tion. In addition, a joint Labor-Management Steering Committee of
middle and upper management of the company and the executive com
mittee of the union was established to meet with the three teams every
two weeks.
The role of the Steering Committee was to provide overall guidance
to each team, help link and integrate their work, and remove road
blocks to obtaining technical assistance and production/customer
information. It would also help judge the value of projects and imple
ment solutions.
All three SATs worked full time on their respective tasks. Technical
and financial assistance was obtained from Trico employees upon the
written request of the teams. However, towards the end of the SAT pro
cess, access to accounting staff became hard to obtain, so the consult
ing manufacturing engineer from RPI was asked to analyze and
evaluate many of the final proposals.
In addition to the three SAT projects, Cornell conducted a study ana
lyzing the successes and problems of firms that had relocated to the
Texas-Mexico border where Trico planned to move. This study, which
was included in the final report to Trico, examined the type of work
performed, the skills and wages of workers in the area, and the avail
ability of technical specialists.
Training for Study Action Teams
Study Action Team and Steering Committee members took part in
an intensive four-day training program which included exercises in
problemsolving and team building; cost-accounting procedures (costbenefit analysis); presentation methods; team meeting skills; tech
niques to obtain technical and financial information; breakdowns of the
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cost structure of the toolroom and linkage departments; methods for
conducting surveys and questionnaires; methods for involving employ
ees in changes within their departments; and methods of evaluating the
workflow of production. Former SAT members from the Xerox Corpo
ration participated in two training sessions and presented techniques
they had found successful for identifying, analyzing, and implement
ing solutions.
Plant visits were also arranged for the SAT members to meet with
labor and management of Packard Electric, a major supplier of parts
for General Motors, and Harley Davidson. At Harley Davidson, work
ers and managers are engaged in cost reductions, product improve
ment, and restructuring of the decisionmaking roles of labor and
management. Meeting and observing other teams in action provided
the Trico SAT members with suggestions for changes and specific
areas to investigate, and helped them better understand their roles.
Initial Outcomes
At the end of 18 weeks, the two in-plant SATs presented their rec
ommendations for changes to the Trico management, regional UAW
representatives, local 2100 executives, and New York State govern
ment officials. All of the recommendations had been analyzed by the
appropriate production areas prior to this meeting and had received the
approval of line operators.
The toolroom SAT proposals included: a new layout of equipment, a
comprehensive training program for all employees in CAD/CAM to
improve their capacity for insourcing work, improved workflow within
the department, a gainsharing compensation plan, and a flexible time
schedule for workers. The most controversial recommendation was a
wage increase, which was suggested because 38 skilled workers had
quit during the past 18 months due to the low pay in comparison to
other companies in Buffalo.
The linkage SAT presented over 60 cost-saving projects. Savings
amounted to over $9 million per year for this department—consider
ably more than the $8 million (30 percent cost reduction) target origi
nally set by the team. Included in this proposal were suggestions for a
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substantial redesign of almost all jobs and a new layout of equipment
and material storage. Recommendations by this team focused on the
elimination of production supervisors: all operators would be trained
and have responsibility for the quality of each stage of the production
process. An investment in high-speed presses and modification of old
equipment were recommended to enable the assembly area to reduce
set-up time, improve servicing of equipment, and increase their ability
to make quick die changeovers. New equipment and accessible areas
for storing component parts were to be integrated into a just-in-time
inventory control system. These changes would eliminate the need for
their expensive computerized Materials Information System. As a
result of these restructuring activities, extensive amounts of in-process
inventory would also be eliminated. Inventory would consist only of
what was immediately needed. Adjustments in compensation were also
suggested by this team, including the elimination of the piece-rate sys
tem and the development of a plantwide gainsharing process.
Final Outcomes and Agreements
A final meeting was held at the Department of Economic Develop
ment office in New York City on October 8, 1986 to review all of the
recommendations of the SAft. This meeting was held with Dick Wolf,
Vincent Tese, the manufacturing engineer consultant, the shop chair
man of the UAW, and myself. Our final report summarized the total
cost savings based on the findings of the two in-plant SATs, and the
work of the third SAT, which had analyzed the cost savings as a result
of consolidating all operations in Buffalo and constructing a new plant
at square footage costs equal to those in Brownsville, Texas. The com
bined work of the three SATs amounted to the identification of cost
savings of $37.5 million per year, amounting to 30 percent of operating
costs—the initial target. Although the consolidation into one plant
would result in a loss of 250 direct and 100 indirect jobs, most of these
reductions would be achieved by retirement and attrition. The UAW
agreed to these reductions as part of the total proposal.
Our report also concluded that, no matter where the plants were
located, it would be critical for Trico to change its production philoso-
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phy and not just chase low wages if it wanted to achieve a just-in-time,
flexible, high-performance work system. The report also stressed the
need for technological breakthroughs by acquiring modular assembly
parts such as electric motors, since the Big Three were moving towards
modular assembly units. The report maintained that although competi
tors might find it easy to manufacture where wage rates are low, they
would not have the skilled workforce and technical resources of New
York to continue to improve their production system.
In summary, the report stated that the lack of a skilled workforce
and technical resources in Brownsville and Matamoros, coupled with
the cost-saving analysis of the three SAIfc, proved that the strategy to
move south was "economically unsound" and, further, would eventu
ally erode Trice's technological superiority. It also concluded that
going forward with the plan to move would likely result in the loss of
all manufacturing jobs in Buffalo. Vincent Tese offered Dick Wolf
funds to help pay for release time for training employees in the new
work systems and in how to use new equipment, R&D funds to assist
in acquiring the new motor for modular assembly, and the development
of a high-tech training center to be located adjacent to the new factory.
In February 1987, after months of meetings between Trico and the
UAW, a final agreement on the SAT proposal was reached between
Trico Products and UAW Local 2100. Although Trico decided not to
reverse their decision to move, the company did decide to keep an
additional 300 jobs in Buffalo over what they had originally planned.
(Left behind was to have been a skeleton staff of 600 employees to do
basic engineering, research and development, and low-volume work.)
The 300 additional jobs resulted from productivity improvements sug
gested by the linkage SAT in several of their low-volume areas. A
strong severance package was established for all workers to be laid off,
which included continued medical insurance for several months, cre
ation of an outplacement center, and additional pay for years of ser
vice.
The toolroom suggestions were implemented by Trico, except for
the proposed wage increase, which was tabled for future discussion.
The linkage assembly proposal to enable operators to inspect their own
work and eliminate the need for final inspectors was also implemented,
and several joint labor-management committees became a permanent
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part of this department for training and to investigate the best use of
equipment.
A significant focus of the union during negotiations, aside from the
number of jobs that would remain in Buffalo, was the need to establish
a new production system with appropriate compensation. It had
become apparent to the leaders of UAW local 2100 during the SAT
process that significant changes would be needed in the production
system in order to save the jobs of Trico workers in the future.
General Risks and Benefits
of the Process for Participants
The entire SAT process was a risk for the union, management, and
the state. For management, the possibility of reversing their decision to
relocate involved losing approximately $5 million of construction
costs already committed to building a new plant. If it were not for the
fact that they were locally owned and that there was considerable com
munity pressure to reduce the continued erosion of manufacturing jobs,
they would probably never even have considered the SAT proposal.
The union took a risk in getting involved in the SAT process
because they had no guarantee from Trico that the plan to move would
be changed. However, they were facing a no-win situation anyway, at
best being able to bargain for keeping only a few hundred jobs. The
gamble paid off as the Study Action Team process evolved into a con
structive method which saved an additional 300 jobs.
The SAT process provided union representatives with extensive
access to financial and production information, giving them skills for
evaluating financial balance sheets and production accounting, and
giving them valuable information about advanced manufacturing
methods. The experience gained in these areas proved to be useful dur
ing the final negotiations for severance pay and benefits and for keep
ing more jobs in Buffalo.
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Risks and Benefits of the SAT Approach

There are several questions raised concerning the Trico project,
some of them related to the SAT process itself. How effective is this
process, and why? Why does this method of analysis identify more
comprehensive changes and a more realistic implementation process
than traditional approaches?
Another important area of analysis concerns the overall outcomes
and what could have strengthened the ability to keep jobs in Buffalo.
What could have been done differently? Should unions support activi
ties such as Study Action Teams? If this is a useful process for unions,
are there better ways to establish such activities? Some of these ques
tions may be answered by comparing the SAT process to traditional
methods.
First, the SAT process helped to integrate the day-to-day knowledge
of shop-floor employees, who know specific details of problems, with
the broader knowledge of technical specialists. In traditional studies
done by management, the ideas and perspectives of the workforce are
rarely examined or considered. As a result of the integrated perspec
tive, new ideas and solutions emerge. Independently, the observations
of labor and management are significantly different and are rarely
brought together.3
The second and perhaps most important aspect of the Study Action
Team process is that it helps to establish a commitment to implement
changes by the workforce and management. Analyses done solely by
technical and financial specialists rarely convince plant management
and workers to make changes. Without the commitment of key
employees, and support from both management and labor, solutions
agreed upon by specialists often remain just good suggestions which
are never actually implemented.
Another beneficial aspect of the SAT process is that it enables an
organization to identify and then find solutions to politically risky
problems. Since the union members of SATs cannot be fired for voic
ing their ideas and concerns, the SAT process allows major problems
to be identified which in the past might have been overlooked. Manag
ers are often reluctant to raise problems because they are fearful of
admitting to these situations in their departments or in the organization
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as a whole. A fairly common feeling among managers is the fear that
raising such questions could cost them their jobs. Also, the very pro
cess of engaging the employees who will be directly affected by a
major organizational change creates an environment in which they are
more likely to be committed to working in structures which they
understand and have helped to develop.
To some extent, the entire SAT process at Tttco Products was hin
dered by the president's initial and ongoing reluctance to establish a
formal agreement. Although he accepted in principle the use of the
three SATs and provided them with access to technical and financial
staff, he never signed an agreement nor agreed to cost-saving targets.
The experience at Xerox showed that having clear cost, productivity,
and quality targets from the beginning of the process helped to keep
the SAT process on track even when several managers left in the mid
dle of the project because they were promoted into the manufacturing
plants.4
The UAW decided that the practical course of action at Trico was to
make the best of the situation rather than further delay getting the
teams started or decide to withdraw from the process entirely. They felt
they had no other choice than to continue even without having every
thing in place. In hindsight, another approach might have been tried to
obtain a formal agreement from Dick Wolf. Requesting involvement
and an agreement from the Board of Directors might have helped cre
ate a more accountable process.
The information on cost structures, production information, and
new product requirements of customers which local 2100 and region 9
gained through the SAT process had never been made available to
them before. This information gave the union a new tool for protecting
the interests of workers by examining and then making recommenda
tions for changing production methods. Traditionally, when there were
severe economic problems in a particular firm, the UAW became
involved in negotiating cost problems solely in terms of what they
knew best and had control over—wages, benefits, and employment of
workers. Specific productivity improvement changes had rarely been
identified as an alternative to cutting wages or laying off workers.
Although the members of the shop committee of local 2100 had no
previous experience in analyzing and improving manufacturing pro
cesses, they quickly became experts.
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The results of the Trico project and similar activities at Xerox sug
gest that the SAT process can give unions an opportunity to explore
extensive changes in production, material control, and general costs, as
well as customer-supplier relations. Rather than just battling over
wages, benefits, and employment, solutions can be identified to reduce
overhead and indirect labor and material costs, as well as improve the
efficiencies of equipment and manufacturing processes. As David
Steinwald, chairman of the shop committee, noted at the end of the
SAT process, "it would have been nearly impossible to have saved an
additional 300 jobs or obtained the severance package using traditional
bargaining methods and lacking access to financial and productivity
information."5 The above conclusions have been seconded by the lead
ership of local 2100 and the regional director of the UAW, Tom Fricano.
The final agreement between the UAW and Trico was reached
largely because of the factual results of the studies conducted by the
SAIs. These findings identified the importance of keeping specific
high-volume operations in Buffalo rather than relocating them to
Texas. By agreeing to changes in work responsibility and manufactur
ing approaches in the toolroom and linkage departments, the union put
itself in a strong position for negotiating an extensive severance pack
age and the development of outplacement services.
In retrospect, it would have been extremely helpful to have been
able to start the SAT process as soon as there were signs that Trico was
in bad shape. If the process could have been established earlier, Dick
Wolf and his Board of Directors might have been more receptive to a
comprehensive approach for achieving cost reductions and changes,
rather than focusing solely on labor costs.
In order to spread the knowledge of the methods and results of the
SAT process to the UAW leadership in region 9, a workshop on the
risks and benefits of SATs was held at their annual retreat in August
1987. The SAT process used at Trico Products was presented by mem
bers of the teams, who examined both the positive benefits and the
areas of weakness. Many delegates to the meeting showed a strong
interest in learning more about this new approach in case their local
membership faced a similar plant closing or major layoff problem in
the future.
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Government Involvement
The Study Action Team process was an innovative and challenging
experiment for the New York State Department of Economic Develop
ment. Prior to the Trico project, the strategy of this agency had been to
focus on trying to attract new business to relocate to New York and
improving access to on-the-shelf technology by existing factories.
Although the Department of Economic Development and the governor
felt comfortable with the concept of joint labor-management programs,
such activities had not been seen as a practical process for solving sig
nificant productivity problems of firms.
Pressure from the governor's office was important in getting Dick
Wolf to sit down and agree to the SAT process. The state did not accept
the conclusion of an earlier consulting report to Trico management
which stated that "Trico's middle managers and hourly employees
could not change their nonproductive ways."
After seeing the results of the SAT process at Trico, Vincent Tese
decided to create the Industrial Effectiveness Program to provide
development and implementation funds to companies and unions that
establish SAT activities. By providing funding and holding workshops
and seminars to promote the Study Action Team approach, New York
State is helping to make the SAT process more accessible to other firms
and unions; it is encouraging an aggressive examination of cost reduc
tions rather than relying solely on wage reductions and layoffs when
companies are faced with extensive needs to reduce costs. Vincent Tese
commented at the end of the Trico project that "the Trico experience
will make us better prepared to respond in the future...it sets a model
that can be used to work with other companies."6
Future Issues
Study Action Teams are currently being used not only in New York
State and around this country, but also in Poland to help improve effi
ciency and to create new work structures in some of their plants. The
process is also being used to increase the opportunity for workers to
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contribute to a more democratic form of decisionmaking as Poland
changes to a social market economy.
There is an ongoing need to examine how to effectively integrate the
ideas and concerns of employees at all levels of plants, and particularly
at times of crisis such as Trico Products faced. The involvement of
workers in the manufacturing and production decisionmaking areas of
companies has not generally been considered important, but it seems
likely that unions will need to consider the use of this approach more in
the future as traditional methods used to negotiate saving jobs become
less effective. In order to use this particular approach in the future, a
careful analysis of the risks and benefits are needed, as well as proper
training to help establish these activities.
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Textile and Apparel Labor-Management
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In 1989, the Pennsylvania Departments of Commerce and Labor
and Industry designed the Manufacturing Innovation Network Initia
tive, or MAIN, to test whether the state could stimulate regional con
centrations of related firms to organize consortia. Firms were
considered to be related to each other if they served similar markets.
These consortia were expected to strengthen the competitive position
of the firms by developing new business services, transferring best
practices between firms, and forming new production relationships
among firms.
Rapidly changing technology and high standards for quality and
speed of delivery are forcing firms to cooperate in new and significant
ways. 1 The number of strategic partnerships is growing, and the range
of issues around which they are organized is increasingly significant.
For instance, companies are joining together for research and develop
ment, capital investment, concurrent engineering, product develop
ment, and to provide technical assistance to suppliers.
Most examples involve cooperation between large companies.
However, there are many examples from Europe and Japan, and to a
lesser extent the United States, of smaller firms joining together at a
regional level to strengthen their competitive position.2 These firms
tend to be clustered in close geographic proximity to each other and are
joining forces to achieve a number of goals, including: combining their
complementary manufacturing capabilities to produce goods for the
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final market; establishing service centers that provide shared market
ing, engineering, design, and testing services; developing lending consortia that provide investment capital to member firms; and organizing
export, training, and educational reform programs.
MAIN, which is managed by the Department of Commerce's Office
of Technology Development, is built on two premises. First, some
problems are simply too large for individual firms to address alone.
Second, collaboration among firms and between firms and unions can
create a learning system which can be a powerful force for manufactur
ing modernization and other innovations.
With respect to the first premise, about 95 percent of Pennsylvania's
17,500 manufacturing establishments employ fewer than 250 workers.
Pennsylvania considers firms of this size to be small firms. While small
firms are often innovative and flexible, they face certain vulnerabili
ties. These would include insufficient resources (capital and people)
for research and development, training, marketing, and exporting.
They often have problems securing investment capital for moderniza
tion. Finally, they are unable individually to improve the local business
infrastructure that supports them; for example, they are unable to
reform the educational system, open up new sources of investment
capital, or strengthen the local economic development institutions that
provide business services.3
The second premise of MAIN is that collaboration between firms,
and among firms, associations, and labor organizations where they
exist, creates the potential for a learning system that stimulates mod
ernization and innovation. An example from the knitwear industry in
Carpi, Italy illustrates this point.4 About 10 years ago, 600 small
knitwear firms in this northern Italian city designed and financed, with
government assistance, a service center which enables them to share
the costs of marketing research, design, training, and other activities
that would be too expensive for individual firms to support. While
these services alone are of value to the firms, the interaction between
the firms' owners at the service center is of equal importance, for it
leads to valuable information exchange and peer pressure to keep pace
with the more innovative firms. This stimulates modernization and
innovation. The MAIN initiative limited itself to supporting projects
targeted at regional concentrations of related firms to maximize the
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chances that firm representatives would personally interact with each
other.
Through MAIN, the state is testing these two premises in four geo
graphically concentrated industries: the apparel industry in the Lehigh
Valley, where there are about 250 apparel companies employing
15,000 workers; the plastics industry in Erie, where there are 80 plas
tics companies employing over 8,000 workers; the tooling and machin
ing industry clustered in Erie, Pittsburgh, Lancaster/York, and the
Philadelphia areas; and the foundry industry in Pittsburgh, where there
are between 50 and 60 foundries employing 6,000 workers.
The state identified these industry clusters using a request-for-proposal process, not an extensive economic analysis. Trade associations,
trade unions and nonprofit economic development organizations were
encouraged to submit bids. It was especially hoped that trade associa
tions would respond, assuming that firms would be most likely to iden
tify with them. In addition, we expected that, as a result of this project,
trade associations would discover new ways to help their members
through the delivery of innovative services.
The state received eight responses from seven trade associations and
one economic development organization. Proposals were evaluated by
a team of representatives from the Departments of Commerce and
Labor and Industry and from academia. The evaluation criteria were as
follows: a demonstrated understanding of the industry; the formation
of an industry-led steering committee; a realistic project design; the
strength of the management team; and the level of private sector finan
cial support.
Based upon the recommendations of the evaluation team, four
projects were funded. Three of the four projects were managed by
trade associations and one was managed by a nonprofit economic
development organization. Two of the projects received $90,000, one
$80,000, and one $25,000.
While the proposal guidelines for MAIN were very general so that
each industry could design a project tailored to its needs, the evalua
tion committee placed the greatest emphasis on two criteria. The first
was the formation of a strong Steering Committee comprised, at a min
imum, of business representatives from the industry and trade union
representatives if the industry was unionized. The membership of the
Steering Committee could be expanded to include others from the
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community with a special interest in the industry. For example, some
Steering Committees had representation from local economic develop
ment organizations, vocational-technical schools, and community col
leges. The second requirement was a detailed description of how the
Steering Committee would use a strategic audit process to identify the
industry structure, key market trends, common problems and opportu
nities, patterns of innovation, and strategies for improvement.
The importance of the Steering Committee to the success of the
MAIN projects must be emphasized. The Steering Committee had
three roles; first, to direct all phases of the project and to ensure that it
was industry-led and industry-driven; second, to coordinate and inte
grate services available in the region that can support the industry; and
third, to resolve conflicts between stakeholder groups in the industry.
It is also useful to highlight the importance of the strategic audit
process. The strategic audit produces information and often surprising
results that can lead to what Chuck Sabel of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology has described as "cooperation through studied consen
sus." This is especially true if the audit relies on personal interviews
with industry leaders. Used in this way, the audit becomes a tool to
draw more firms and unions into the project, uncover industry leaders,
develop new cooperative relationships, and organize the industry for
improvement projects.
Key problem areas emerged in all four projects almost immediately
after the strategic audits started. Tooling and machining firms identi
fied as their most critical problem a shortage of tool and die makers
and, in partnership with high schools, launched a youth apprenticeship
program; foundries began to develop a strategy for disposing of
foundry sand; plastics companies identified the need for new types of
equipment that would be shared by the firms, as well as new training
and export programs; and apparel firms focused on developing tech
nology, marketing, new services, work organization, and supervisory
training strategies.
Since 1991, the MAIN initiatives have been managed by Pennsylva
nia's Industrial Resource Centers (IRCs). The IRCs, which were estab
lished by Governor Robert P. Casey in 1988, are regionally based,
industry-led, nonprofit corporations. Overseen by the Office of Tech
nology Development, the IRCs are the manufacturing equivalent of the
agriculture extension service. Staffed by professionals with industrial
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and economic development experience, they help firms in their regions
adopt modern manufacturing technologies and techniques. The IRCs
accomplish this goal by working one-on-one with individual compa
nies, and by forming networks of related firms as in the MAIN
approach.
This report focuses in detail on one of the MAIN initiatives—the
Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile Innovation Network. This project
distinguishes itself from the others by a high degree of union involve
ment. As such, it is an important example of how a labor-management
participation process at the industry level could help spark the restruc
turing and modernization of a regional industry.
The Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile
Innovation Network

In 1988 there were approximately 125,000 people employed in the
apparel and textile industry in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
accounting for 13 percent of the total manufacturing employment sec
tor. Over 50,000 of these employees were members of either the Amal
gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) or the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU).
The apparel and textile industry of Pennsylvania has been under
severe competitive pressure in recent years. Both production and
employment have declined sharply as a result. In 1988, apparel alone
accounted for over $21 billion or 15.5 percent of the total U.S. trade
deficit Approximately 60 percent of U.S. expenditure on apparel went
to foreign-made garments, and the great bulk of these imports origi
nated in low-wage countries. The failure of this industry to respond to
competitive pressures was readily apparent, and Pennsylvania was par
ticularly hard hit. For example, from 1974 to 1985, the industry
declined more than 37 percent within the Commonwealth, while
nationwide the decline was 16.5 percent.
This innovation effort centers on the Lehigh Valley, including the
municipalities of Easton, Bethlehem, and Allentown, and the counties
of Northampton and Lehigh. Textiles and apparel represent the largest
employment sector in the area.
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The industry in the Lehigh Valley has changed from one based on
local competition for long runs of limited styles, to one facing short
runs, new fabrics, rapid style changes, higher quality standards, and
worldwide competition.
Strategy

It was believed that competitive advantage could be returned to this
industry by improving production methods and work organization to
meet the changing demands of retailers for quick response capability
and improved quality. Firms in the Lehigh Valley can take advantage
of their proximity to the market by moving from the lower price point
niche to the higher end, which is less price-sensitive and more con
cerned with characteristics such as quality, design, delivery, and rapid
response to style changes. Firms able to supply products with these
attributes to manufacturers and retailers would be less vulnerable to
competition from lower-priced imports.
Relationships

Over the past decade, joint labor-management efforts in planning
and problemsolving have produced significant results in individual
organizations. Improvements include fuller use of human resources,
higher quality products and services, and closer coordination between
departments, divisions, and plants. Most of these systems have been
developed separately in individual firms. However, based on this expe
rience we believe that many of these lessons could be applied to the
problems of smaller firms in a specific industry clustered in a particular
geographic region.
It was critical for the firms within the apparel and textile industry to
be able to constantly adjust their responses to pressures from domestic
and international competitive forces. Flexible and adaptive economies
are dependent on a high level of trust among the participants. The
industry needed to develop vehicles for increasing the trust level and
productive working relationships.
Goals

There were four specific goals in mind as Pennsylvania developed
this initiative:
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(1) Create a joint effort on the part of labor unions, owners and man
agers of firms, trade associations, economic development agencies,
educational institutions, and state and local government to design and
direct an effort toward developing a common understanding of the
problems of the apparel and textile industry in the Lehigh Valley, and
develop a joint approach toward implementing solutions to these prob
lems.
(2) Demonstrate that economic development efforts in this and other
fragmented industries can more effectively be directed to a specific
sector concentrated geographically, rather than to individual firms.
(3) Develop vertical and horizontal linkages between firms to deal
with inefficiencies, and create new learning opportunities in this frag
mented industry.
(4) Establish in the Lehigh Valley an ongoing structure and process
dynamic enough to continue to evaluate the needs of the industry and
generate solutions.
Steering Committee
The first step of this project focused on the Steering Committee.
This group met every month and represented the varied constituencies
within the industry, as described above. In order to form a cohesive
group, we wanted to establish a common base of understanding of both
individual and group needs. The problem of industry fragmentation
was mirrored in the Steering Committee, so the process of creating a
common vision for the industry had to start with this group. Through a
planning process, and by discussing the findings of the strategic audit,
a common understanding of the problems of the industry and a com
mon vision of a direction for the industry were developed. Relations
between members began to improve, as members shared information
on training, technology, marketing and labor force recruitment.
The Steering Committee's membership was as follows:
•the Executive Director of the Atlantic Apparel Contractors' Associ
ation and the President of the Valley Apparel and Textile Associa
tion
•four owners or senior managers of firms
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•four International Union Vice-Presidents (two from the ILGWU,
and two from ACTWU)
• the Executive Director of the Bethlehem Industrial Resource Cen
ter
•the Superintendent of the Easton Area School District
•the Director of the Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Laboratory
at Lehigh University
•the Dean of Community Education, Northampton Community Col
lege
•the Principal of Northampton Vocational-Technical School
In organizing the Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile Innovation Net
work, we attempted to ensure that:
•all stakeholding organizations were represented in a meaningful
way;
•the Network continued to organize itself through working groups,
allowing for the broadening and deepening of involvement;
•the activities of all groups resulted in a process of mutual education
of each organization's needs, concerns and goals;
•the Network became a forum where the groups could work toward
solutions to problems;
•trust relationships developed between the various stakeholders,
which would serve as a foundation for additional activities.
Working Groups

The Steering Committee formed working groups made up of its own
members and representatives from individual firms, as well as outside
resources. Such a mix results in a pool of skills and serves as a method
to both broaden and deepen the industry's involvement. The working
groups, which are both educational and organizing vehicles, were
formed around labor force recruitment and retention, public relations,
marketing, and technology.
The results of the Exit Survey, a study of employee turnover, helped
the Labor Force Working Group develop an integrated approach to the
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issues of recruitment and retention by developing an entry-level skills
training course through the Commonwealth's Department of Com
merce and a local community college; an industry-specific supervisory
training program; and a strategy for upgrading the skills of the existing
workforce in conjunction with the local vocational-technical high
school.
These activities of the Labor Force Working Group had the added
benefit of teaching the various stakeholding organizations about each
others' concerns and issues. Another activity was the development of
internal resources within individual firms to improve communications,
problemsolving, quality, and planning. These internal resources are
available as trainers in the plants and facilitate group problemsolving.
The Technology Working Group focused on the development of an
apparel-specific technology training course at a local area community
college. This activity also included the development of a videotape
presentation of the new technology available to apparel firms in the
hopes of encouraging broader use.
In addition to the above activities, another working group has been
developing a program to promote the industry and to improve its
image. Such an activity can help local recruitment as well as make
New York City manufacturers (the source of most of the work sewn in
the Lehigh Valley) aware of innovations taking place within the Lehigh
Valley.
Labor's Role in Economic Development
Organized labor can play a unique role in this type of economic
development activity. First, labor can project democratic values into
decisions regarding the selection of new technologies (such as Unit
Production systems, CAD/CAM applications, Programmable Sewing
Machines, and Modular Manufacturing) and how these technologies
are deployed. If the decisions are made without labor's input, then the
cooperation needed to fully take advantage of these investments will
be limited. Labor unions must be prepared to serve as the voice mecha
nism that resolves workers' fears about displacement, or fears of hav
ing their skills rendered obsolete. Furthermore, this voice function can
encourage substantive input into the selection of the technology and
the organizational design that accompanies the technology's deploy
ment
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Second, labor competently trained in business strategy and manage
ment is uniquely able to add value, providing substantive input, con
tributing to the competitive success of the industry. Union officers have
been trained by their unions to think critically about management decisionmaking, not simply in terms of economic costs and benefits and
rates of return, but also in terms of social costs. Furthermore, both the
ACTWU and ILGWU have long histories of providing industrial engi
neering and technical expertise to employers with whom they have
contractual relations.
Labor unions can play a role that assures their traditional concerns
for democratic values and principles are projected into the managerial
decisionmaking process. Unions can provide a valuable review func
tion by an independent, competent body. In order to fulfill these
responsibilities, however, labor needs to obtain the required skills at all
levels of its organization.
Strategic Audit

The Steering Committee is responsible for defining and managing
an economic development initiative for this industry. A critical tool in
this effort is an audit of firm business, marketing, and human resource
strategies to identify both the major pressures facing the firms in this
industry and their most effective responses—what was working and
what wasn't Meaningful information regarding firms' strategic
choices is needed in order to describe how successful firms compete.
We expected the following results:
•Identification of overall industry strategies
•Judgments about future direction
•Identification of subgroups within the industry and the strategy of
each
•Descriptions of patterns of development and opportunities these
present for creating interfirm industry networks.
In conducting this audit we focused on 50 leading firms identified
by the unions, employer associations, or other firms as examples of
success, innovation, or leadership. Strategy, specific adjustments, and
choices made over the last five years were examined, as well as trends
the firms expect will shape direction over the next few years. It was
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important to understand their market niche and any changes they antic
ipated in price point, quality, delivery, product mix, and batch size.
Particular attention was paid to innovative relationships contractors
developed with manufacturers and retailers involving new products
and services.
The audits involved management and production systems, including
the organization of production, and the integration of technology. The
research also covered relationships between contractors, subcontract
ing arrangements, and opportunities for networks to share information,
resources, and services. An assessment of training activity was
included to determine the skill levels currently pursued by the industry.
Finally, we explored the institutional responses of the ILGWU and
ACTWU to the restructuring taking place. The unions' strategies for
the future were of interest, as were the responses by the employers'
associations, one of which bargains directly with the ILGWU repre
senting its members.
In summary, the strategic audit has become a way for the Steering
Committee to:
•describe where this industry is currently positioned and the strate
gic choices that have already been made;
•identify a strategic vision for the industry; and
•develop a plan to close the gap.
Preliminary Results of Strategic Audit
The apparel industry has changed from one based largely on domes
tic competition and regional markets, to one based on global markets
and international competitors. This has meant a proliferation of prod
ucts, an increase in season and style changes, and a growth of market
niches. Products are more specialized for particular market segments,
and quality demands have increased. Further, retailers have sought to
minimize their risk and financing costs by dramatically reducing their
inventory levels. By reducing inventories, they have also attempted to
minimize the need for discounting. They have moved to smaller orders
and shorter lead times, hoping to be able to respond to market trends
through a reorder strategy dependent upon quick turnaround produc
tion. Since contractors typically have no experience in marketing,
sales, piece-goods sourcing, design, and relations with retailers, they
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are ill equipped to deal directly with these market changes. Finally,
some low-cost market segments that have continued to provide long
runs of standardized products have gravitated to low-wage countries.
There did not appear to be any single strategy followed by the
majority of the 50 contractors we visited and interviewed. However,
responses by firms to changes in the competitive environment seem to
fall into three categories: integrative strategies, partial strategies, and
nonresponse.
Integrative Strategies
Our study revealed that 25 to 30 percent of the firms were experi
encing significant growth in sales, profits, or employment These suc
cessful firms were union as well as nonunion, some older and well
established and others in business for less than 10 years. Our audit of
firm business and marketing strategies revealed that these firms have
developed innovative ways to deal effectively with the new competi
tion by breaking out of the traditional contractor-manufacturer rela
tionship and structure. The new relationships and strategies have some
common characteristics which appear to be transferable to other firms.
The most general characteristic that these firms share is that they
have increased the services they provide to manufacturers and retailers.
These services include the following:
•product design and design for manufacturability
•pattern-making
•marker-making
•grading
•cutting
•packaging
•shipping
•coordinating production among a group of firms
•ensuring quality control in subcontractors
•sourcing and financing piece-goods
•managing all of the above services among a group of firms (total
packaging)
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While few contractors provide all of these services, it is important to
note that traditionally these functions were controlled by manufactur
ers. Contractors are offering services they have traditionally never pro
vided. They provide these services for retailers' private labels or for
manufacturers who now want to shift responsibility to contractors for
such services as design, patterns, grading, and marker-making, thus
allowing for more rapid response to market trends through co-locating
design and production, and involving multiple firms (contractors) in
the design, marketing, and product development end of the business.
Contractors in some cases collaborate with manufacturers on "design
for manufacturability," so that they can increase the speed of design/
style changes for new seasons. These collaborations are also geared to
lower production costs and improve quality. Multiple innovative con
tractors are able to specialize in a variety of market niches and thereby
simultaneously offer a range of products and delivery times that single
manufacturers could not develop on their own. Those who provide
these services have broken out of the mold of the typical contractor and
benefit through increased sales.
Contractors decrease turnaround time and their ability for quick
delivery response by increasing their line flexibility for rapid changeovers and broader product mix. In some cases 'lead contractors" go
beyond their own firms and take responsibility for coordinating large
orders among a network of contractors for a given manufacturer. Con
tractors also go beyond the boundaries of their own shop and take
responsibility for quality assurance away from the manufacturer, in
some cases sending their inspectors to other subcontractors.
Firms in this category have been able to successfully change their
relationship to the market, offering new products and services to manu
facturers and retailers, and asserting control in relationships where pre
viously there existed only dependency.
These firms attempted to institute changes in each of the critical
dimensions identified (see Figure 1). Further, they appear to have
achieved some measure of internal consistency in their systems, inte
grating across multiple dimensions.
Partial Strategies
These responses were directed toward a particular dimension, i.e.,
technology, workforce, or other related topics. They tend to be specific
programmatic changes in the operations, such as new equipment or
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training programs. These responses were not directed toward changing
the relationship to the market, i.e., manufacturers or retailers. Further,
they tended not to be integrated across dimensions. Approximately 40
percent of the firms interviewed fell into this category.
Figure 1
Critical Dim* i
Workforce
I estructuring
Training
-Recruitment
-Retention
-Skill Upgrading
-Supervisory
Employment Security
Wages

Technology

CAD/CAM
-marking
-cutting
Programmable Sewing
Unit Production System

Market

Niche
-high end
-increased style changes
-increased product mix
-volume mix
Closer to Retail
-Private Label
Closer to Manufacturer
-Services
-design for
manufacturability
-marking and cutting
-lead contractor to
coordinate subcontractors
-quality control

Industry Structure
Subcontracting
Contractor - Manufacturer
Contractor - Contractor

Work Organization
Modular
Unit Production System
-for flexibility
-for automation
-greater workforce
involvement in
organizational
improvement
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Nonresponse
Finns in this category were simply hoping their competitive situa
tion would improve, and they were not proactive in responding
through strategic changes in their operations. Approximately 30 per
cent of the firms interviewed fell into this category.
Making the Transition
In trying to understand how the innovative plants were able to break
out of the traditional relationships between contractors and manufac
turers, we detected three general patterns which distinguished them
from the balance of the firms in the sample. We have called these pat
terns generational, skill-based, and new entrants. The firms character
ized as generational appear to be making the shift into new services or
business strategies as a generation of new owners takes over from the
earlier generation. Members of this new generation either ignore the
structural boundaries that define the role of a contractor, or simply do
not feel the constraints their parents did, and are expanding what con
tractors typically offer.
The group characterized as making a skill-based shift are people
who come into the contracting business with nontraditional skill bases
such as design, sales, or expertise in computer technology. These peo
ple use their skills to drive new competitive strategies, such as product
design, CAD/CAM production, or piece-goods sourcing.
The group characterized as new entrants is based on a population of
new immigrants to the Lehigh Valley from both the Far East and Mid
dle East. These immigrants contract in a nontraditional way, possibly
because they had a different tradition in their country of origin, or they
didn't see the same constraints. The innovative firms identified have
one of these characteristics, having redefined their business by break
ing out of traditional patterns.
Labor Force Retention
The apparel and textile industry of the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylva
nia has faced a severe labor shortage. The industry has experienced
great difficulty in its efforts to recruit and retain workers. An assump
tion by both unions and management has been that the majority of peo-
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pie who left this industry did so primarily because of layoffs, shop
closings, or dissatisfaction with compensation levels.
We conducted a survey of 3,213 people who have left this industry
in the Lehigh Valley over the past few years in order to better under
stand what improvements could be made to retain the current work
force. Almost 60 percent of those leaving the industry in the last five
years left voluntarily, not as the result of layoffs or shop closings. Fur
ther, the primary factors cited were "treatment" issues—supervisors,
underutilized abilities, lack of opportunities for advancement, and the
pressures of the piece-rate system. These four treatment issues
accounted for more than 51 percent of the responses when people indi
cated what would be their primary reason for departure, while pay was
the main factor for only 26 percent of the respondents.
The importance of these treatment factors was reinforced when the
new jobs people have taken in other industries were compared with
their old apparel jobs. The new jobs were rated consistently higher on
factors such as treatment by supervisor, opportunities for promotion,
and whether workers felt a sense of accomplishment.
Further, workers in the apparel and textile industry perceived that
their old sewing jobs required less skill than their new jobs. This per
ception might exist, in part, because of the lack of formal training in
the apparel industry and the significant amount of training reported by
employees in their new jobs.
Improvement of treatment factors may provide the apparel and tex
tile industry the greatest opportunity to retain workers, and the industry
itself has significant control over this area.
Conclusions and Implications
These findings have implications for the management systems used
by apparel firms in the Lehigh Valley. If this industry is to be success
ful in retaining the skilled workforce necessary to compete in a global
marketplace, it will have to adopt new methods of training, supervi
sion, and compensation. In addition, new systems of production are
necessary to meet the changing demands of the market for higher qual
ity products in smaller volumes, with more rapid style changes and
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quick turnaround production. We believe that the same factors of work
organization and skill development that have implications for work
force retention are also critical for marketplace competition. While
addressing treatment factors will not solve all of the competitive prob
lems this industry faces, increasing skill levels and allowing for greater
use of workers' capabilities can contribute to building and retaining a
skilled and motivated workforce, thereby improving quality, produc
tivity, and market responsiveness. This means integrating technology
and participation in a way that supports positive human resource prac
tices as well as the changing needs of the market. The Lehigh Valley
Apparel and Textile Innovation Network must explore and demonstrate
new ways to solve both the competitive problems this industry faces
from outside and the very human problems it faces from within.
The effort in the Lehigh Valley is developing some new approaches
for solving problems associated with industrial restructuring and
increasing competitiveness. One of these innovations is a process of
joint labor-management strategic planning at the industry level to iden
tify a future direction for this region, as well as to put in place a more
supportive infrastructure. The systems emerging are both social and
technical, involving the development of new relationships as well as
new systems of production.
The Lehigh Valley Network attempts to help contractors unable to
make these changes on their own by providing workshops, confer
ences, training, direct technical assistance, and access to best-practice
examples. The Network helps noncompetitive firms improve by expos
ing them to new models, and providing the resources and leadership
necessary to make the transition.
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Labor and Industrial
Relations Strategies
in the State of Michigan
Michael Schippani*
The 1980s was a period of extensive experimentation in industrial
policy in the State of Michigan. The need for a new strategy was obvi
ous to those who were struggling with the rapid changes in the struc
ture and vitality of the economy. The state was hit very hard by the
recession in the early 1980s. The global reorganization of the auto
industry meant massive job loss, fiscal crises for government, and a
declining standard of living for many citizens.
In 1983, first-term Governor James Blanchard and his economic
policy staff responded by organizing a policy advisory group to craft a
strategy for maintaining and revitalizing the industrial base. The group
was led by Douglas Fraser, former president of the International
Union, UAW, and Lee lacocca of the Chrysler Corporation. The delib
erations resulted in a three-pronged strategy based on a vision of the
future of Michigan as an international center for the development and
application of manufacturing technology.
The first part of the plan was to develop an applied technology strat
egy. The goal was to design public and private programs, and ulti
mately build institutions, that would be in the business of developing
and applying technology to the manufacturing base in Michigan and
the nation.
The second part of the state's strategy was to complement the pri
vate capital markets with new innovation capital and capital-gap
financing. A new institution called the Michigan Strategic Fund was
developed to perform a variety of financing functions in an attempt to
bridge the gaps perceived to exist in the private financial markets.
The last area of concern was titled "workforce learning and work
relations"; that is, education, training, and innovations in labor rela-
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tions to meet the needs of the changing workforce and to help adapt to
the changing labor relations structures and practices in the workplace.
This third part of the strategy, investing in "human capital" and reform
ing the related institutions, proved to be the most difficult part to craft
change strategies that could be measured for their effectiveness.
The three-part effort was an aggressive state intervention strategy to
create new public investment and program vehicles and to turn around
the faltering industrial economy of the early 1980s. These new institu
tions were expected to deliver a steady stream of services into a revital
ized industrial base.
Publicly Supported Institutions for Manufacturing
To implement the overall strategy, state government, with the assis
tance of private foundations, supported the development of the Indus
trial Technology Institute, a nonprofit organization staffed by
manufacturing engineers and social scientists. The original design for
the Institute was to create and develop new technology for manufactur
ing. The strategy has since been adjusted to include the application of
existing and appropriate technology and production processes into the
Michigan industrial base by leveraging resources and concentrating on
particular geographic areas, industries, and technologies.
The second institution created was the Michigan Modernization Ser
vice (MMS), which was designed to serve as the state's major outreach
service to the small and medium-sized manufacturers. It is the largest
public organization of its kind in the United States with the mission of
delivering strategic advice to small and medium-sized firms on tech
nology, training, and marketing issues.
MMS functions through consultations with individual firms and by
working on projects with groups of firms. The consultations are carried
out by three-person teams with expertise in manufacturing methods
and technologies, workforce training, and market analysis and market
ing planning. The typical case involves five days of work from each of
three members of the team. One of the products is a detailed written
report analyzing the firm's performance and a series of recommenda
tions for change.
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The individual firm consultations typically cover several areas,
including strategic business planning, technology utilization, produc
tivity improvements, general management issues, quality control,
workforce training, labor relations (in unionized settings), and market
analysis and planning. The service is provided at no cost to the firm.
MMS also works with groups of firms to encourage cooperation
among firms and between groups of firms and other players in the
economy. This program is carried out through grants to groups of
firms, trade associations, or unions. Projects that have been funded
include: production networks in the metal working and furniture indus
tries; research and development strategies for the machine tool indus
try; and a program for auto parts suppliers, represented by Region 1-A
of the United Auto Workers.
MMS has an annual budget of approximately $4 million. The staff
consists of a combination of state employees, private contractors, and
employees of private, nonprofit organizations such as the Industrial
Technology Institute in Ann Arbor.
Focusing on the Smaller-Firm Sector

As a number of researchers have noted, firms with 20 to 500
employees produce over 40 percent of the value added in American
manufacturing. MMS and the Industrial Technology Institute made a
decision to target the small-firm sector because (1) the smaller firms
did not have the resources or the market opportunities that the largerfirm sector had, (2) the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
were increasing the amount of outsourcing to the supplier sector, and
(3) the productivity gaps between the large firms and the small firms
was growing (see Figure 1). As a result of the restructuring of the
industrial system, wage gaps were growing, unionization rates between
the small and large industrial firms were growing apart,1 and there was
a need to focus public attention and, indeed, public investment on the
small-firm sector of the industrial economy.
In Michigan, there are about 6,000 small to medium-sized manufac
turing firms, employing 500,000 workers, with a total payroll of about
$11 billion. In all, they account for close to half of the Michigan manu-
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factoring economy. The proportion of the manufacturing base repre
sented by the smaller-firm sector has been steadily increasing. The
percent of manufacturing employment in smaller firms increased from
37 percent in 1979 to 44 percent in 1986.2
Figure 1
Productivity and Earnings
in Manufacturing Establishments
by Number of Employees
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SOURCE: Census of Manufacturers
Reprinted with permission from The Industrial Technology Institute.

As the new flexible technologies reduce the importance of econo
mies of scale, and as the large U.S. manufacturers continue to see mar
ket share threatened, more and more employment will be in small and
medium-sized shops. Unless more is done to improve productivity and
thereby raise wages, benefits, and conditions, the high industrywide
living standards that exist will be threatened.
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A Role for Unions and Workers
Throughout the 1980s we have seen many of the country's leading
industrial states treat technology as a central element in the emerging
equation of international competitiveness. It is usually only on an ad
hoc basis, however, and often during a crisis, that those most affected
by technological change—the workforce—are brought into the process
to play a role in designing change strategies.
The goal of a technology strategy that includes unions and workers
would be to mitigate the negative impacts of new technology and begin
to empower workers to participate as an equal partner in the process of
technological change. To do so would involve the development of pro
grams that include a clear assessment of the effects of technology, an
awareness of the possibilities for influencing changes, the exploration
of options, and availability of appropriate technical assistance.
The Michigan Modernization Service is a strong actor in the state's
technology thrust. Up until very recently, MMS has defined its cus
tomer base to include only the management of the companies served
by the organization. There has been no formal process to communicate
with the workforce or union on any of the issues discussed by the
firms' management and MMS consultants.
Beginning in 1988, the state Departments of Commerce and Labor
supported the development of a labor-management effort that would
provide information and services to strengthen and improve labormanagement relations in smaller workplaces where workers are repre
sented by a recognized trade union.
After an intensive period of research and development, the labormanagement project developed tools to (1) analyze the union-manage
ment relationship in smaller firms within the context of business condi
tions and the needs of the workforce, (2) recommend appropriate
changes, and (3) deliver training on participation strategies.
After field testing the service to over 30 firms and their unions, the
state's labor-management project began to transfer the labor relations
assessment and training instruments to existing public and nonprofit
institutions like MMS. As a result of a strategic planning process,
MMS agreed to incorporate a role for the union and the workforce as a
part of the consultation process. The case of Philips Drop Forge, out-
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lined below, provided additional evidence to MMS leadership of the
importance of involving unions in designing change strategies.
The Case of Philips Drop Forge

The primary business of Philips Drop Forge is the production of
steel forgings with conventional drop hammers. Most of the production
is for automotive applications. Founded in the early 1900s in down
town Detroit, the company has just under 100 employees who are rep
resented by a local of the International Union, UAW. Due to the change
in materials (from forging to castings and powdered metals), newer
processes and overseas competition, the firm needed to restructure to
remain in business. The owner indicated a need to see a restructuring
plan in place and indications of a turnaround before the end of 1990 as
a requirement for the continued operation of the business.
A local UAW representative, through the union's regional office,
requested that the state consider providing turnaround assistance to
Philips Drop Forge. The request was made to the state's Labor-Man
agement Project. A decision was made to offer the assistance of both
the Michigan Modernization Service and the Labor-Management
Project
Figure 2 shows a comparative analysis by the state's Labor-Manage
ment Project of the separate turnaround recommendations by MMS
and the union shop committee at the plant. The reader should look
across the boxes to understand the alternative perspectives. For exam
ple, while the MMS staff recommended a generic "employee involve
ment" program as a response to the poor economic conditions of the
business, the union leadership insisted that a joint union-management
steering committee be organized, trained, and empowered to plan and
manage a change agenda for the facility.
The importance of the specific proposals put forward by the union is
that (1) they reflect the significance of the collective bargaining agree
ment, and (2) they emanate from a clear recognition of a worker's
organization that has ideas based on experience and that is independent
from management with different goals and values.
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Figure!
Philips Drop Forge/U AW
Comparable Issues/Different Perspectives

MMS Action Plan
Recommendations

a. Introduce employee involvement by
communication from owner on poor
financial condition of company
b. Management and workforce
training on problemsolving, SPC,
teambuilding, hammerman
c. Track incoming material inspection
data
d. Conduct hot inspections with cheap
fixtures
e. Group purchasing and better
utilization of material
f. Preventive maintenance program
g. Explore viability of gainsharing

UAW174 Action Plan
Recommendations

a. Empower joint union-management
steering committee to manage and
plan the change agenda
b. Address qualifications of
supervisors; provide personnel
skills training
c. Smarter steel ordering to reduce
scrap
Identify sources for better quality
steel
d. Management must make effort to
repair and maintain equipment
e. Gainsharing plan must be evaluated,
fully implemented so that payoff of
new initiatives is clear to the
workers

Different Issues
MMS Action Plan
Recommendations

a. Closer relationship with major
customers
b. Track inventory
c. Tool control program
d. Quality team on high-value part

UAW 174 Action Plan
Recommendations

a. Company has too many supervisors,
white-collar staff
b. Collective bargaining agreement
will not be opened as a result of this
activity
c. Entire workforce must be informed
and educated about the problems
and plans for change
d. UAW research department should
analyze finances.
e. Create health and safety joint
training program

116 Labor and Industrial Relations Strategies in the State of Michigan

Recommendations by MMS for restructuring the manufacturing
process at the facility were presented to both top-level management
and the entire workforce at an off-site meeting. The proposals were
debated and an action plan for the future was agreed upon. Company
management, recognizing the need to more formally and completely
involve the union in the change process, agreed to support the develop
ment of a top-level joint steering committee which would assume
responsibility for implementing participation strategies to meet the
objectives of the action plan.
Labor as Catalyst to Strengthen an Industrial Sector

Beyond the individual workplace level are a variety of structural
issues that planners ignore at their peril. Globalization of manufactur
ing processes due to capital mobility and the existence of cheap labor
havens around the world are seriously affecting the U.S. auto supply
industry. Suppliers, faced with higher demands from automakers for
quality, just-in-time delivery, lower-cost production, and greater design
capabilities have found it increasingly difficult to succeed in a more
competitive marketplace. The number of U.S. suppliers has declined as
U.S. automakers limit contracts to those suppliers who provide a fuller
complement of services and can meet increasing demands. Likewise,
most U.S. suppliers have not been successful in winning over Japanese
automakers more accustomed to doing business based on long-term
relationships.
To respond to this environment, and in the face of inadequate fed
eral policy measures designed to introduce fair trade practices into the
system, management and labor must equip themselves to save their
businesses and their jobs. However, they must also recognize that each
firm acting alone does not have the resources or the expertise to be able
to respond effectively at every turn in the road.
Regional Director Bob King of UAW Region 1-A, representing over
100 independent parts suppliers in southwestern Detroit, developed a
plan for a labor-management Council of Independent Parts Suppliers.
The Michigan Modernization Service provided a planning grant to
begin the process. The Council's goals include (1) providing the union
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and management with new tools to improve company performance and
save jobs; (2) strengthening labor-management relations in small sup
plier shops; (3) developing a program that will help stop job losses and
plant closings in the small-shop sector; (4) building a new government/
labor/management collaborative process; and (5) targeting appropriate
publicly available education, training, and technical services to the
union and companies involved in the Council.
The project began with solicitations to 10 firms to establish the
Council. Over 20 firms ultimately formed the organizing committee of
the Council, with both top management and union leadership from
each plant attending meetings.
Over the course of several meetings, participants heard presenta
tions describing the current state of the auto industry and global exam
ples of interfirm strategies. A day-long planning session was held to
develop priorities. Groups were organized around (1) interfirm strate
gies to improve competitiveness; (2) skill development; (3) participa
tion strategies; (4) health, safety, and environmental issues; and (5)
employee assistance programs.
As a result of the planning meetings, the membership of the Council
crafted a two-part strategy. First, a Market Development and Job
Retention program was created to help meet the challenges of external
demands. The program included (1) documenting the technology,
skills, and production capabilities of member firms; (2) establishing a
formal relationship between the Council and the sourcing managers of>
the large manufacturers; (3) aggregating the production capabilities of
member firms and identifying co-production possibilities; and (4) con
ducting industry-specific research and auto industry information-shar
ing sessions.
The second part of the strategy involved an Individual Firm Perfor
mance and Quality Jobs program. This program was established recog
nizing the fact that the implementation of any restructuring effort
would need to be accomplished at the individual firm level, and that
the interrelationship between the nature of industrial relations and the
economic performance of the firm was a determining factor. Included
in the action plan for the program was (1) implementing UAW RightTo-Know training; (2) developing a cost-sharing program; (3) imple
menting labor-management training programs; and (4) analyzing the
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skill demand needs of member firms to determine the content of a
training agenda.
The key for this union-led project was to strike a balance between
worker needs and business realities, on the one hand, and between edu
cation/information and action, on the other. At a recent Council plan
ning meeting, one firm owner stood up to declare "for me this Council
represents an opportunity to recognize the union in my plant as a stra
tegic weapon in our effort toward industrial growth and renewal."
The Need for a Strategic Response

Union-initiated industrial restructuring activity raises important
strategic questions for trade unions and public policymakers. What
institutional resources need to be developed to significantly increase
the participation of workers and unions in this environment? How do
we shape existing institutions toward the objective of addressing work
ers' problems in the workplace and strengthening the unions for future
struggles in both the workplace and in economic policymaking?
Models of government support for strengthening the role of unions
and workers in firm and industry decisionmaking exist in Canada and
Western Europe.3 Many of these competitively successful countries
have established high standards of living by investing in modern edu
cation, labor market, and industry-specific policies and programs
designed by innovative institutional partnerships between government,
business, and labor; a partnership where labor plays a more co-equal
role than that experienced in the U.S.
The development of a more strategic role for trade unions in the
restructuring process is an important part of the process to stop the
decline of unionization and to save the U.S. manufacturing base. State
government, by commanding or effecting the deployment of technol
ogy, training, and financial services could act as a catalyst to counter
the short term bias of current federal policies and private sector behav
ior. A public policy of assistance to workers and unions that comple
ments and underpins all other interventions in the industrial economy
can greatly enhance the prospects for maintaining good jobs and
improving industry performance.
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Epilogue
With an 11,000 vote margin, the newly elected Republican gover
nor, by the stroke of a pen, closed down many of the programs serving
Michigan's industrial community in the winter of 1990. Calling them
"tinsel on the tree," the new governor shut down programs such as the
Michigan Modernization Service. As a result, hundreds of smaller
firms and thousands of workers would no longer have the benefit of
publicly supported technical assistance in their struggle to maintain
jobs and competitiveness.
Along with the loss of MMS went the start-up grant to help the
UAW Region 1-A Labor-Management Council of Independent Parts
Suppliers. To survive, the leadership organized a membership fundraising effort among the local unions and participating firms. Over 20
firms and the related union locals raised enough membership dues
money to maintain the organization and staff, and bought some time to
reorganize and identify outside funding sources.
The reorganization plan apparently satisfied federal IRS officials,
winning tax-exempt status for the group and building the basis for
attracting private foundation funds. The newly named Labor-Manage
ment Council for Economic Renewal serves as the education arm of
the more action-oriented Labor-Management Suppliers Council.
More recently, the group was the recipient of a grant from the Man
ufacturing Technology Center (MTC), located at the Industrial Tech
nology Institute. The MTC is one of five centers around the country
sponsored by the government-financed National Institute of Standards
and Technology. The MTC's Cooperative Capability Project, with the
UAW/IPS Labor-Management Council, is assisting member firms and
union locals in identifying and building interfirm production activity,
or networks, with the goal of capturing business that is disproportion
ately being outsourced to the nonunion sector by the original equip
ment manufacturers.
The International Union, UAW, made an industrial policy proposal
in 1983 that called for national coordination, democratic decisionmaking, a strong role for government, and the use of social accounting
principles in the evaluation of industrial and employment policies and
programs. Looking back, it appears that some people were listening.
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Michigan in the 1980s was a positive example of the old democratic
value that ordinary people and honest employers could depend on gov
ernment for help in the effort to rebuild industry and create jobs. Mich
igan in the 1990s is a much different place, as jobs disappear and
whole industrial sectors deteriorate. And no one appears to be listen
ing.
NOTES
•At the time of writing, Mr. Sdiippani worked for the State of Michigan. He is now employed
in the research department of the United Automobile Workers union.
1. A July 28, 1990 Detroit Free Press article showed that independent automotive suppliers
whose workers belong to unions went from 62 percent in 1976 to 22 percent in 1988. Unioniza
tion of Big Three assembly plants, however, stayed constant relative to the overall decline in
employment
2. Testimony of John Cleveland, director of MMS, to the Senate Subcommittee on Innovation,
Technology and Productivity, December 19,1989.
3. The most recent example is the Technology Adjustment Research Program funded by the
Ontario government Administered by the Ontario Federation of Labor, the purpose of the pro
gram is "to assist the Ontario trade union movement in developing constructive and progressive
responses to change in the workplace."
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Applying Skills-Based Automation
Through Participatory Management
The Center for Applied Technology
Frank Emspak
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Origins of the Center for Applied Technology
The Center for Applied Technology was first proposed in January
1987. Governor Dukakis wanted a program that would bring state-ofthe-art technology to the traditional industries of Massachusetts as a
means of preserving employment. He also wanted to show his concern
for issues affecting working people. He asked the Secretary of Labor to
cooperate with other state agencies to devise a program. The Secretary
worked with agencies such as Massachusetts Centers of Excellence
Corporation, the Massachusetts Product Development Corporation,
and the Industrial Services Program—all quasi-public corporations,
most under the budgetary authority of the Department of Economic
Affairs (Commerce). During the spring of 1987, the Centers looked at
other state industry-university partnership programs, especially those
in Pennsylvania and Michigan. These programs focused on building
industry-university partnerships to foster innovation in manufacturing.
The Center for Applied Technology (CAT) was constituted along the
lines followed in other states—with one important exception as dis
cussed below. The CAT board reflected the industry-university connec
tion and the technocratic bent of the administration. Thus the members
of the board included representatives from three of the most prominent
engineering schools in the Commonwealth, business representatives
from two high-technology firms, and state agencies dealing with eco
nomic development issues. The Center for Applied Technology for
mally began operations on November 1,1987.
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CAT searched for ways to encourage worker participation in the
technology design and implementation process. It was this dedication
to the notion of worker participation in the design process that distin
guished CAT from other agencies in the state or elsewhere who were
attempting to assist manufacturers modernize their productive facili
ties. CAT's work in this area was supported and encouraged by the
CAT board.
CAT and Worker Participation

Generally speaking, the labor movement has little influence on the
industry-university model of innovation and economic development.
CAT wished to alter this traditional model. The objective of worker
participation was met through both administrative and program initia
tives.
As an example of an administrative action, the Secretary of Labor
chaired CATs advisory board. It was felt that by placing the Center
under the titular direction of the Department of Labor, a signal would
be sent to the labor movement that CAT was open to labor participation
in economic development issues. In addition, meaningful participation
of working people in the economic development process also required
defining programs in such a way as to encourage participation from all
groups using manufacturing technologies.
CAT approached this problem by requiring worker participation in
order for university-industry research partnerships to get financial sup
port CAT did not specify the form that worker participation should
take in the research projects, however, it was one of several funding
criteria. Financial support by CAT for firm-specific technical assistance
also required that a union, if any, or representatives from the workforce
be included in any committee that helped define the problems to be
solved. In addition, all CAT conferences (there were four) were orga
nized to include both management and labor participation.
While these organizational changes were important in themselves,
the actual impact of labor/worker participation on the shape and con
tent of the projects needs to be assessed case by case.
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In CAT'S view, this formal representation is not enough. CAT was
searching for ways that rank-and-file workers could speak in their own
right regarding questions of technology design and implementation.
CAT was aware of the action research models employed in Scandina
via which might serve as models. However, there are stronger institu
tions, especially unions, that serve as support for these projects. This
country does not have that trade union institutional structure that can
lend support to research projects.
Each project was to try to find a way to involve the user-workers in
its research. Eventually each research project developed a means of
involving the end user. For example, the University of Lowell shopfloor programming project actually hired machinists to evaluate soft
ware under review. That phase of their project devised criteria for judg
ing how the software under discussion was designed, referencing the
procedures that skilled machinists employed in making a specific part.
Program Development
At the outset of the Center for Applied Technology formation pro
cess, the Massachusetts Centers of Excellence (MCEC) had a view of
applying state-of-the-art technology to traditional industry via indus
try-university partnerships. However, it was not clear to CAT that this
could be done. While manufacturing in Massachusetts has pockets of
modernity, a good deal of manufacturing is also not up to current tech
nical standards. If computers are in use, they are generally in the office
and not integrated with the shop-floor manufacturing process.
In September 1987, the author made a presentation to the CAT hir
ing committee proposing a different model of technology implementa
tion and transfer as an alternative to the state-of-the-art universityindustry partnership model. Rather than try to apply state-of-the-art
technology, the author suggested that CAT use the resource that is most
abundant in the metalworking sector of manufacturing in the Com
monwealth—skilled workers. Based on the availability of one resource
(skill) and the lack of another (capital), CAT argued that a skill-based
strategy which emphasized better use of existing technologies was
both immediately applicable and would have the most immediate and
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lasting impact on industry. Eventually a successful skill-based
approach would also put the metalworking industry in a position to use
more advanced technologies if they made sense. Thus CATs idea was
to apply appropriate technology, defined as worker-centered and skillsbased.
From a design point of view, CAT took traditional engineering crite
ria for machine or process design—such as speed, repeatability, and
accuracy—and added the enhancement of skill as criteria for designing
or applying new production methods to a particular shop. In addition
CAT was sensitive to ergonomic considerations including noise. After
all if workers can't hear because there's too much noise, they probably
can't think either.
An industrial system that focuses on skill requires greater emphasis
on process and on the worker so, automatically, the worker becomes
more central to the picture than the machine. The CAT technical assis
tance project at the Pneumatic Scale Company in Quincy, Massachu
setts met these criteria. Pneumatic was actually two projects—a
retraining of the assembly workers, who were among the most skilled
craftspeople in the plant and organization of a manufacturing cell to
produce spare parts. Deputy CAT director Dr. John Hoops assisted the
firm and the union in organizing a training program for the assemblers
with Wentworth Institute that allowed the mechanical and electrical
assemblers to combine their knowledge with increased familiarity with
electronics and hydraulics. Thus the assemblers' skills could keep pace
with the changing machinery they produced. The skilled work was
kept in the bargaining unit. The jobs of assemblers were kept unified
by adding an enhanced technical component.
The work cell was an answer to the chronic problems with spare
parts availability and delivery. Placement of the machines was the least
difficult task. The organization of production, the role and skill levels
of the workers, and the proper provision of work and orders to the
work cell became the focus of the union-management discussions,
assisted by CAT.
In both examples at Pneumatic, the people were upgraded—not the
equipment. Organizational solutions which focused on enhancing skill
were the chosen path. Implementation was aided, and indeed made
possible, by the active participation in planning and development by
the unionized workforce.
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From Theory to Practice
CAT's challenge was to take a concept of applied technology based
on skill, that is, the worker, and turn it into a legitimate, accepted eco
nomic program. The CAT concept had two parts: an engineering notion
called skills-based automation, and an implementation pathway based
on user (worker) participation. In order to make the concepts real, CAT
decided to fund three distinct types of services. First, they funded the
Massachusetts Manufacturing Resource Center, a source for informa
tion about skills-based automation. Second, CAT funded applied
research in the area of manufacturing. Third, CAT staff organized and
CAT funded a technical assistance service.
With the organization of three distinct program areas, CAT trans
formed itself from the conception that the governor had of high-tech
and state-of-the-art applications. CAT became an organization that pro
vided down-to-earth advice and assistance to small manufacturers. The
name didn't change, but the content did. The nature of the project
changed from a grant-giving institution for research with industry, with
no labor participation, to a subsidized technology transfer and consul
tation business with strong labor participation and a supporter of
research with a strong bias to labor.
The Massachusetts Manufacturing Resource Center
In June 1988 CAT established the Massachusetts Manufacturing
Resource Center (MMRC). CAT's initial vision for the center was
drawn from organizations such as the Science Center in Berlin, the
Norwegian Computing Center and the Worklife Center. CAT hoped the
MMRC would be a place where unions and manufacturers could come
together to learn about skill-based manufacturing methods. CAT
wanted the Center to publicize the concept and explain the benefits.
CAT also wanted the Center to establish a current, and preferably on
line, collection of articles and materials to provide examples of
attempts to employ a skill-based method. The MCEC and CAT boards
saw the MMRC as a major component of the CAT program and
devoted one-third of the program budget to the MMRC.
The project was located at TXifts University and at the University of
Lowell. The University of Lowell is one of the Commonwealth's best
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engineering schools and has a close relationship with industry. It also
houses an environmental and health and safety program which enjoys
widespread industry and labor support. TUfts has a focus on engineer
ing and technical policy issues. CAT felt that the MMRC could draw
on the expertise of both institutions to establish itself as a source of
both engineering and policy information.
Program work was divided between the two institutions. The Lowell
branch established the MMRC library. It collected articles, case stud
ies, pamphlets, and materials from unions, universities, and companies
regarding work organization, skills-based automation, and attempts to
implement skills-based systems. The Lowell team also emphasized its
contacts with labor, doing some outreach to labor unions and the Mas
sachusetts State AFL-CIO.
The 1\ifts end of the program began to specialize in the develop
ment of a network, as one aspect of making the information available
to potential users. Tufts also worked with some manufacturers to
assess their views on a skills-based approach with a view to recruiting
them to the Board of Directors of the MMRC.
CAT made two assumptions in the original thinking regarding the
MMRC. First, they assumed that as the ideas of alternative manufac
turing strategies were publicized by the MMRC, business would be
willing to use the resources of the Center. Second, they felt that as
unions understood the value of a skills-based approach, they would
also begin using the Center and vigorously support it CAT hoped that
unions wanting to pursue a skills-based approach would have a
resource to draw on for information that would also be 'legitimate" in
the eyes of management. Therefore the concepts of skills-based manu
facturing would get wider exposure, and the requisite political support
from management and labor would develop so as to secure continued
funding for the MMRC.
For a variety of reasons, the MMRC did not succeed in all of its mis
sions. From the start there were organizational difficulties engendered
by the dual location of the MMRC. Problems of coordination and
focus were magnified by the location of distinct functions at different
institutions. Second, the MMRC did not stabilize as an organization in
the first year. A strong board, representing business, labor, and the uni
versities, and which could and would support the MMRC, never really
got off the ground. This contributed to the growing lack of financial
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support. In its original plans, CAT intended to support the MMCR at a
high level for three years, by which time it was felt that the organiza
tion would have had time to prove its worth. However, under the pres
sure of continuing and severe state budget cuts, CAT was unable to
maintain that high level of support. Although a significant level of sup
port remained, the MMRC had to find other sources of support after
only 18 months. Therefore, on one level, the inability of the Common
wealth to make a long-term investment in an alternative manufacturing
pathway eventually fatally wounded the MMRC.
The combination of different missions on different campuses com
bined with limited funding possibilities intensified MMRC's drift away
from its original purpose. As mentioned, one part of the Center (Hifts)
began to concentrate on electronic networking. In part the theory was
to help bring about the type of close cooperation between small metalworking plants that tends to distinguish northern Italy. The system
serves to link small concerns for the purpose of marketing and infor
mation sharing. Eventually it is intended to be a means with which the
smaller firms can get information on-line from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) regional technology centers, espe
cially the one located at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI). How
ever, while the project has done some extremely interesting work, it
has also moved away from the skill-based technology aspects. Lack of
state funding means that now the network receives most of its funding
from the NIST and increasingly is integrated with the NIST center at
RPI. As an economic development initiative, especially in regards to
technology innovation, the network idea has great potential. It is
unclear if, or how, the network will function on behalf of worker par
ticipation in the application of technology or proselytizing for skillsbased automation.
The University of Lowell branch of the MMRC acquired documen
tation and information regarding skills-based concepts. From the first it
focused more on building relations with the labor movement, which
has fewer financial resources to commit to any activity and has rarely
committed resources to engineering research/documentation. NIST
and other federal agencies are interested primarily in technology trans
fer or relatively technocratic models of technological innovation. Thus
public, i.e., state support, for the Lowell activities is crucial. The Lowell branch was unable to do enough outreach fast enough to establish
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an independent financial base before the fiscal crunch hit. CAT will be
able to support the library and acquisition functions of the Lowell
branch, but CAT will not be able to support the other functions at as
high a level as wished due to changes in funding.
In short, for an MMRC to succeed, a higher level of institutional,
political, and hence funding commitment will be needed. It may be that
such an institution is beyond the capacity of one state. It is also clear
that an MMRC-type institution needs a champion outside of state gov
ernment—either in industry or labor— in order to serve as a pole of
attraction for political support.
Applied Research

CAT funded six applied research projects. An example of the
applied research is the Shop-Floor Programming project that CAT
sponsors at the University of Lowell. If the worker is central to the pro
cess and not an afterthought, the design of the man-machine interface
becomes important. For instance CAD/CAM systems are designed
with the engineer in mind. Essentially engineers are writing the pro
grams based on the steps they take when they use computer-aided
design. The "thought process" in the CAM software mirrors the CAD
thought process.
Do machinists visualize a problem of machining differently from
engineers? The Lowell project demonstrated that indeed the answer is
yes. Thus, if machinists are to have software that allows them to do
parts programming, the internal architecture of the software must be
redesigned to match the thought processes of the machinist. In this
example, the idea of "user-friendly" takes on a different dimension. It
is not a question of making a keyboard "easy" to use, or of providing a
menu-driven system with limited selections, but rather a question of
redesigning the system itself to more closely approximate the way a
skilled machinist envisions a metalworking problem.
The project at Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) approached the
problem of worker participation differently. Their objective was to
develop a more user-friendly and flexible CAD/CAM system for the
production of sheet metal parts. WPI organized a project with a spe
cific metalworking shop and gradually over a period of months worked
out a close relationship with the sheet metal workers in the shop. WPI
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designed a custom training program such that programmers were able
to upgrade to more design, and machinists were able to do on-line
shop-floor programming of their machines in response to customer
demands. Simultaneously, the software was also configured to meet the
needs of the machinist users. The CAD/CAM system and course is
now available for distribution. A good deal of time was spent by the
machinists off the floor at WPI learning the system and providing feed
back to the researchers as to how it could be modified.
At the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, the problem was more
difficult Labor relations at the industry partner were poor. The project
in its initial phases was also pretty abstract in that it was to define
mathematically the tool path for a grinding wheel doing a complex part
(a cutting tool). After many discussions with the researcher involved,
the company, and the unionized grinders, the grinders were able to par
ticipate more fully in the project. The grinders were able to evaluate at
the worksite the software produced and visit the University of Massa
chusetts during working hours to get a better understanding of the
entire process.
There are very difficult problems to overcome if we are to involve
working people in a meaningful way in a research project. Institutional
questions such as paid time off from work are one problem. But cul
tural problems are another. The university is not the environment that
most blue-collar workers are used to. Likewise, most professors are not
used to taking the opinions of shop-floor workers seriously. There are
also language problems. People speak differently and use different
words. There may be a period of education needed, so that all partici
pants in the project can comprehend the significance of the changes in
software or tool design that they are advocating. This education period
is not simply aimed at blue-collar workers, but also at researchers since
they too must learn the significance of proposed design changes on the
skills and environment of the worker.
Nonetheless, CAT feels it has taken important first steps in this area
and crossed one crucial barrier. The individual professors involved
became advocates of the idea. Perhaps, if funding allows, support for
work in these areas can be deepened and broadened.
The research projects have led to some industrywide changes, and
they do aid some specific firms. However, for a project such as the
Lowell project to succeed, significant funding and additional time are
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needed. As of this writing, the funding outlook is not promising. How
ever, a software development pathway emphasizing worker (blue-col
lar) skills has significance and can offer a means to bring complicated
programming functions into the shop in an economic and practical
fashion.
In CAT's view, the research sponsored should be guided by the
actual conditions in the field. CAT had to show the industry, by exam
ple, that a skills-based, participatory model of technical innovation
would work. CAT also realized that demonstration projects that actu
ally performed a service to an industry would help make the program
understandable to the legislature, other business, and local unions.
Therefore CAT decided to organize "pilot technical assistance
projects." In effect, CAT became a small industrial extension service,
using a skills-based model of technical innovation. Some of the
projects are discussed below.
Technical Assistance Projects

Direct services to the workforce and the manufacturer help validate
CAT's other work and also provide models for a worker participation
method of technology innovation. So far, CAT has worked in about 15
different factories of varying sizes. Approximately 1,000 people were
employed in the various firms. Projects have ranged from laying out a
small factory, to designing and implementing a machining cell as part
of a larger effort to restructure jobs, skills and the work flow in a siz
able factory. As mentioned earlier, the Pneumatic Scale Company
project involved not only the design of a cell, but also a general
upgrading of skills throughout the affected areas. This, in turn,
required a sizable training program. The objective of the project was to
ensure the survival of the plant by reducing the time it took to get
needed spare parts to the customer. In fact, the time was reduced,
mostly due to paperwork types of reorganization, and the company is
now prospering. A detailed description of this project would require a
chapter in itself.
CAT chose to focus on small and medium-sized firms in the metalworking industry. The choice of firm size was driven by several fac
tors. First, Massachusetts industry is characterized by the smaller firm,
so to serve the Commonwealth the smaller firm should be the recipient
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of aid. Second, most small firms do not have the financial or engineer
ing resources to adequately access the information they need to apply
new means of manufacturing to their operations. Third, the number of
people employed in smaller firms is a significant sector of the work
force.
CAT chose metalworking for more parochial reasons. Metalworking
was and is an important producer of wealth in Massachusetts. Metalworking supports more than its share of service jobs—one service job
for each job in metalworking. Metalworkers—especially unionized
metalworkers—are also the highest-paid manufacturing workers, so
saving jobs in that sector is a priority. But for CAT, one other important
reason for choosing metalworking was that the author had worked in
the industry for 15 years and thus understood a good deal about manu
facturing conditions and skill levels.
The important aspect of all of these technical assistance projects is
the participation of the workforce in the projects. By participation,
CAT means decisionmaking. In each project, CAT organizes a team of
workers to be part of a committee comprised of management and their
technical staff (if any), CAT consultant or CAT staff, and the work
force. This committee figures out what needs to be done and how the
project should proceed. CAT facilitates that process by providing rele
vant technical expertise or organizational assistance. The point is to
bring the workers' knowledge and expertise into the discussion in a
proactive, meaningful way. This does not mean "cooperation" with a
preset agenda, but a jointly developed plan for upgrading a particular
plant or operation. Generally speaking, the union emerges from this
process strengthened organizationally. If nothing else, the union or
workers have a much deeper knowledge of the factory and how it
works than they did previously. Since one of CATs design criteria is to
enhance skill, most projects also result in an increase in the number of
skilled workers and thus usually an increase in wages as well.
However, CAT programs also distinguish themselves in one key
area from typical labor-management cooperation programs. CAT tried
to organize its technical assistance work so that workers could have a
meaningful voice in what technologies would be introduced and how
they would be used. In other words, they sought ways to allow working
people and management collectively to make the strategic decisions, as
opposed to simply asking workers to help implement or make minor
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modifications. To CAT, the question of design was the starting point,
not the problem of implementation.
CAT technical assistance projects also reemphasized a point made
in 1950 when firms began experimenting with various productivity and
quality programs such as the Scanlon Plan. Then Fortune magazine
advised employers that the presence of a union was necessary for these
plans to reach their full value. CAT technical assistance projects also
showed it to be easier to work in factories where the union was well
organized.
In unionized shops, there is an organization of people elected and
trusted by workers with whom CAT could speak. They were not afraid
to raise questions and could help define the problems with an indepen
dence from management not demonstrated in nonunion shops. People
could speak with less fear and more openly as they had a contract to
protect them. In nonunionized shops, often the people management
made available to CAT were those trusted by management. They were
not necessarily the most skilled or competent (although they could be),
but they owed their position on the committee to management, not to
their fellow workers. Thus there tended to be considerable self-censor
ship and/or willingness to allow traditional authority to define the
issues. This process makes it more difficult to isolate and solve prob
lems of production and design. Also, without a contract and grievance
procedure, workers, in reality, do not have the ability to speak their
mind.
Of course there may be reasons why the existence of a union could
present additional difficulties. For example, there may be contractual
regulations regarding job placement, training, removal, and pay levels.
In addition, the union may decide to choose its representatives on a
technology design/change committee. In the unionized plants at which
CAT worked—Pneumatic Scale and Mitchell Machine—these socalled problems were not major issues. Regulations regarding job
placement allowed CAT to work within a defined and accepted frame
work. The existence of a union at Pneumatic allowed for an organized
approach to training and pay problems. And just as management chose
its representatives to the committee on technology/organizational
issues based on a combination of knowledge of the area and ability to
make decisions, so did the union.
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Of course in a union environment the union can always withdraw
from a team and thus kill it However, it is also true that in serious
questions of design in a joint worker-management setting, manage
ment can withdraw. It has been CAT's experience that management is
more likely to resist sharing authority as compared to the union's resis
tance to gaining it. In other words, management resistance to empow
ering workers to discuss design issues was the problem. Neither union
withdrew or threatened to, even though in varying degrees the firms
showed considerable concern with their participation at various points.
CAT has found that technical assistance projects are extremely diffi
cult to organize and manage. Technical innovation is the least of the
problems. Getting management to the table and willing to alter their
plans at the request of the workers is often the greatest difficulty. Natu
rally we are dealing with issues of control of the workplace, along with
traditional styles of top down authority.
CAT also tries to make sure that the discussions take place in an
atmosphere of equality when it conies to making technical decisions
about fixtures, machines, etc. This often means that the firm must
invest in an education program, or at least encourage team members to
work with resources knowledgeable of the area under discussion. Two
types of education usually need to occur. There has to be technical edu
cation. Workers and management need to be familiar with the technical
choices at their disposal. There also has to be education that enables
the parties to do joint problemsolving and strategic thinking. In addi
tion, the firm needs to allow time for the education process to take
place. Naturally this should occur during the working day, not as an
extracurricular activity.
The role of the consultant in these projects is particularly important.
The consultant is often fulfilling two functions at once. On the one
hand he/she offers technical expertise. On the other hand he/she tries to
facilitate meaningful worker participation in decisionmaking. In gen
eral, experience has encouraged CAT to provide a different consultant
for each role. In some cases, CAT staff does the facilitating, but in
larger projects CAT employs people who have expertise in teaching
empowerment strategies, organization tactics, how to hold meetings,
and so forth. When CAT hires consultants for their technical skills,
they also strive to acquaint them with the larger CAT agenda as well.
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Over time, CAT has identified a number of people who are now more
sensitive to the needs of all of their users.
CAT and Economic Diversification

Part of CAT's job is to service the needs of the small and mediumsized manufacturer. The objective is to maintain the manufacturing
base. Massachusetts, however, has an extremely high defense depen
dency. A good proportion of the work of many of the smaller firms is
defense-related—mostly supplying parts to prime contractors. In many
cases these firms need to find new customers very soon or they will be
out of business.
For years, the discussion of economic diversification has turned on
the question of product diversification. It is true there is a need for
product diversification, and also for community- and worker-based,
multiple-use committees to encourage that diversification. But that is
not the whole story.
From CAT's perspective as an organization that works with the
manufacturing process, many companies make useful products. But
they are making them according to military standards and procedures
and are, therefore, not competitive in the commercial market. Thus
there is a role for a process-driven strategy of economic diversification.
In other words, if CAT can fix up the manufacturing process so that the
company can produce for the commercial market, then they have a
chance to survive.
To this end, CAT has actively sought to have the various federal
defense adjustment bills changed so that there is federal aid to the
smaller firms via agencies like CAT to enable them to make the transi
tion from one style of manufacture to another. Naturally, CAT would
help firms make this transition using their normal criteria—worker par
ticipation and a skills-based production design. So far, the processdriven approach has succeeded in reducing the defense dependency
from 60 percent to about 20 percent in a plant that was producing for
both commercial and defense markets. In this case, changes in manu
facturing technique allowed the firm to lower unit costs and increase
quality, thus allowing it to win a substantial commercial contract.
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Since its defense business is expected to decline, the ability to manu
facture for the commercial sphere will save the firm and the jobs.
Obviously a process-driven approach is not the only approach that can
be of use, but for firms whose products are similar for the defense
industry and for the commercial market, it does offer some assistance.
In addition, a process-driven approach to diversification places real
value on worker participation, since the changes CAT supports are
dependent on the worker. In other words, the workforce is not a specta
tor to the diversification process but a participant
CAT as a Political Organization
In certain ways, the CAT project director has a political rather than
technical job. In order to move the CAT agenda forward industry, aca
demics, and the labor movement must all support it. Just getting the
notion across that technical innovation occurs least expensively and
more efficiently when it is based on worker participation and skill is a
big agenda item. Obviously, if firms refuse to even try the model, there
will be no projects. If CAT cannot convince engineers and others to
work with them and for them, they will not get the technical expertise
needed. Likewise, AFL-CIO support has been critical for CAT in iden
tifying plants that are in need of assistance and in working with local
unions to encourage participation.
Worker participation is also a profoundly political idea. It is derived
not only from common sense and experience in industry, but also from
a view of how a state-supported agency should function. Most of the
people in the state are working people. They pay the taxes. They are
the "users." Therefore it seems only fair that economic development
must explicitly serve the needs of all the users, not just the managers
and technicians. After all, no industry favors the trickle down theory
when it comes to their needs; public agencies should not favor trickle
down ideas when it comes to the needs of working people either.
CAT has set out consciously to build a constituency of people who
recognize the importance of the industrial base in Massachusetts. This
is not a glamorous task. Given the extreme budget problems in the
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state, it takes a high degree of cooperation from the constituent base to
maintain the program. So far, CAT has been successful.
Support for manufacturing can take many forms. CAT'S contribu
tion to the discussion is trying to get across the notion that a state
extension service for manufacturing is not a finance problem; in fact,
most of it is manufacturing process. Looked at from a process point of
view, workers and their organizations are put in the middle of the inno
vation process, as opposed to participating later. A process-oriented
program would favor in-plant education and apprenticeships. A pro
cess-oriented program also focuses assistance on the recipients—the
small manufacturer and the workforce—not intermediaries. Processdriven programs do not spend most of their resources at the university
or insuring bank loans.
Overall, however, the weight of those who favor support for manu
facturing is relatively weak. Even in good times, the Massachusetts
programs did not match the scope and intensity of the industrial assis
tance programs in most other industrialized states, or in many southern
states. There is not yet a large enough consensus in the Commonwealth
to support a manufacturing extension service in light of the fiscal prob
lems facing the state.
What makes the CAT program unique is its commitment to a
worker-centered, skill-based approach. As such, it has more worker
involvement than most. It has also been successful in saving or
enhancing manufacturing activity in a number of plants. Therefore,
even though CAT is not expected to grow substantially over the next
few years, it should be able to continue to function.
NOTE
This essay was written for a lecture presented in May 1990. It was edited in August 1991. By
that time the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had disbanded the Centers of Excellence, CATs
parent organization. CAT was able to move to another agency, but with no new funds appropriated
in the 199 lor 1992 budget.
Frank Emspak was Project Director of the Center for Applied Technology from November 1,
1987 until April 1,1991.

Can the End of the Social Democratic
Trade Unions be the Beginning
of a New Kind of Social
Democratic Politics?
Charles F. Sabel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The title of this essay is a provocation directed at the smaller and
smaller group of people in the advanced capitalist democracies who
are viscerally disturbed by the trade unions' self-evident disorientation
and loss of influence on macroeconomic decisions and the reorganiza
tion of firms. We know who we are. Despite our differences, we
believe that persons who cannot exercise their autonomy in choosing
their work and how to do it are diminished in an essential aspect of
their personhood; and we believe that autonomy in these things can
rarely be achieved by individuals acting in isolation. Because our ideas
about how good society can be are bound up with these beliefs, we are
always looking for signs that the strongest trade unions—those in the
social democracies of Northern Europe—are successfully adjusting to
the new conditions of international competition, and that their renewal
can serve as a model and guide to the reconstruction of more embattled
labor movements.
The first half of the provocation, hinted at in the title and spelled out
in the body of the essay, is that this hope is unwarranted. I will not
belabor the end of the industrial proletariat and its consequences for
traditional forms of trade unionism. 1 1 argue instead that social demo
cratic unions suppose in their organizational foundations a certain con
cept of corporations, of relations among them, of careers within them,
and of the boundary between them, "private" life, and the public sec
tor. As actual conditions diverge more and more from this concept, the
social democratic unions have more and more trouble addressing the
difficulties that employees face in their workday lives, and less and less
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ability to make effective use of their powers to regulate production.
The first part of the essay gives a compressed analysis of the way the
corporations' successful adjustment to the crisis changes their organi
zation in the relevant dimensions. The second part argues that social
democratic unions will very likely, but not necessarily, encourage these
transformations, yet are just as likely to be victims of these successes.
The other half of the provocation in the title and the essay is the idea
that to the extent social democratic unions do adjust to the new envi
ronment, they perform activities associated more with political entities
such as parties and social movements than with trade unions, although
neither political parties nor social movements today define themselves
as performing these particular tasks. The argument is a bit devious
here, so it is only fair to tip my hand. Thus, the third part of the essay
looks at effects of corporate reorganization on career patterns and the
conception of work as a distinct sphere of activity; the fourth part inno
cently deduces the features of a labor movement which can take
account of these effects. The concluding section asks much less inno
cently whether an organization with those features is a trade union in
any reasonable understanding of that term at all. It contends that it is
not a trade union but rather a new form of political activity. The reader
is left wondering whether, if true, this finding is a good or a bad thing.
So we end the excursion all in the same boat.
The Reorganization of the Firm
There is widespread agreement that firms respond to the current
economic environment in one of two very general ways. The first is by
cutting the production costs of standard goods. This can be done
through automation of traditional production lines, subcontracting to
low-wage producers, or some combination of both. Firms pursuing this
strategy are always at the mercy of new low-cost entrants. Hence, they
are permanently tempted to cut costs by reducing pay, worsening
working conditions, introducing machines that can be operated by
cheaper or less labor, or shifting production to low-wage areas. This is
or soon becomes a sweating strategy, whether pursued by large firms
or small. It is hard watching, among other things, the current massive
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layoffs of middle managers in U.S. firms that did for a time pursue this
strategy, to see how anyone given a choice could prefer it in the long
run to the alternative.
The second response is a strategy ofpermanent innovation. The aim
is to respond to and stimulate demand for products or services that cor
respond to consumers' wants more exactly than mass-produced goods.
All products are regarded in this strategy as if they were capital goods,
and valued according to the relation between their price and their abil
ity to satisfy particular wants (the more favorable the price/perfor
mance ratio the better), rather than according to their absolute price
(the cheaper the better).2
This second strategy depends on the reintegration of conception and
execution in production. Marketing, design, and manufacturing must
proceed concurrently, with those responsible for building the product
helping to define what it will be in the first place and vice versa. Only
in this way is it possible to cut development times in the measure
required to get products to market when they are still in demand, and to
reduce development costs to amounts that can be recovered through
sale of short runs of affordably priced goods.
The reintegration of conception and execution has among its many
other consequences three closely related effects which are of immedi
ate significance for the organization of trade unions. The first is to raise
the general level of skill required in production. Skill is the ability to
perform complex tasks guided only by indicative instructions. The
more superiors at all levels in the firm are pressed by constraints of
time and money to instruct their subordinates to "use their judgment,"
"do their best," or simply "solve the problem," the more the subordi
nates are called on to exercise their skills. It is impossible to apply
instructions where there are none, and the further a firm progresses
down the track of permanent innovation, the less likely it is that the
production of any particular product will be codified in rules. Notice I
am not claiming that all employees in firms following this strategy are
always acquiring and using all the skills for which they might poten
tially have a use. The claim is simply that whereas in the sweating
strategy model the tendency is toward de-skilling, the tendency here is
towards skill acquisition.3
The second consequence is to change the relation between firms,
particularly large firms, and their subcontractors from one of domina-
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tion to one of collaboration.4 Just as the reintegration of conception and
execution within firms leads to increased cooperation among different
departments and across grades of hierarchy, so too it requires increased
cooperation among the firms jointly producing a single final product.
Subcontractors were, in effect, treated like semiskilled workers in the
mass-production system: they executed a set of detailed blueprints pro
vided by the customer, and secured orders by entering the lowest bid
for a particular job. In a system of permanent innovation, where even
the largest firms cannot master (because they cannot reliably antici
pate) all the key technologies necessary to define and build rapidly
changing products, subcontractors increasingly collaborate in the spec
ification of the design and manufacturing setup. Asked to build a par
ticular component or subassembly, for example, a subcontractor may
propose modifications that reduce its cost of manufacture or improve
its performance; asked to contribute expertise in the formulation of a
plastic compound for an automobile company, for another example, a
chemical firm may install and oversee the operation in the customer's
plant of the machinery which shapes the new compound. This is not to
claim that there are not disparities of power in relations between large
firms and subcontractors in this system. Again the contrast is with the
organization of mass production, particularly as it is denatured through
sweating. In mass production, subcontractors were permanently, but
not necessarily increasingly, subservient to their large customers. In
sweating, a bad situation gets worse. In a system of permanent innova
tion, the tendency is for it to get better, though plainly not for all sub
contractors all at once.
The third consequence is the regionalization of production, by
which I mean the geographic clustering of firms providing similar or
complementary products or services to the same or related markets.5
This third effect follows in large measure from the first two. Thus, the
shorter the product life cycles, the riskier it is to hold inventories at any
stage of the production process—hence the need for just-in-time logis
tics, in which parts are produced and delivered as needed. Often (but
by no means always) this means establishing production facilities in
close proximity to the customer; and once established, these facilities
attract other customers of the same sort. The shorter the product life
cycle, moreover, the more likely it is that indispensable knowledge
about production will become local knowledge—embedded in the
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half-articulated practices of persons who are in daily contact and who
alone are in a position to grasp the implications of what they say and
do. The more knowledge is commonly known to be of this type, the
more firms will want to locate in the locale where it circulates. Finally,
the more specialized firms or operating units of firms become, the
more they are likely to depend for some of the services they need on
the public or cooperative institutions of their locale. Training, quality
control testing, and industrial medicine geared to the needs of a partic
ular branch or sector are all examples of services that firms may want
to have provided collectively; and, once again, the provision of such
services by municipal authorities or a cooperative of firms or some
combination of both attracts other firms in the same line of business.
Thus, just as the integration of conception and execution blurs the hier
archical boundaries within firms and the frontiers among them, so too
it blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors.
This does not suggest that there has been or will be a night-to-day
transformation. Because firms will want to cluster some of their key
activities does not mean that all will be clustered. It may often be more
advantageous to purchase subassemblies or even services from an
established supplier than to invest in creating a local supplier. But the
expectation is that the established subcontractor owes its success in
part to its location in a prospering regional economy specialized in its
business. Thus regionalization of production can go hand-in-hand with
internationalization in the sense that firms reinforce their own core
locales by linking them to similarly organized production systems else
where.
To sidestep several debates that are, I think, out of place here, con
sider two general qualifications regarding the model of the flexible,
high-wage economy as a whole. First, the permanent-innovation econ
omy is not necessarily an economy of small firms, although it is, com
pared to the world of mass production, an economy of small
production units or establishments. The model supposes that econo
mies of scale—the bigger the plant, the cheaper the product—are less
and less important. Otherwise the specialized product would be prohib
itively more expensive than the standard ware. Hence the size of estab
lishments should be (and according to much evidence is) constant or
falling, always with respect to the size distribution of plants in particu
lar industries in the period of mass production.6 But firms can also
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grow through exploiting economies of scope: the more diverse the cur
rent production, the lower the incremental cost of a new product. By
providing financial, marketing, or research and development services
to establishments in different but related lines of work, a corporation
can expand by enabling its constituent parts to specialize and diversify.
There is, however, no reason to think that these services must be pro
vided by a corporation with a controlling interest in the operating units,
as opposed to a bank, a trading company, or a federation of the (inde
pendently owned) operating units themselves. Even if it is a corpora
tion which does the coordinating, furthermore, the control it exercises
will be radically different from the centralized, bureaucratic control
typically exercised by the headquarters of an American corporation in
the past. Economies of scale are achieved through specialization of
resources: ever more dedicated or specialized machines, ever more
narrowly (semi) skilled workers, and ever more centralized structures.
Economies of scope are achieved by "generalizing" resources or turn
ing them to more and more diverse uses. This means more and more
flexible equipment, more skilled and autonomous workers, and more
supple organizations. As a glance at the management literature will
reveal, managers themselves are extremely worried that the decentral
ized organizations they are building will fly fissiparously apart7 People
in the labor movement are obviously and rightly concerned with the
distribution of power in firms. But these days the size of a corporation
is a less and less informative indicator of how authority is distributed
within it.
The second qualification has been anticipated by the repeated obser
vation that the shift to a flexible economy is not ah all-or-nothing prop
osition. The permanently innovative, flexibly specialized, high-wage,
high-skill economy is a limiting case. Some markets or parts of mar
kets remain stable; some technologies, however plastic by historical
standards, are more refractory than others. It is risky to try to shift from
mass production to permanent innovation in a single leap, partly
because it is unclear what the new model corporation really is (the
point made just above), partly because building it, whatever it is,
requires resources such as skilled labor which cannot be conjured into
existence where they do not exist, and partly because firms cannot be
sure that the unstable environment to which they are adjusting will not
unexpectedly stabilize in a way that is more hospitable to a variant of
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mass-production techniques. For all these reasons, firms hedge their
bets on rationalization, preferring hybrid strategies that combine ele
ments of mass and flexible production in a fashion that allows the firms
to move in the direction of whichever pole is more attractive. In an
unstable world, all irreversible decisions are dangerous traps, including
the decision to abandon the ability to respond efficiently to stability.
The consequence of these hedging strategies is that almost every firm
and every group of firms deviates from the limiting case of permanent
innovation. But for present purposes, that is less consequential than the
fact that they deviate as well from the traditional models of firm orga
nization upon which the modern labor movement in both Western
Europe and North America is premised. Corporate reorganization has a
long way to go before the typical firm resembles the ideal type
sketched here. But it has already demonstrated its competitive virtues
with such clarity that it is necessary to rethink how the labor movement
can encourage such benefit from these changes.
Some of the Things We Don't Know About
How the Labor Movement Can Encourage and Benefit
from Corporate Reorganization
Inconclusive as the model of the fully flexible corporation is, it is
still more substantial than our knowledge of how such firms are or can
be created in a particular economy, or of how labor can help create
them and benefit from its efforts. There is little in the current debate on
the future of the labor movement to challenge this assertion directly;
but there is a great deal which presumes knowledge of these matters
that I do not think is in hand. The purpose of this section, therefore, is
to look critically at the two major and related arguments that connect
the idea of labor's participation in economic restructuring to the reor
ganization of the labor movement. Being clear(er) about what we don't
know strikes me at the least as a good way to avoid a comforting, semi
conscious reliance on familiar models and tropes in rethinking the
tasks and structure of the labor movement. At the most, a clear view of
the inappropriateness of new variants of old models to current condi
tions focuses attention more precisely on what is truly novel in the cur-
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rent situation. For what it is worth, I have at one time or another argued
both of the positions I criticize, and I am therefore at least as discom
fited as anyone else by the criticism.
The first explanation of why some national economies, and collater
ally some national labor movements, move more quickly and success
fully in the direction of permanent innovation is simply that even as
they industrialized, some economies never went very far down the path
of mass production.8 Smaller, more differentiated markets and craft tra
ditions of production reinforced each other so that, despite appearances
to the contrary, the key elements of a flexible economy—skilled labor,
flexible equipment, and the managerial know-how to constantly
recombine them—were constantly reproduced. Conversely, these same
traditions put barriers in the way of a forced-draft extension of massproduction models. When the new conditions of competition put a pre
mium on flexibility, the West German, Austrian, Italian, Japanese, and
Swedish economies did what came naturally: because the strategy of
permanent innovation had many affinities with past practice whereas
the sweating model looked like a radical break with tradition, they
"chose" the former as the safer proposition. Where, as in the United
States and Great Britain, less of the craft tradition had survived, the
balance of potential costs and benefits was reversed, and the firms
moved the other way, at least initially. The lesson for labor in this view
is simply to revive and adjust to current conditions in craft traditions of
organization wherever they have not survived and adjusted automati
cally.
As a description of what makes for competitive success and failure,
this type of account is unbeatable. But as an explanation, it is circular
to the point of vacuity. Suppose we call all the rules and routines that
regulate the distribution of authority in production economic institu
tions. Then this view explains the existence in a particular economy of
institutions favoring flexibility as the result of the historical presence in
that society of institutions encouraging flexibility (or at least encourag
ing the creation of institutions that encourage flexibility). If you think
you can explain the sedative effects of opiates by noting their forma
tive powers, you will find this kind of account satisfying; otherwise
not.
To see the practical limits of this kind of tautologous formulation, it
is only necessary to look a little more closely at the suggestion to

Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics

145

revive craft principles in the organization of labor. Surely the craft idea
of defining union jurisdiction according to the materials worked in
each task—pipes to the pipe-fitters, bricks to the bricklayers—is an
invitation to permanent jurisdictional disputes in an age when the con
stant introduction of new materials makes it hazardous to guess what
will be made of what. But the craft tradition of hiring halls, labor
exchanges, and chambers of labor, where unions take substantial
responsibility for training and allocating skilled labor, can arguably be
seen as an intimation or (exceptionally, as in the case of Sweden) even
a precursor of the kind of labor market institutions appropriate to a
flexible economy. If firms increasingly subcontract design and produc
tion of key subassemblies, why can't labor become a systems supplier
of skilled labor? If the tendency is toward more collaborative relations
between workers and managers within firms and between firms and
their subcontractors, why is collaboration between the firm and the
union as organizer of the local labor market less probable?
The point here is that to elaborate the case against "craft" jurisdic
tion over jobs and for "craft" organization of the labor market is to
specify which of the structuring principles of the craft economy might
efficiently structure the emergent flexible system and why. To do that,
however, is to begin to replace the flexibility-begets-flexibility argu
ment with a model or proto-model of a flexible economy that shows
just how specific institutions prove to be adapted to the current envi
ronment
This is just what the second argument promises to do. I will call this
the model of resurgent social democracy, because many of the institu
tional features it identifies as favoring the transition to a flexible econ
omy and reinforcing the labor movement through that transition are
characteristic of the Northern European social democracies, particu
larly those in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Indeed,
the model is appealing in no small measure because it suggests that
institutions indigenous not just to the West but to the left in the West
could unexpectedly prove a politically palatable alternative to whole
sale initiation of Japanese practices, which otherwise seems the humil
iating price required to maintain economic competitiveness.
Like the more general institutional view, the model of resurgent
social democracy identifies costs and benefits which move firms'
choices away from sweating in the direction of the permanent-innova-
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tion strategy.9 The emphasis is on the costs imposed and benefits pro
vided by the system of industrial relations broadly understood. The
most important cost regards layoffs: a combination of legal and politi
cal constraints obliges firms to negotiate expensive severance arrange
ments whenever they seek to reduce the workforce. This makes
management think twice and twice again before rationalizing, relocat
ing, and subcontracting production work as prescribed in the sweating
model. Labor, the familiar argument goes, is increasingly viewed as a
fixed cost; and firms must consider carefully how to make efficient use
of an asset of which they cannot dispose.
Here is where four key benefits of social democratic industrial rela
tions come in. First, there is a system of plant-level dispute resolution
based on considerations of equity and substance rather than precedent
and procedure. Outcomes, in theory, are supposed to secure the firm's
competitiveness while respecting the interests of employees, not to
determine which employees are entitled to what given the language of
the collective bargaining agreement and the common law of the plant.
It would be easy to overstate the difference: workers in the social dem
ocratic systems have plenty of legal and customary rights, and bargain
ing in, say, the Anglo-American system is influenced by complex and
encompassing ideas of equity.
But in the Anglo-American system, at least as it existed in the early
1980s, the definition of rights was tied to the definition of jobs and
seniority in ways that made reorganization at work a constant threat to
established patterns of entitlement.10 To accept changes in the defini
tion and scope of one's job was to accept greater vulnerability to mana
gerial discretion. In the social democratic system, standards are
established to govern treatment of whole classes of employees—those
above a certain age, the skilled, those with families, those requiring
training—and so long as there are good prospects of satisfying these
standards by any combination of, say, job transfers, compensatory
training, and indemnifications, individuals do not have rights to partic
ular places in the production system. Hence reorganization is not held
hostage to adjudication of such rights.
The remaining features of the social democratic system as portrayed
in this argument regulate relations between labor and capital outside
the plant. The first and in many ways most important is simply labor's
right to participate in the definition of administration of training pro-
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grams.11 As demand for skill increases, labor's place in the institutional
order becomes more central, the argument goes, because labor already
occupies a central place in the training system; and this is true regard
less of whether unions come to manage local labor markets on the hir
ing hall model or in some other, unspecified way.
The second and third supra-plant features of the social democratic
system are industrywide collective bargaining and the elaboration of
framework labor regulations. Industrywide collective bargaining obvi
ously establishes minimum wages and working conditions and guaran
tees that flexibility at the plant and company level does not lead to
company unionism in which workers and managers in each production
unit try to advance their own (collective) interest, regardless of its con
sequence for others in a similar situation. It also allows for experimen
tation, industry-by-industry, with new ways of collectively establishing
a fair distribution of the burdens of reorganization and adjusting the
standards of equity applied at plant level to the new forms of work
organization resulting from rationalization. Framework legislation,
finally, coordinates public provision of training and social insurance
with needs of firms and industries; it also protects and extends labor's
right to gain, through some form of participation in managerial decisionmaking, the kind of information and veto powers necessary to
make substantive regulation of industrial reorganization workable.
Without the knowledge to judge what can reasonably be expected of a
firm in a particular situation, and without the power to effectively
obstruct solutions that violate its sense of equity, labor would have to
seek protection through imposition of a much finer mesh of plant-level
rules.
The net effect of the social democratic model is to make a choice of
the sweating strategy of prohibiting expenses and the strategy of per
manent innovation affordable and remunerative, if not painless. More
over, the more rapidly the new strategy spreads, the better for the
unions. The demand for skill draws unions more and more into the pro
cess of reorganization itself, reinforcing their position with respect to
the firms at the same time it refurbishes their appeal to their members.
Indeed, if the process goes far enough, the unions will eventually come
to exercise de facto rights of determination that they have not been able
to obtain directly through legislation. Hence the resurgence of social
democracy, and particularly social democratic industrial relations,
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which seemed threatened by the breakdown in the new world economy
of tripartite or neocorporatist systems of wage bargaining that helped
these countries reduce both inflation and unemployment in the 1970s
and early 1980s. The lesson for economies that do not already have
social democratic industrial relations systems as depicted in this model
is clearly to build them, starting with the creation of training systems in
which labor plays a central part.
This view certainly has more bite than the generic institutional
explanation. The problem with it is not, I think, that it is vacuous but
that, taken at face value, it is wrong. First, a strong labor movement in
the sense of resurgent social democracy is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to encourage restructuring along the lines of the
permanent-innovation strategy. Moreover, there is good evidence that
trade unions and the labor movement more generally are unexpectedly
being weakened by the very changes that they are directly and indi
rectly encouraging, including the changes that favor use of more highly
skilled labor.
Developments in countries as diverse as Switzerland, Japan, and
France show that a social democratic labor movement is not a neces
sary condition for flexible adjustments. All these countries have
adopted flexible adjustment strategies, although the shift in this direc
tion is more recent and less comprehensive in France. Swiss national
unions are nonentities by almost any imaginable standard; there is
debate about whether Japanese unions are company unions in the sense
defined a moment ago or rather in the perjorative U.S. sense of yellowdog organizations which betray their members to do the bidding of
their masters in management. But there is no doubt that they are com
pany unions in one sense or another. In France, less than 9 percent of
the workforce is organized in unions. The question publicly posed for
debate in that country is whether there can be unions without mem
bers.12
It is, to be sure, possible to explain how firms in each of the coun
tries were moved, at least partly because of the particularities of their
relation to labor, to decide in favor of the flexible strategy. Japanese
firms have practices of granting long-term job security to their core
workforce dating back to the 1920s. French unions have by law the
right to participate in the decisionmaking of a great number of public
entities with responsibility for monitoring and shaping the labor mar-
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ket. Swiss firms have long traditions of flexible production, and corre
spondingly developed complex formal and informal systems of dispute
resolution consistent with that strategy.13 But the more complex and
particular each of these explanations becomes, the closer it gets to the
generic institutional argument in which flexibility begets flexibility. If
you nodded in approval as that argument was dismissed a moment ago,
you cannot use it as a makeweight to save the resurgent democratic
model. The strength of that model is its parsimony; and elaborating it
in response to counterexamples only weakens its foundation.
The same difficulties arise in the defense of the claim that the social
democratic model of industrial relations is a sufficient condition for
extension of the flexible economy. The argument suggests that the
stronger the unions in the social democratic sense, the more likely that
firms will perceive the costs of the sweating strategy as prohibitively
high and the costs of flexible reorganization as attractively low.14 But
all change, even change ultimately for the better for almost everyone,
imposes short-term costs. Suppose the unions become so strong that
they can successfully not only oppose a switch to sweating, but also
pursue a variant of the high-skill strategy in which the costs of transi
tion are fairly shared. The result, as illustrated in the bankruptcy of the
Austrian state-owned steel and metalworking firms that are the tradi
tional fortress of the country's trade unions, is first stalemate, then
catastrophe.15 However much one is inclined to favor the expansion of
union influence, this is, at best, too much of a good thing.
Here too, of course, it is possible to patch the argument by specify
ing that it holds only within a particular range: when labor has suffi
cient power to block sweating but not enough to be tempted to believe
it is invulnerable to changes in the environment, and is able to defend
the status quo indefinitely. But insofar as the specification looks for
ward to the outcomes it aims to include and exclude, it again arouses
suspicion of circularity. Just as troubling, the notion that more trade
union power is not necessarily better undercuts the (to me) politically
attractive suggestion that the model of resurgent social democracy
offers an alternative to democratization of the workplace through legis
lation. Surely employers will tend to suspect that there is a point at
which an increase in union influence on decisionmaking begins to
impede flexibility rather than encourage it. If advocates of the model of
resurgent social democracy concede that such a point exists without
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being able to locate it precisely, managers will voice those suspicions
sooner rather than later.
Labor, indeed, may not merely reap fewer benefits from restructur
ing than the model suggests. It may find its organizational integrity
undermined by the very process of economic reorganization it encour
ages and from which members benefit as individuals. Whether this
happens or not depends on the influence of reorganization on back
ground conditions that the model, in its appealingly parsimonious
forms, ignores.
Take as an example the organizational consequences for German
unions of increasing demand for skill and the resulting extension of
training programs.16 Traditionally, youths went to work full time upon
completion of their apprenticeships and were assimilated into the over
lapping worlds of the shop floor and the union in the years that fol
lowed. Many would subsequently continue their educations by
attending classes. But even when they left the shop floor to become
technicians or engineers, often with highly responsible jobs, they
remained attached to the values which had formed them, and tolerant
of if not loyal to the unions. In any case they defined themselves as dis
tinct from university-trained managers, for whom the idea of a career
was associated with the idea of progression up a formal hierarchy
rather than with growing technical prowess.
Today this pattern and the distinctions on which it is based are disin
tegrating. Young people spend a shorter and shorter time on the shop
floor between completing their apprenticeships and continuing their
educations. For the most ambitious and talented, more and more of the
time spent on the shop floor at any stage in their careers is spent in spe
cial project groups where teams of engineers, managers, technicians,
and skilled workers perfect new products or install new production
systems. The union is simply not a constitutive element of the training
system on the shop floor as these new cohorts of skilled workers expe
rience it. They are, to all appearances, not antiunion, but quite indiffer
ent to its existence. Because the most active trade unionists and the
bulk of union officials have, in Germany as elsewhere, been recruited
from among the skilled workers, this indifference threatens the organi
zation's ability to renew itself, and is clearly perceived by union lead
ers as doing so.
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A second German example concerns the effects of subcontracting
and the blurring of the boundaries among corporations more generally.
As subcontractors take more and more responsibility for design and
production work once done in-house, the plant or firm-level institu
tions that defend employee interests are less and less able to even mon
itor, let alone control, developments. The problems are aggravated
when, as is frequently the case, the work is subcontracted to firms in
industries other than the client's, and hence organized by different
unions: unionized seamstresses upholstering seats in an automobile
firm are members of the metalworkers union in Germany, but members
of the textile and garment workers union if employed by a seat-making
firm supplying the auto plant just-in-time from an adjacent facility. The
engineers and skilled workers designing the microprocessor used in an
advanced fuel-injection system are likely to be working for an elec
tronics firm that is not organized by any union at all. Given that the
social democratic model of substantive dispute resolution presumes the
possibility of making a comprehensive assessment of the costs and
benefits of various possible compromises, the fragmentation of control
over the process of restructuring endangers the capacity to formulate
and assess just the kinds of comprehensive bargains upon which the
success of the substantive system depends.
A third example concerns the effects of changes in the boundaries
and operation of the public sector. The reorganization of the economy
on flexible lines changes the division of labor between the public and
private sectors. The earlier discussion of the regionalization of produc
tion and the increased public provision of services to industry indicated
one aspect of this change. Another regards the growing barrier against
the entry of the unskilled into the flexible economy. So long as much of
the skill needed for work could be learned on the job, the state could
provide unemployment insurance and other forms of social assistance
independent of systematic job training and placement. The state
assured citizens of a subsistence income, and the economy eventually
provided jobs which allowed those who wanted to work their way into
economic and social security the chance to do so. The more necessary
it is to possess substantial generic skills to get any job, however, the
more important it becomes to integrate the provision of social services
and training into a package customized according to the needs of par
ticular clients or client groups.
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But this recombination and customization of services often requires
a profound reorganization of social welfare bureaucracies, including
decentralization of authority to the local level and devolution of the
responsibility for providing many services to community or other non
profit groups with the kind of local knowledge on which the effective
ness of the program depends. These pressures for reorganizing the
bureaucracy and opening it to the outside world are further increased
by the ambition—often inspired by the experience and model of the
large firms and their reconstitution—to break monopolies in the provi
sion of services ranging from medical care to garbage collection both
as a spur to efficiency and as a protection against administrative arro
gance.17
The cumulative effect is that the fluidity of production relations, as
indicated particularly by an increase in subcontracting, is becoming as
typical of the public sector as it is of private industry. And as in private
industry, the consequence for unions is an increase in jurisdictional dis
putes whose occurrence is a sign of an increasingly poor fit between
the organizational boundaries of the labor movement and the bound
aries of the relevant units of economic and social welfare activity. Swe
den is the most clamorous example of disruption which can result
when public- and private-sector unions fight each other over the right
to represent employees or classes of work which have passed in one
form or another from public to private control. In Sweden, as else
where, these conflicts resonate with and thus amplify the jurisdictional
disputes provoked by reorganization within the private sector. 18
The aim in criticizing the model of resurgent social democracy is no
more to suggest that labor's role in organizing the training system of
shaping corporate decisions is irrelevant to its future than criticism of
the generic institutional model is meant to demonstrate that economic
adjustment is not influenced by institutional patterns.
Historical barriers to the extension of mass production and historical
dispositions for flexible economic organization, including especially
those associated with the social democratic system of industrial rela
tions, help stack the deck against pursuit of the sweating strategy and
for a program of permanent innovation. The difficulty with both the
general and the particular institutional arguments is that in identifying
important continuities between the emergent flexible economy and its
antecedents, the former is assimilated into the latter in a way that
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obscures vital differences between them: differences, indeed, which
affect the role in the new economy of just those institutions such as
training that appeared to warrant the assimilation of new to old in the
first place.
In the next two sections, I reverse the procedure. Rather than search
ing for even a crude blueprint for the future in the past, I look only for
those old building materials that can be used to erect the new system.
Instead of treating the flexible economy as a distinctive elaboration of
certain historical traditions in new circumstances, I try to outline a plan
of construction by reflection on the novelty of the current situation as it
has emerged in the preceding discussion.
The Localization of the Labor Market
Firms, we saw, are opening themselves to one another (through the
transformation and extension of subcontracting relations) and to the
society in which they are more and more embedded (through increas
ing reliance on public or at least collective provision of training and
other services as well as new forms of social insurance). This double
opening is leading, I argued earlier, to the regionalization of produc
tion: at the limit the fundamental unit of production is not the firm, but
an ensemble of firms and public or community institutions in a particu
lar locale.
Regionalization has two closely related effects on the organization
of labor markets and hence on the boundary conditions that any labor
movement operating in such markets would need to respect. First, the
blurring of boundaries among firms that follows from the reintegration
of conception and execution means that even as the demand for skill
increases, individual jobs become less and less secure. When even the
largest firms expect to turn to system suppliers to provide crucial
expertise, but cannot predict when and for what sort of know-how they
will do so, who at what level of the firm can be sure of his or her job?
Where is the stable core of the economy? When high-flying employees
can expect to be rotated from autonomous division to autonomous
division or project group to project group to develop a sense of loyalty
to the corporation as a whole, but the corporation cannot define itself
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as a unified entity except by pointing to the common experience of the
high flyers, what sort of loyalty will the latter develop? Under these
circumstances, to pursue a career does not mean to progress rung by
rung up the bureaucratic ladder as envisaged in the concept of the
closed labor markets central to the social democratic system of indus
trial relations: many rungs are gone and the very structure on which the
ladder rests may disappear. Nor does it mean, as in craft labor markets,
to master a well-defined body of knowledge by moving from firm to
firm in a predictable pattern: the definition of what knowledge is rele
vant is constantly changing. Rather it means to assess constantly which
of all the current or potentially acquired skills ought to be developed in
the light of changing market conditions and one's unfolding self-con
ception.
Second, the blurring of the boundary between the firm and society is
paralleled for the individual in the blurring of the boundary between
work and other crucial spheres of experience. The devolution of
authority within organizations and the growing need for skill and team
work require employees even in large corporations to exercise on the
job the kind of autonomy and responsibility for the use of resources
that in capitalist democracies have typically been regarded as the pre
rogative of groups such as homeowners or the self-employed: those
whose control over some form of capital entitled them to a correspond
ing kind of economic sovereignty. "Private" or even "family" values
such as self-reliance in complex situations are highly valued, perhaps
even indispensable at work. Conversely, however, the less secure jobs
become and the less meaningful the traditional ideas of a career, the
more employees must rely on extra-firm associations established
through the family, professional groups, churches, political parties,
hobby groups, or social movements to learn what kinds of jobs are
imperiled, what kinds expanding, and where to acquire the skills nec
essary to compete for them. By definition, an information network that
followed the contours of the firm would be of no help in these regards
precisely because the information of value concerns possibilities
beyond the corporate boundaries—the disintegration of which creates
the insecurity in the first place. The more the social and the economic
become fused through regionalization, the more the home invades the
workplace and vice versa. Changes in gender relations, related but not
reducible to changes in the organization of work, further mute the dis-
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tinction between the two by formalizing the division of labor in the
household (if only by making it a matter for family discussion), and
making family needs as the job prospects of each partner in the more
and more numerous two-earner households a constraint on job
choices. 19
Social democratic unions are coming to grief because they are not
adjusting to these effects of reorganization, although they are in many
ways the best positioned of all contemporary labor movements to make
such adjustments. The unions (perhaps with the exception of those in
Sweden) are losing their formative influence on the skilled workers
because they are extraneous to the complex systems of post-appren
ticeship training that define new kinds of careers and loyalties. Because
their basic units of organization are the plant, the firm, and the branch,
unions cannot regulate the increasing movement of work and workers
across these boundaries. Because they presume a stable division of
labor between the public and private sectors, and treat the public sector
as if it were a firm in the traditional sense, unions are bewildered by
efforts to redistribute responsibility between the state and civil society,
efforts which often entail reorganization of the state itself.
Towards a New Model Union

To do better these unions will, in a sense, have to follow the lead of
the firms: push responsibility for decisionmaking down to the local,
operative level, and open the local unions and plant-level institutions
in each area to one another and to the whole range of economically rel
evant local actors from municipal authorities to environmental and
social movements, and even political parties with whom they may
have little or only hostile contact.20 By inserting themselves into the
regional economy at the points where the firms connect with one
another and where they as a group join the local society, the unions can
make themselves indispensable to management as systems suppliers of
skilled labor and indispensable to their members as guides and advi
sors in their passages from job to job and home to work and back. Con
tinuing education for the skilled, extensive training for the semiskilled,
extensive job counseling that bundles general social services and train-
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ing of both sorts in packages individuals and families can use are the
first, indispensable steps to this end. If the social democratic unions
can learn to do that much locally, it will be almost child's play to rede
fine the advisory and tutelary role of the national union.
Unions in the United States seem to have an incomparable harder
row to hoe.21 Social democratic unions are victimized by the success of
a broad movement towards flexible reorganization that they encourage.
In the United States, the respective costs and benefits of the two adjust
ment strategies are often indeterminate, and firms frequently oscillate
between them. But whichever course firms choose, and perhaps most
directly by their wavering, they do the unions harm.22 If the unions
oppose cost-cutting strategies they are defending their members' privi
leges; if they condone them, they are protecting their organizations at
the members' expense. If they block attempts to increase flexibility,
they are dinosaurs, unable to understand the motivations of the modern
workforce and the exigencies of competition in world markets; but if
they cooperate with strategies aimed at increasing productive flexibil
ity, they make themselves and their members hostage to management's
half-hearted and vacillating dedication to this course of action. Even
the fear of a reversion to cost-cutting strategies— provoked perhaps by
high-level corporate struggles far beyond the influence of plant-level
or division management—is enough to reveal that labor's gradual
abandonment of its traditional forms of self-defense make it vulnerable
to incalculable risks. U.S. unions would, I suspect, love to have the
problems of their social democratic counterparts; and that is perhaps
one of the reasons they tend to discount the gravity of those difficulties
if they take notice of them at all.
But it is easy to overlook the vulnerabilities of the strong and the
strength of the vulnerability. The social democratic unions' position in
the largest plants, the continuing allegiance of the middle-aged work
force, and the unions' political influence make it easy for them to
downplay the dangers of delayed adjustment, hard for the national cen
ter to see why it should cede power to the local periphery, and harder
still for any one powerful union to see why it should abandon its jurisdictional claims to the benefits of a rival. Conversely, the confusing
fluidity of the American corporations and the debility of American
labor mean that local unions may enjoy more freedom than their more
closely regulated social democratic counterparts to establish them-

Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics

157

selves as an indispensable component of an emergent regional econ
omy should the occasion present itself for them to do so.
Such possibilities are, I think, much less remote than a simple sur
vey of the disorganized and dispirited state of national—or, as their
Canadian affiliations entitle them to say—international unions in the
United States would suggest. At the plant level, many unions have
become engaged during the last decade in various forms of worker par
ticipation or employee involvement. In the many successful but scat
tered programs of this type, blue- and white-collar workers take an
active role in assessing the competitiveness of the plant and determin
ing ways to improve it.23 To do this they and the unions who represent
them must have access to virtually all the information that manage
ment considers in making its decisions. The result in the best cases is a
system of substantive dispute resolution and de facto labor-manage
ment codetermination which approximates the social democratic sys
tems. But whereas the latter presumes rigid plant boundaries, many of
the emergent plant-level systems in the United States grow out of
cooperative efforts by managers and employees to establish which
products the operating unit can, after the requisite reorganization, prof
itably make, and which must be abandoned to other makers. Thus
cooperation in this setting is from the first directed toward limiting the
risks of an organizational vulnerability which, given the impossibility
of fixing firm boundaries with any reliability, is broadly seen as a con
stituent fact of corporate life. For the moment, these open-ended suc
cess stories remain isolated: plants in the same corporation or region
can have wildly different experiences in this regard, depending on the
accidents of personality and timing; and national unions are either
ignorant of local successes or too threatened by the popularity of the
leaders they create to even debate their significance. But if one of the
building blocks of a new labor movement is a local union rooted in the
firm's decisionmaking yet not barricaded behind its formal boundaries,
construction materials of this kind are being produced in the United
States.
Similar considerations apply to training programs and the creation
of subcontracting networks, although unions have been reticent to par
ticipate in either of these foundational elements of the new regional
economies. Here too local initiatives are indispensable. The pattern in
training is for a group of firms, varying in size according to the nature
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of the local economy, to join with a community college or vocational
training center to create a new kind of apprenticeship which blends tra
ditional forms of vocational education with the relevant components of
an undergraduate-level technical curriculum.24 New degree programs
transform traditional machinery and other trades into paraprofessions.
Often the project is initially funded with the help of state or federal
monies. In this case too the fluidity of the situation is a potential advan
tage. If apprenticeship were recreated in the United States now, and if
the unions participated in its formation, it could be done in a way that
gives labor a central place in a system of life-long training—a system
that does not draw the line between initiation into a trade and continu
ing education that vexes much of the social democratic labor move
ment. But for the moment, U.S. unions are so absorbed with their dayto-day problems and the defense of the interests of their current mem
bers that they are less likely to embrace these efforts to regenerate skill
than to ignore or even to oppose them in favor of programs to retrain
older, displaced workers.
The growing efforts to create subcontracting networks of diverse
kinds also involve consortia of large and small firms, public—typically
state—agencies, and educational institutions. Sometimes the initiative
comes from large corporations, sometimes from trade associations,
sometimes from ad hoc groups of small firms, sometimes from the
public sector. Again the results are mixed. There are plenty of reliable
successes strewn among the tales of disaster. But win or lose, the
effects seldom succeed in overcoming the unions' preoccupation with
other matters or fear that they lack the competence to participate
knowledgeably in decisions for which they may later be held account
able. Yet again it is clear that if the unions could vanquish their reti
cence, they could be rebuilding themselves by building a structure
indispensable to the local economy—and difficult to construct with the
organizational tools of social democracy.
If your imagination stretches easily to comprehend these separate
possibilities, then it will take only a slight additional effort to compre
hend the possibility of a strategy that makes realization of each easier
by connecting it to the others. Take the common case of a local union
fighting for the innovation strategy in alliance with one faction of plant
management against the rear-guard, cost-cutting methods of a second.
Suppose next that the union and its allies participate in a training con-
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sortium that, among other things, undertakes to remedy the spot skill
shortages that clouded the prospects of the permanent-innovation strat
egy and provided a convenient argument to oppose it Suppose further
that the union and its allies in management simultaneously participated
in a consortium of large and small firms dedicated to improving sub
contracting relations, and thus removing yet another potential obstacle
to the flexible alternative. Suppose, finally, that a state government pro
vides funds and advice to help the local union pursue all these tasks at
once, and—welcome to America—you will have imagined just the
program which the State of Michigan and a local of the United Auto
mobile Workers in the auto parts sector pursued until the governor who
supported the plan was unexpectedly defeated for reasons unrelated to
his economic initiatives.25 Had this plan succeeded, or if any of the
many, less formal ones that survive it prospers, one result would be to
create local constituencies (other firms, educational institutions, public
officials) who will take the union's side in its struggle against the costcutting strategy. If successes multiply, a second result would force
unions to reverse the firms' strategy of using labor's concessions at one
plant as justification for demands for give-backs at another. Instead,
unions favoring the permanent-innovation strategy could begin whipsawing recalcitrant management, using the examples of managers else
where who participated to their benefit in cooperative strategies as a
means of convincing their recalcitrant local interlocutors to do the
same.
Does It Matter Whether
There Are New Model Unions?
Whether There Are Unions At All?
To us, the us addressed at the beginning of this essay, the answer to
both these questions is self-evidently yes. People who are not much
interested in labor these days are so sure that unions have no future that
they seldom can be troubled to read essays alleging they might; those
who believe unions do have a future or should are so desperate for
some conformation of their hopes that they take the mere fact that
essays appear on the topic as a sign that labor is more vigorous than it
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appears. But this essay about the future of the unions had indirectly
raised the question whether we—and I am still talking about us—
should care about the fate of the new model union, and indeed whether
that organization is reasonably regarded as a union at all.
The answer to the first question is clearly connected to the unions'
role in economic adjustment. If (almost) everyone should reasonably
prefer the innovation strategy to the sweating strategy in the long run,
and strong unions in the social democratic or new model sense encour
age diffusion of the innovation strategy, then (almost) everyone should
support either social democratic or new model unions.
But in the light of the foregoing discussion it is hard to extract much
of a defense of new model unions from this kind of shaky syllogism.
First, the argument supposes that unions play a critical role in deter
mining the choice between strategies as though most of what managers
did was decided by what unions did or how industrial relations are
organized. Those things count—a lot. But we saw, first, that a social
democratic industrial relations system is neither a necessary nor a suf
ficient condition for the choice of the innovation strategy, and, second,
that social democratic unions do not automatically become new model
unions. On the contrary, they are more likely to be victims of the reor
ganization they encourage.
The upshot is that the preceding discussion provides reasons for
supporting several types of unionism if you care strongly about the
outcome of economic adjustment, but no reasons for supporting unions
more than, say, programs to encourage training or build subcontracting
networks. Presumably more of all these things is better than less, and
doing them concurrently or at least in a coordinated way is better than
doing them disjointedly. But the model of resurgent social democracy
is too ramshackle a theory of economic adjustment to suggest how
scarce resources should be allocated even among this limited group of
tasks.
The one strong conclusion which discussion of the model of resur
gent social democracy does allow is, paradoxically, that whatever
robust labor organizations emerge from and take root in the process of
economic reorganization will not be trade unions in any traditional
sense. Trade unions in the sense of social democracy or of American
industrial unionism are concerned with the interests of employees at
work, where work typically means a long-term association with a par-
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ticular occupation in a single firm. But if the foregoing analysis of the
effects of reorganization is correct, the new model labor organizations
will have to be concerned with addressing problems that cross the
boundaries among firms and between work and other vital life activi
ties. A labor organization that tries to distinguish its members' interests
at work from their general interests in well-being could not, in this
view, effectively represent their interests at all.26
But why call an organization that represents some aspects of mem
bers' general interests in well-being a trade union, or even a labor orga
nization? I can think of little reason especially if that organization
operates in association with social service agencies, schools, churches,
and political parties. I say little reason rather than none at all because I
imagine this organization might play a distinctive role in wage deter
mination. But the more wages are set through individual negotiations
between employees and firms on the one hand and more and more
encompassing minimum wage or minimum social income legislation
on the other, the less distinguishing a mark this will be. 27
No, the more natural but troubling way to think about organizations
that represent their members' general interests in well-being is to
regard them as engaged in politics. The characterization is natural
because to defend its members' general interests in well-being an orga
nization must articulate and advance a vision of life, including ideals
of justice, views about the proper distribution of control over economic
activity, and so on. If an organization that does these things is not a
political organization, what other kind of reorganization might it be?
But because the same kinds of everyday definitions that make it rea
sonable to say that the new model union is not a union but a political
organization obstruct efforts to say what kind of political organization
it might be. Plainly unions are not parties in any traditional sense,
because parties, we just saw, traditionally leave concerns about work to
unions. More precisely, concern with work exhausts itself in concern
for "the economy," which typically means macroeconomic decisionmaking, except insofar as such decisionmaking is in the hands of virtu
ally self-governing institutions (as is often the case with, for example,
central banks). Nor are these new model political organizations easily
assimilated to social movements. Either these movements are con
cerned with the situation of particular groups, in which case they aim
to regulate workplace conditions only insofar as those conditions
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threaten their constituents' interests: for example, feminist groups fight
sexism on the job and seniors' associations fight ageism. Or the social
movements are concerned with what they regard as public interests
such as a healthy environment or safe consumer products. In that case
they aim to regulate production insofar as it is necessary to eliminate
threats to these public interests: for example, by legislating reductions
in pollution or creating incentives to or improving the safety of prod
ucts by making firms strictly liable for harm caused by their wares.
Thus social movements are not trying to regulate the relation between
the economy and other spheres of life in general.28 On the contrary, it
would be more accurate to say that the proliferation of these move
ments is a response to the failure of the existing division of labor
between parties and unions to define a form of regulation adapted to
current circumstances; and that this response presumably makes the
task of finding a general solution harder by creating more and more
precise divisions among groups and interests that will eventually need
to be reconciled both on and off the job through complex compro
mises.
New model political organizations cannot, therefore, be social
movements. If they are doing their jobs, they will be reducing the need
for social movements, or rather the need for social movements to do
some of the things they currently do in the way they do them. Certainly
this will require collaboration between the new model entities and the
social movements; but this does not suggest that one will absorb or
come to approximate the other, any more than cooperation with politi
cal parties suggests analogous outcomes.
Hence the disturbing provisioned conclusion: there is nothing in the
logic of the current reorganization that warrants the assumption that we
will have trade unions in the future. And if we have them they will be
filling a political function that we can specify only in the sketchiest
outline. But then it may well be that reflection on the void that would
exist if these almost indefinable political entities did not take the place
of trade unions is the beginning of another and more robust kind of
argument for creating them.
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Training and the
New Industrial Relations
A Strategic Role for Unions
Wolfgang Streeck
University of Wisconsin-Madison

In the past decade, training seems to have emerged as a core subject
of what to many promises to become a new type of industrial relations:
more cooperative and consensual, less adversarial and conflictual, with
fewer costly power struggles. More and more employers have come to
accept that a modern economy's competitiveness depends on the skills
of its labor force. Many union leaders, in turn, no longer object to the
idea that secure employment at high wages requires above all eco
nomic competitiveness. To deal with what are perceived as critical skill
shortages, employers in many countries and industries urge govern
ments and unions to join them in conceited training offensives. Gov
ernments, for their part, have moved training to the center of labor
market policies. As skill formation turns into a central issue of eco
nomic policy and labor relations, previously opposed group interests
and the general interest finally seem to converge; distributional conflict
promises to give way to productive cooperation; and eventually what
appears to be outdated political antagonism may be displaced by
peaceful competition for the best ideas on how jointly to organize and
implement the upskilling of a country's, industry's, or company's labor
force.
Still, few unions have yet thought through the implications of the
resurgence of training as an industrial relations issue for their own
strategy and status. Beyond general acknowledgments of the impor
tance of skill formation, there is considerable skepticism and suspi
cion, especially about the intentions of employers. Among many
unionists, memories of the destruction of the craft tradition under mass
production in the name of economic necessity and rationality are still
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vivid. More recently, unions in many places have observed an indus
trial restructuring process that was above all aimed at "doing more
with less"—less labor, that is. The training efforts that accompanied
this were too often intimately linked with downsizing, speed-up,
unemployment, and intensification of work to offer strategic promise
from a union perspective. Moreover, the frequent and conspicuous
emphasis on "social" and "attitudinal" skills, especially in firms and
sectors that have gone through the trauma of downsizing, is bound to
raise suspicions that employers' real objective in training is the restora
tion of unquestioned managerial prerogative. And are there not enough
cases where "retraining" or "further training" are no more than a cover
for outright de-skilling? Or where alleged skill needs in fact serve to
justify the reintroduction of discretionary wage differentials?
In the burgeoning "new industrial relations" rhetoric (for a more
moderate version, see Heckscher 1988), all of this alleged to have
changed recently. Employers are said to "need" high skills—as well as
"good industrial relations" in a participatory work organization
because of fundamental changes in their competitive environment. As
markets and technology allegedly force employers into high-wage and
high-skill production—turning them into "good employers" as a matter
of economic self-interest—the implication seems to be that there is no
longer a need for unions to impose benevolent labor practices through
mobilization and application of collective political power. Now it is
suggested, and not just by traditional unions foes, that unions can and
should instead concentrate their efforts on the implementation of such
changes as economic restructuring, modernization, and flexibility,
thereby finally taking on productive rather than merely distributive
functions and moving from conflict to cooperation as their main new
source of influence and organizational status.
Union reluctance to embrace tripartite cooperation on training as a
central new industrial relations subject ultimately derives from its
unclear implications for the role of unions and the structure of indus
trial relations in general. In the following, I wish to argue that popular
images of a harmonious "new industrial relations" based on common
interests in high skills are dangerously simplistic—mixing truths and
delusions, profound insights and business school rhetoric, in an almost
perfect melange. The principal flaw here is a misconstrued relationship
between productive cooperation and distributive conflict, or between
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cooperative policy and adversarial politics, suggesting that the benevo
lent market pressures that give rise to "flexible specialization" signal
the obsolescence of struggles over and for power. This is not just a mis
reading of the evidence which, as will be illustrated in more detail,
supports the old insight that conflict and cooperation not only do not
preclude, but often in fact presuppose, each other. In addition, by
implying that unions that care about productive concerns can be no
more than agents of management-determined economic necessities, it
also deters unions from constructive and creative rethinking of present,
primarily distributional policies. The point I would like to make here is
that one can fully agree with the proposition that unions should
embrace skill formation as the centerpiece of a new, cooperative, and
productivistic strategy, and at the same time insist on unions' need for
a strong, independent power base giving them, just as in the past, a
capacity to impose rules and obligations on employers that they would
not voluntarily obey or accept. I will argue that the latter no less than
the former is in fact an indispensable condition for a successful joint
union-management strategy of industrial upskilling, even from the per
spective of governments and employers. To do this, I begin with a brief
general discussion of the relationship between unionism and the sphere
of production.
Unions and the Supply Side
Mainstream unions in the postwar period have almost universally
conceived of themselves as agents of distributive and redistributive
politics, not of production. As such, they were reluctant to discuss their
activities in terms of their impact on, or their contribution to, efficiency
and productivity—and indeed usually such discussions were forced
upon them by employers, conservative governments, and hostile aca
demics. Nevertheless, the ideological self-stylization of unions as
exclusively devoted to distributive concerns,1 enabling them to decline
direct responsibility for the well-being of national economies and indi
vidual enterprises, was not only historically new but also factually
incorrect. This was because, through their very concentration on distri
bution, unions in the Keynesian-Fordist world of postwar Social
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Democracy contributed to economic performance both by more or less
explicitly accepting managerial prerogative at the workplace, and by
helping stabilize aggregate demand and increase the economy's pro
pensity to spend at the macro level. In fact, unions' very power in dis
tributive politics was conditional on the productive functions that their
emphasis on distribution performed for the economy as a whole; and it
was only because of these that unionism could come to be regarded by
governments and employers as serving not only particularistic but also
general interests.2
Today the Keynesian configuration is history (Skidelski 1979). For
many reasons, the critical problems of the economy have migrated
from the macro to the micro level, from the demand to the supply side,
from the amount of output to its structure—and from distribution to
production. In the process modern unionism has been thrown into dis
array. Having comfortably located themselves in the distributive poli
tics of macroeconomic demand management, unions are now faced
with an apparently irreversible breakdown of the felicitous conver
gence of particularistic interest representation and the promotion of the
general interest that had in the Keynesian period sustained both their
institutional position and the economy.
Why do unions typically have such a hard time asserting themselves
in the changed political economy of the 1980s and 1990s? The supply
side has been called the "kingdom of the bourgeoisie" (Przeworski and
Wallerstein 1982, p. 59). At first glance, production requires above all
cooperation and compliance, not conflict and resistance. Likewise,
structural change and industrial adjustment have to be responsive to
market conditions; if they are driven or constrained by distributional
politics, the result is all-too-often disastrous. Moreover, unlike the
demand side which is governed by politicians, the supply side and the
microeconomics of individual enterprises are run by managers; while
politicians are subject to a similar set of incentives and strategic imper
atives as union leaders, and therefore are often sympathetic with them,
managers are not. Also, the micro level is a world, not only of diverse
conditions in different sectors and workplaces, but also of competitive
market pressures. Unions that get entangled in these may lose their
capacity to impose general rules on the economy as a whole, find their
internal politics and their organizations fragmented by divergent mem
ber interests, and run the risk of being torn apart by identification of
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their members with the competitive needs and interests of their
employers.
Not that there was, even in an orthodox view, no place at all for
unions in an economy driven from its supply side. Today unions are
again and again invited to "cooperate" with management in restructur
ing, in rebuilding competitiveness, improving quality, increasing pro
ductivity, and other efforts. But typically such cooperation is not meant
to entail much more than union leaders explaining to their membership
why it is necessary to comply with whatever management determines
is required—for example, more training and retraining. The rewards
held out for such cooperation are improved economic performance,
with an uncertain share of the benefits accruing to union members, and
perhaps management absention from trying to break unions and run the
workplace unilaterally. Indeed not a small number of union officials all
over the western world today pursue cooperative policies for exactly
these reasons, and for no others. Correspondingly, unions in stronger
industries or with a more secure organizational base often prefer not to
get involved in a kind of cooperation that seems to offer them essen
tially no other role than that of subordinate agents of managementdetermined economic, or "strategic," necessities.
Drawing on training as my example, I argue that just as in the past
on the demand side, there are today on the supply side numerous
opportunities for unions to combine independent, powerful representa
tion of member interests with a pursuit of general social and economic
interests. Exploring such opportunities indeed requires cooperative
policies and strategies. But the type of cooperation needed here is far
from passive acceptance of managerial decisions or self-limitation of
unions to the implementation of them. Quite to the contrary, forceful
intervention in, and regulation of, managerial behavior are required,
with unions potentially and eventually appropriating, through collec
tive political action, a significant share of the responsibility for produc
tive performance. This is so, and indeed cooperation is necessary in the
sense that it is competitively superior to managerial unilateralism,
because the supply side of a modern industrial economy is a kingdom
of the bourgeoisie only on the surface. In reality, it is rather a magic
kingdom full of paradoxes and contradictions, the most important of
which is that the king cannot properly govern, either in his own interest
or in that of his subjects, unless he is himself governed by these—a
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king who needs to be constrained by a powerful citizenry in order to be
able to accomplish what he would like to accomplish; a king, as a pris
oner of his passions, faces dilemmas that he can solve only if he is
compelled to do so by others.
Skills and Effective Supply

Union involvement in skill formation may well be the successor in
the post-Keynesian political economy to what wage formation was for
unions under Keynesianism, being as important and performing the
same functions for them. Understanding the politics and institutional
dynamics of training constitutes a major step towards a theory of effec
tive supply to succeed older theories of effective demand, and may help
unions adjust their position in the political economy to new conditions
and realities. In training as well as, before, in demand stabilization, the
possibility for unions to perform a useful function for both their mem
bers and the society at large derives from the fact that their oppo
nents—capitalists or management—are confronted with vexing
dilemmas between their collective long-term and their individual
short-term interests. In the Keynesian world, this was the dilemma
between the need for high and stable purchasing power and the desire
to cut costs. The solution was cooperation between employers, forced
upon them by unions through the exercise of collective power in indus
trial conflict, and often also by governments through legal intervention.
More specifically, unions imposed on employers a more or less uni
form and rigid wage pattern, thereby taking wages out of competition
and insuring investors against the downward spirals in purchasing
power that may result from competitive cost-cutting. In this way, col
lective action of workers created the stable and growing product mar
kets that enterprises in the era of mass production needed to invest and
grow.
In a market economy, training poses similar problems for employers
on the supply side to that of aggregate demand stabilization on the
demand side, and it offers similar opportunities to unions to build a
base of independent power. What wage bargaining was for distribu
tional unionism, training may become for unions working on and
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through the production side of the economy and making their peace
with it: an opportunity for conflictual cooperation, or cooperation
through conflict; for redistribution in the general interest; and for deep
involvement of unions in the management of an advanced industrial
economy and society. In short, this is because:
1. In certain growing but highly competitive product markets, a rich
supply of skills, and especially of broad, experientially based general
work skills, constitutes perhaps the most important source of competi
tive advantage for firms.
2. The skills that are most needed in such markets are of a kind that
can be generated only with the active involvement of employers. This
is because such skills are most likely to be generated through workbased learning in close proximity to the work process, and clearly not
in schools.
3. While the acquisition of today's critical skills requires the utiliza
tion of workplaces for nonwork purposes, most employers, if left to
their own devices, will not do enough for skill formation, in part
because of individually unsolvable problems of calculating expected
returns on investment, and in part because in an open labor market
skills are, in an important sense, collective, or public, goods (Becker
1975).
4. Unions, if properly supported by public policy, have the capacity
to make employers train, and may well develop the motivation to do
so.
I have elaborated these points elsewhere (Streeck 1989). For the
present purpose, I would like to confine myself to a few selective
observations.
The Relationship Between Modern Technology,
Work Organization, and Skills

Modern technology is less than instructive with respect to the skills
needed to operate it (Brodner 1990; OECD 1988). The reason is that
microelectronic circuitry can support radically different patterns of
work organization. Vastly increased capacities to process and transmit
information allow for centralization of control and differentiation of
tasks far beyond what has been possible only a decade ago. At the
same time, they also enable organizations to delegate decisions to flex-
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ible subunits with integrated, overlapping functions, so as to respond
better to more complex and specific demands from their environment.
Different patterns of work organization give rise to different skill
needs. A centralized and functionally differentiated organization
requires a small number of highly skilled employees located in stafflike departments remote from the actual production process, and a
large number of unskilled or semiskilled operators with narrowly spe
cialized tasks waiting to be eliminated by automation. By comparison,
a decentralized and functionally integrated work organization will
have short hierarchies and will require a relatively even distribution of
skills.
Beliefs about a trend towards upgrading work in modern production
systems, about urgent needs for improvements in initial and further
training, about a "skill gap" in the workforce, or about skills as a cru
cial resource for international competitiveness are all premised on the
assumption that in the future, most productive work will be done in
less centralized and less functionally differentiated organizations. To
the extent that firms will be compelled to exploit the potential of
microelectronic information technology for decentralizing and reinte
grating work tasks, it is argued that they will have to rely on a large
supply among their workforce of a combination of cognitive-technical,
attitudinal, and social skills that together form the basis for what may
be called "decentralized competence"—where competence means both
the organizational autonomy and the individual ability of workers to
make correct and responsible decisions embedded in and related to the
context of the organization at large.
The Relationship Between Product Markets,
Product Strategies, and Productive Flexibility

While the skill needs of employers using new technology depend on
how employers choose to organize work, that choice, in turn, is related
to the product market in which a firm operates. Decentralized compe
tence seems to be particularly conducive to, or outright required for,
small-batch production or customized production of goods or services
designed to fit the specific needs of individual clients. This is because
decentralized competence provides organizations with a high degree of
internal flexibility in general and a capacity for fast retooling in panic-
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ular, i.e., for switching from one product, or batch of products, to
another.
Producing a diverse and changing range of products at a high qual
ity level requires not only a strong engineering capacity that allows for
a high rate of product innovation. It also demands close interaction
between the organization and its customers, as well as between differ
ent organizational functions such as marketing and product engineer
ing, or product engineering and production. For this to be possible,
employees in different parts of the organization must be able to under
stand each other's job, and sometimes to substitute for one another.
That is, their qualifications must overlap (Gustavsen 1986). Moreover,
rapid product change is facilitated by work groups integrating, like
small firms, a wide range of tasks and thereby becoming more inde
pendent from concurrent decisions or supporting activities of differen
tiated, functionally specialized units. This calls for duplication of skills
across organizational subunits. Productive flexibility thus necessitates
redundant (i.e., overlapping or duplicated) organizational capacities
that can be economically sustained only if other overheads, like quality
control, supply management, or worker supervision, are cut—which
again demands integration of previously separate, specialized tasks in
front-line production work.
Overall, it appears that today's product markets place a premium on
customization (Piore and Sabel 1984), and that firms that are flexible
enough to engage in small-batch or customized production can com
mand higher profit margins, are less vulnerable in their market posi
tion, and are likely to enjoy more long-term stability. Ultimately, this is
based on the experience that in the highly competitive 1970s and 1980s
firms, or national economies, that were capable of offering more diver
sified and customized products fared better than more traditional pro
ducers of standardized mass products. There is some disagreement as
to why this should have been the case, to what extent product markets
have really changed, and how large the new markets for what has been
called "diversified quality production" (Streeck 1991) actually are.
What seems clear, however, is that the economic attraction for employ
ers of small-batch or customized production is often conditional on the
prevailing wage level in a given country or region—firms that can
bring down their wages far enough may have the alternative to survive
as mass producers. The problem is that in a more and more global
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economy, mass markets tend to be increasingly taken over by produc
ers from newly industrializing countries where wages are so low that
firms in old industrial countries may, for all kinds of reasons, find it
impossible to compete.3
In addition, it seems that the distinction between mass and custom
ized markets is more fluid than is often believed. Given the productive
flexibilities made possible by information technology, especially in
combination with a work organization that emphasizes decentralized
competence, small-batch producers and customizers are often able to
transform mass markets into markets for more customized products, as
mass producers in the course of industrialization transformed craft
markets into mass markets. This is because high productive flexibility
makes it possible to narrow the cost differential between customized,
or semicustomized, and mass production to a point where the (still)
higher price of nonstandardized goods or services is compensated by
their better match of the customer's individual needs. To the extent that
advances in customized and semicustomized production methods
make this possible, mass markets shrink and differentiated quality mar
kets grow.
In sum, as product markets fragment, the market a firm serves
becomes increasingly subject to "strategic choice." Simultaneously, as
technologies become more undefined and malleable, the products that
are produced with them, and the organization of work that surrounds
them, are less determined than in the past by a technology's intrinsic
properties; they, too, have to be strategically chosen. Given existing
technologies and demand structures, a firm can in principle aspire to be
either a quality-competitive producer of customized goods with a flexi
ble, fluid, and decentralized work organization, employing highly
skilled workers at a high wage, or an efficient price-competitive pro
ducer of standardized goods with a centralized and formalized organi
zational structure, unskilled labor, low wages, and high-wage
dispersion (see Carnevale 1991; CSAW 1990).
The Institutional Sources of Skill Use
and Skill Development

The long controversy on the direction of skill development under
capitalism can now by and large be considered settled. Whether or not
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employers prefer de-skilled over skilled labor cannot, in Bravermanian
fashion, be decided deductively and once and for all. The question can
sensibly be answered only when placed in the context of wage-setting
mechanisms, the regulation of employment contracts, patterns of work
organization, styles of technology use, and firms' strategic product
market decisions (Sorge and Warner 1988). Tbday managerial choices
between downskilling and upskilling are clearly not driven by technol
ogy as such; microelectronic circuitry can be used for cutting costs by
eliminating skills and human intervention, as well as for increasing
product quality and variety by enriching the productive capacities of
well-trained workers. Downskilling presupposes, among other things,
downward flexibility and wide dispersion of wages, enabling employ
ers to adjust wages to relatively declining labor productivity, as well as
high numerical flexibility of employment, permitting rapid adjustment
of labor input to market fluctuations and making it unnecessary to pro
vide for workers' internal redeployability through training. By compar
ison, rigid and high wages, an egalitarian wage structure, limited
access of firms to external labor markets, and limitations on the
deployment of new technology for "rationalization"—by making it
impossible for firms to be profitable in mass markets for standardized,
price-competitive products and forcing them to try and serve differen
tiated, quality-competitive markets—tend to forbid downskilling and
instead induce firms to raise the skill level of their workforce.
The Importance and the Difficult Economics
of Work-Based Learning
Consensus is growing that today's advanced work skills are best
acquired at or near the workplace (for the United States, see OTA
1990). Workplace-based training, where it is up to its new task, is quite
different from traditional on-the-job training. Its task is to impart, for
the mass of the workforce subject to easy, flexible hiring and firing,
cheap, narrow, workplace-specific skills supplementing the general
skills produced in public educational institutions. The growing need to
use the workplace for training purposes is related to the fact that with
fast-changing and highly flexible technology, and with fast product
turnover, work routines can never become so established that execu
tion can be neatly separated from conception. Work in such environ-
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ments amounts to continuous experimentation with, and permanent
"debugging" of, new processes and machine setups. On the part of
operators, this requires, in addition to high cognitive skills (literacy
and numeracy), an intuitive feel for the work that can only be gained
from experience, as well as a range of motivational, attitudinal, and
social skills that cannot be adequately developed outside "real work"
production situations with their pressures and constraints. This is one
reason why countries like Japan and Germany, where most industrial
skill formation takes place in work settings, are so advantaged by their
human capital endowment. Put in more general terms, the skills
required for advanced industrial competitiveness are most likely to be
available where it is possible to transform the workplace into a place of
learning in addition to a place of work (i.e., to place a large share of the
training burden on firms and managements and make them accept the
utilization of the enterprise not just for production but also for skill for
mation).
Mainstream labor economics proceeds from the seminal insight that
in an open labor market, returns on investment in general skills cannot
be internalized by individual firms since such skills are transferable
from one employer to another. This is why such skills will not be pro
duced unless the costs are borne by the worker as an individual or as a
taxpayer (i.e., in the latter case, by the general public). Keeping expen
diture on and responsibilities for general and specific skills apart is
greatly simplified if general skills are taught outside the workplace in
specialized training organizations—schools—while specific skills are
generated at the workplace. To the extent that the workplace is used to
produce general skills, which is not likely to be typical, workers must
be willing to accept a pay cut equivalent to the cost of the general train
ing they receive, or the government must reimburse employers for their
expenses. The first solution presupposes that general training can
indeed be paid for out of a share of a worker's wage during the training
period; both assume that the costs and returns of training at the work
place can be reliably established.
All these assumptions have come under heavy pressure. As has been
pointed out, there is for a variety of reasons a fundamental school fail
ure with respect to the formation of general work skills. As a result, to
the extent that an economy depends for its competitiveness on high
skills, a growing share of its general training effort has to be carried out
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at its workplaces. Typically, the costs of such training are high and can
be recovered by individual employers only over a long period far
exceeding the time of training, and with some reasonable commitment
by workers not to move to another employer. The benefits of work
place training for employers inevitably become vulnerable to being
pirated by competitors. Unlike previous types of market failure, this
problem cannot be remedied by unilateral public provision, since that
fails to produce the desired type of skills.
Moreover, the exact costs of workplace training defy conventional
accounting and can therefore not easily be reimbursed. Workplace
learning is optimally effective in a group-based or team-centered work
organization that is more open and "porous" than what traditional
industrial engineering prescribes. While this may in one sense increase
costs, or at least make costs less easy to detect, it may at the same time
engender quality improvements and productivity increases. To this
extent, workplace training may pay for itself. In any case, an offer by
the public sector to pay employers for general training at the workplace
is likely to encourage all kinds of "creative accounting." Also, employ
ers may feel induced to rely on more traditional, classroom-style train
ing, the costs of which are easier to establish. The inevitable
conclusion is that adequate utilization of the workplace as a learning
site requires that employers pay a significant share of the costs of gen
eral training.
The difficult economics of workplace training require public inter
vention of a kind that makes unilateral provision look simple by com
parison. The assumption by employers of responsibility for training in
workplace-unspecific skills, as appears optimal for competitive perfor
mance, demands effective imposition of social obligations to train, as
a substitute for insufficient individual market incentives and as a way
of taking training costs out of competition. In open labor markets,
employers competing with each other will always be under a tempta
tion to "cheat" by not investing in general training and hiring skilled
workers from their competitors. What is more, the mere prospect that
others may behave in this way is likely to deter employers from train
ing even if the result will be a general skill shortage. Societies that
have at their disposal institutional or cultural mechanisms by which to
oblige firms to cooperate in training are likely to enjoy competitive
advantages as they will be able to protect their firms from the dysfunc-
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tional consequences of market-rational behavior for the production of
skills as collective goods. The governance of workplace training, like
that of workplace relations and the employment contract in general, is
best assigned to legally supported and facilitated joint regulation
between management and labor at the point of production. The same
reasons that speak for collective bargaining as an alternative to both
managerial unilateralism and direct government intervention in the
workplace also speak for an orderly sharing of responsibility for gov
erning the workplace as a place of learning.
Union Policies on Training: From
Consumption to Investment
Unions in advanced industrial countries differ widely in their atti
tudes towards training. The spectrum extends from outright hostility
among radical unions of unskilled workers (as in parts of the Commu
nist French CGT), to indifferent lip service to the idea of shared, public
responsibility for skill upgrading; and to long-standing support for, and
involvement in, initial and continuous training (e.g., in Denmark or
Germany). However, even where unions have accepted training as a
current concern, there usually is still a long way to embracing it as a
core subject of union strategy.
This is not only because there is a temptation for unions that support
training to do so in the traditional framework of distributive politics,
conceiving of training as a basically consumptive nonwage benefit.
More important, training tends to be regarded by many unionists as an
investment employers make out of economic self-interest, as required
by technology and product market conditions. To this, the principal
modus operand! of unionism—the creation of entitlements for work
ers—does not seem to apply. As long as it is assumed that "employers
know what they are doing" (i.e., that product market signals are suffi
ciently instructive for employers to "do what is needed" on training),
there is simply no reason for unions as unions to expend scarce bar
gaining power on making employers train. For this to make sense,
union confidence in employers' ability to act with economic rationality
must be less than complete. An active union policy on training, in other
words, presupposes that the limited capacities of the self-proclaimed
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king of the supply side to act in his own interest are thoroughly appre
ciated.4
A positive union policy on training may also take off from the
insight that advanced skills require investment not just by employers
but also by workers, and that such investment is indeed more likely if
supported by negotiated entitlements—albeit, of course, to invest
rather than consume. More generally, the opening for unions becoming
agents of a more-than-distributive training policy lies in the incom
pleteness, as it were, of the human resource investment functions of
both employers and workers—being due to a lack of resources on the
part of the latter, and the inherent limits of rational return-on-investment calculations for the provision of work-based training in high,
broad, experiential skills on the part of the former. Here as elsewhere,
gaps in the instructive capacity of product markets and technology
have to be filled, and conflicts between individual and collective ratio
nality overcome, by institutional rules and social norms enabling ratio
nal economic actors to act in their rational economic interest
Union Intervention in Training

Independent union intervention in cooperative training and human
resource policies must combine the imposition of institutional con
straints on managements that foreclose low-skill, low-wage paths of
industrial adjustment, with the creation of institutional opportunities
for managements to pursue successfully a high-skill and high-wage
policy. Constraints and opportunities must be built simultaneously;
while the former without the latter suffocates economic performance,
the latter without the former results in a dual economy with widely
divergent conditions and performance levels, and very likely an underutilization of productive opportunities due to unchecked temptations
for employers to defect from more demanding high-skill and highwage production patterns.
How specifically unions can deploy their political and organiza
tional capacities to build the constraints and opportunities required to
make employers train, and what those constraints and opportunities
could be in a given economic and political setting, depends on the situ-
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ation and, of course, the creativity of the actors involved.5 What can
generally be said is that cooperation on training is not only compatible
with conflict, but indeed may require a conflictual capability of unions
for its success. Examples where rigorous pursuit of, in part quite tradi
tional, union objectives—if necessary against employer resistance—
complements and makes effective a cooperative strategy on training
are:6
1. Defense of high wages and a relatively flat wage structure, so as
to foreclose the option of low-wage, low-skill employment. High and
downwardly rigid wages force employers to raise the productivity of
their workers to match the given price of their labor, rather than
depress wages to the level of workers' given marginal productivities.
The more flexible the wage, the lower the interest of employers in
training. The higher the wage spread, the more selective employers'
training investment will be.7 Given the inherent indeterminacy of skill
needs and the benefits of a rich skill environment for advanced com
petitiveness, highly selective and targeted human resource investment
is, almost by definition, likely to be economically suboptimal.
2. Insistence on obligatory, standardized workplace training curric
ula that firms have to follow if they want to train for a particular skill or
occupation. These curricula must be broadly defined, so as to prevent
overspecialization and provide the ground for future, further training.
Standardized curricula also serve the important function of enabling
workers to quit and carry their skills with them. This ability constitutes
a major source of union and worker power that can be defended only if
training regimes are centralized.8 Moreover, by barring employers
from generating skills that are too workplace-specific, generally bind
ing curricula provide the constraint as well as the opportunity to pro
duce exactly the kind of broad, polyvalent skills that they need most.
3. Use of the union workplace organization, or whatever structure of
worker representation may exist at the workplace, to ensure that train
ing follows the standardized curriculum and neither becomes too
workplace-specific nor is absorbed in productive work. Without an
effective, on-the-ground enforcement mechanism, unions and workers
cannot live with a high differential between training and skilled wages.
Effective union supervision of workplace training, ensuring that it
remains just that, is an important safeguard against the temptation for
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management to extract more productive work from trainees, thereby
neglecting their firm's own longer-term interests.
4. Defense, or extension, of legal and other provisions that protect
employment continuity and stability. Employers who can satisfy their
skill needs and change the skill composition of their workforce by fir
ing old and hiring new workers will have less incentive to train than
employers who face fewer employment rigidities. An economy where
employers have the option of turning to the external labor market for
skills, instead of training or retraining their existing workforce, will
tend to suffer from a general skill deficit This is so not least since the
expectation on the part of employers that their competitors will seek
external rather than internal adjustment constitutes a strong disincen
tive to train, even in periods of obvious skill shortages and even for
firms that feel severely constrained by these.
5. Imposition of a flat wage regime with the few wage grades and
job classifications, which rewards knowledge rather than activities per
formed. Wage structures of this kind allow for easy redeployment of
workers, which affords firms a degree of internal flexibility that makes
the constraints of external employment rigidity bearable. Even more
important, with the right kind of pay system workers will not only be
willing to acquire skills but will also accept internal mobility—in part
because it helps them learn.9
6. Active pursuit, as an objective in its own right, of an anti-Taylorist policy of work organization, aimed at imposing on employers
negotiated obligations to move towards broad job descriptions, a low
division of labor, long work cycles, and reintegration of tasks. In addi
tion to improving working conditions, such a policy contributes to
making low-skilled labor unusable by eliminating the type of jobs for
which it was in the past typically hired. Coupled with external employ
ment rigidities and internal employment flexibility, de-Taylorization of
work organization thus constrains as well as induces employers to
invest in training.10
7. Negotiation of training and retraining plans with employers, set
ting a mutually agreed human resource policy for enterprises, regions,
or industries. Such agreements would have to create enforceable enti
tlements for workers to be trained and retrained at the workplace on a
current basis, not just in emergencies, and under general as well as
workplace-unspecific curricula. Given that firms lack instructive eco-
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nomic criteria as to what kind of skills and how many they need; and
given the advantages quality-competitive firms, industries, and regions
derive from a rich supply of excess skills, there will be ample space to
accommodate egalitarian demands for underendowed groups in the
workforce to be included in training. In fact, it will be through negoti
ated entitlements to learn at work that unions will contribute most to
the broad and unspecific skill formation that firms in demanding mar
kets need but find so hard to generate on their own.
A Strategic Perspective?

Unions today have a unique chance to return in a productive way to
their craft heritage (Piore 1986). Craft unions were producers of skills
as well as sellers. Up to the present day, there are industries in the
United States where high standards of training at the workplace, and
indeed the very provision of such training, depend on strong craft
union presence and disappear with the decline of unionization.
But it is also true that in their distributional battles with Bravermanian employers, craft unions often redefined skill in terms of exclusive
rights of their members to narrowly demarcated jobs. 11 In that process,
unions' contribution to the production of skills began to take second
place to the defense of craft prerogatives. Where craft unionism, or
important elements of it, survived, it all-too-often deteriorated, under
the pressure of employers' de-skilling strategies, into a reactive
defense of status and privilege. In such cases training lost its productivist meanings: at the worst, it became reserved for small groups of
carefully selected apprentices, with restricted access serving to main
tain a high differential between skilled and unskilled wages, and turned
into an increasingly well-paid, waiting period for accession to the labor
aristocracy, without much of a meaningful curriculum. 12 This, in turn,
made it easier for employers to attack unions as special interest groups
impeding both industrial progress and fair access to good jobs. Deunionization and the destruction of apprenticeship can thus be pre
sented by employers as efficient as well as equitable.
In a perverse alliance, then, industrial employers bent on de-skilling
and craft unions narrowly representing only their members, often
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enough played into each other's hands. The dismal results were unhap
pily reinforced when industrial unionism appeared and found in deskilling the promise of a homogeneous workforce easy to organize in
inclusive unions around distributional concerns and without entangle
ment in the sphere of production. This configuration prepared the
ground for the postwar compromise between capital and labor, in
which the latter agreed to leave production to management and accom
plish its egalitarian objectives through distributive collective bargain
ing and social policy. With the ascent of Fordism, training was no
longer much of a concern.
There is nothing in the present return of skills onto the industrial
relations agenda that would compel unions to give up the egalitarian
values they inherited from industrial unionism. In fact, in a world in
which redundant skills may be necessary for competitive economic
success, the two traditions of unionism may now be able to converge in
a policy of negotiated general upskilling, conducted and enforced in
cooperative conflict with employers and in creative partnership with
governments, and indeed much facilitated by the internal organiza
tional dynamics of industrial unionism. Who will be king on the supply
side is far from being a foregone conclusion.
NOTES
*I am grateful to Joel Rogers for constructive comment. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. In reality, of course, the matter was more complicated. In all western countries in the post
war period, there were sporadic demands by unions for involvement in managerial decisions.
Mainstream unionists typically had a hard time deciding if these were a right-wing sellout to cap
ital, or a Communist attack on the market economy and, with it, free collective bargaining. The
mainstream Nur-Gewerkschqfter, to use Marx's term, hated both. To keep his distance from the
inscrutable ambivalence and the puzzling political contradictions of productivism, right or left, he
would insist that the union's proper concern was fundamentally different from management's; that
the two were confounded only at the union's and, perhaps, the economy's and democracy's peril;
and that while management was in charge of efficiency, or economic issues, the union was to look
after equity, or the social questions. Coexisting with this strand of unionism were other, older stra
tegic orientations that sometimes looked "cooperative," or "yellow," and sometimes "radical," or
"red." Their difference from mainstream centrism was that they sought an active role for unions in
the efficient organization of production. In some countries, these in fact became the mainstream:
the "left" version in Sweden, the "right" version in Japan, and a peculiar blend of the two in Ger
many (viz. that chameleon-like institution, codetermination). The matter is made even more con
fusing by the fact that rhetoric and behavior did not always coincide, so that one found, for
example, distribution-minded centrists supporting wage moderation in the name of economic
growth.
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2. For the workplace, Freeman and Medoff (1984) have produced econometric evidence that
unions, even in the United States and in contradiction of received wisdom, increase productivity.
For more recent confirmation, see Mishel and Voos (1991).
3. Firms in high-wage areas that do not want, or are unable, to develop productive flexibility
may also, of course, relocate to low-wage countries.
4. Again, this does not appear to be a clear-cut left-right issue. Confidence in the superior eco
nomic wisdom of owners and managers can be found both among "cooperative" unionists for
whom cooperation consists of rallying their members behind management-defined economic
inevitabilities, and among "arms-length," "adversarial" opponents of cooperation who want to
confine unions exclusively to extracting distributive concessions. The latter position implies that
the economic basis for such concessions can be safely produced and reproduced without union
"involvement," i.e., by management acting on its own.
5. A different but related question that I will not address here is how unions with weak or
declining organizational capacities, for example in the United States, can use involvement in skill
formation to build or protect such capacities. Much depends in this respect on whether employers,
and perhaps the state, perceive existing skill deficits as so critical, and their own means to deal
with them as so limited, that they are willing to pay a political price to whoever may be able and
willing to help them out. This would imply that if unions could come up with an effective contri
bution to skill formation that only they can make (or that they can make better than others), they
could in principle "sell" that contribution in the same way and for the same kind of returns as they
have in the past sold their more traditional "product"—peace at the workplace. As Joel Rogers
reminds me, unions thrive if their policies satisfy three conditions: they must be advantageous to
their members and possible members; they must give employers something that they want, but
cannot get on their own; and they must make a visible contribution to the "common good." Pro
motion of effective skill formation, especially at the workplace, may very well do all of the above.
6. As will easily be recognized, my list draws in large measure on the German experience
(Hilton 1991; Lane 1989; Streeck et al. 1987). However, this is only because I happen to know
that experience better than others. To the extent that there may be lessons from the German case
for other countries, these would consist of a number of general principles rather than concrete
institutional cookbook recipes. I believe that most of those principles have to do with the insuffi
ciency of a market mode of skill formation; the crucial importance of using the workplace as a
place of learning; the dangers of off-loading training to the state; the need, resulting from this, for
mechanisms generating social obligations for employers to train, thereby transcending the limits
of a liberal-voluntaristic training regime; and the potentially extremely productive role unions can
play in generating such obligations. On the basis of what I think I have learned from the German
case, I would be inclined to predict that where such principles are neglected, skill formation and
advanced industrial competitiveness will lag behind German (and Japanese) standards.
7. Alow wage spread at a high overall wage level induces employers to distribute their human
resource investment more evenly. This presupposes relatively low training wages, especially for
young people—which may or may not be difficult to concede for unions. The narrower the gap
between training wages and skilled wages, the larger the productive component of a trainee's
activities at the workplace, as distinguished from its investive, training component
8. While this might appear alien in an American context, it is not so at all. Not long ago
apprenticeships were a major mechanism of skill formation in the United States. Their rapid
decline in the recent past derives from the combined effects of de-industrialization, declining real
wages, and de-unionization, not from a basic incompatibility of externally regulated and stan
dardized workplace-based training with the American culture.
9. While a low wage spread above a high wage floor creates an incentive for employers to
train, it may constitute a disincentive for workers to learn. The latter seems to have been one of

Training and the New Industrial Relations

187

the unanticipated consequences of Swedish "solidary wage policy." Unions taking an active role
in skill formation will have to search for a "saddle point" where wage differentials are low enough
for employers to be willing to provide training to the workforce at large, and high enough for
workers to justify the effort of undergoing training. (To make remaining wage differentials effec
tive with respect to training, they should to the greatest possible extent be based on knowledge.)
One would expect that the ideal level of wage differentiation should be found somewhere between
the extremely high American and the extremely low Swedish wage spread.
10. To advance more comprehensive job demarcations as well as facilitate the move towards
an ability-based payment system, unions could negotiate higher wages for workers who have
undergone training, regardless of whether or not their additional qualifications are actually used.
This will be a strong incentive for managements to reorganize work in such a way that the new
skills can in fact be utilized—which will in turn make it easier for unions to push for a less frag
mented work organization. Being forced to use newly generated qualifications by reorganizing
work so as to accommodate them, managements will be educated about the possibilities and
advantages of high-wage and high-skill production, and in this way unions may provide further
training to management in their own long-term interests.
11. That is, where they were given the chance to do so, especially in the Anglo-Saxon coun
tries. For a variety of reasons, the development was quite different in Germany and Scandinavia.
Still, the differences are gradual and not categoric, and at least historically the dynamic described
here was present everywhere.
12. This was the case particularly in Britain where apprenticeship typically deteriorated into
"lime served," at declining pay differentials between skilled workers and apprentices. As a result
it almost completely disappeared.
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